兩職結(jié)構(gòu)改變對管理層兩類代理成本的影響分析
發(fā)布時間:2018-05-09 07:22
本文選題:兩職結(jié)構(gòu)改變 + 直接代理成本; 參考:《當(dāng)代財經(jīng)》2017年09期
【摘要】:兩職結(jié)構(gòu)的科學(xué)設(shè)置及如何降低管理層代理成本,歷來是會計理論界研究的熱點(diǎn)問題。運(yùn)用2010—2014年間的A股上市公司樣本數(shù)據(jù),考察了兩職結(jié)構(gòu)改變對管理層直接代理成本和間接代理成本的影響,以及法治水平對二者關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)作用。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):兩職結(jié)構(gòu)的分權(quán)式改變顯著降低了管理層的直接代理成本和間接代理成本;兩職結(jié)構(gòu)的集權(quán)式改變顯著增加了管理層的直接代理成本,不影響管理層的間接代理成本。進(jìn)一步的分析發(fā)現(xiàn),兩職結(jié)構(gòu)的分權(quán)式改變對管理層直接代理成本和間接代理成本的影響只在法治水平較低地區(qū)的企業(yè)中起作用,即法治水平越低,兩職結(jié)構(gòu)的分權(quán)式改變對管理層兩類代理成本的影響越大;但法治水平不影響兩職結(jié)構(gòu)的集權(quán)式改變與管理層兩類代理成本的關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:How to set up the two-position structure scientifically and how to reduce the cost of management agency has always been a hot issue in the field of accounting theory. Based on the sample data of A-share listed companies from 2010-2014, this paper investigates the influence of the change of two-position structure on the direct agency cost and indirect agency cost of management, as well as the regulative effect of the level of rule of law on the relationship between them. It is found that the decentralization of the two-position structure significantly reduces the direct agency cost and the indirect agency cost of the management, and the centralization of the two-position structure increases the direct agency cost of the management. It does not affect the indirect agency cost of management. Further analysis shows that the effect of the decentralization of the two-position structure on the direct and indirect agency costs of the management only plays a role in the enterprises with a lower level of rule of law, that is, the lower the level of the rule of law, the lower the level of the rule of law. The change of separation of power in the two-position structure has a greater impact on the two types of agency cost of management, but the level of rule of law does not affect the relationship between the centralized change of the two-position structure and the two types of agency cost of management.
【作者單位】: 江西財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計發(fā)展研究中心/會計學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家自然科學(xué)基金項目(71562014)
【分類號】:F275;F832.51
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1 周霞;對代理成本的減少相關(guān)問題的探討[J];財經(jīng)理論與實踐;2001年S1期
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