發(fā)布時間：2018-04-20 10:30

  本文選題：供應鏈金融 + 有追索權保理��； 參考：《南京理工大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：當前,在我國經(jīng)濟持續(xù)穩(wěn)定的發(fā)展過程中,中小企業(yè)發(fā)揮了巨大作用,但中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展卻面臨重重困難。其中資金短缺,融資困難是其發(fā)展道路中最大的阻礙。由于資金約束的限制,中小企業(yè)很難快速健康的發(fā)展,長期發(fā)展下去必將對我國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展產(chǎn)生不利的影響。供應鏈金融的出現(xiàn),為中小企業(yè)的融資難問題帶來了新的解決思路。這種新型靈活的金融融資服務大大緩解了中小企業(yè)融資難的問題,有助于中小企業(yè)獲得所需資金。供應鏈金融融資模式不僅能夠有效地解決中小企業(yè)資金約束問題,而且能夠同時提升供應鏈整體的效益,增強供應鏈整體的競爭能力。當供應商受到資金約束,可基于核心零售商的信用擔保,售讓應收賬款進行保理融資。本文將對保理融資的相關問題進行討論。文章首先研究了有追索權保理融資和無追索權保理融資方式下保理商應收賬款保理融資比例的決策問題。然后,對有追索權保理融資和無追索權保理融資兩種融資模式下,零售商的訂貨量和供應商的批發(fā)價格進行了詳細研究,通過數(shù)學建模的方式,對上述問題進行了定量分析;同時,對于兩種融資模式下的相關決策進行了對比分析研究。最后,本文研究了基于保理融資的收益共享契約模型。對有追索權保理融資和無追索權保理融資兩種融資模式下的收益共享契約進行了探討。通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn):在無追索權保理融資和有追索權保理融資模式下,保理融資利率和損失補償率的提高,會使零售商訂購量降低,供應商批發(fā)價格提高。無追索權保理融資模式下的零售商訂購量在一定情況下小于有追索權保理融資模式下的訂購量,供應商批發(fā)價格在一定情況大于有追索權保理融資模式下的批發(fā)價格。這對于金融機構和供應鏈主體的相關決策具有重要指導意義。另外,基于有追索權保理融資和無追索權保理融資情形下的收益共享契約模型都能夠使零售商處于主導地位的兩級供應鏈達到協(xié)調,并且核心零售商可利于其優(yōu)勢地位使得供應商只能獲得契約約定的最小收益,從而實現(xiàn)供應鏈收益的最大化。
[Abstract]:At present, in the process of sustained and stable economic development in China, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have played a great role, but the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is facing many difficulties. Among them, capital shortage, financing difficulty is the biggest obstacle in its development road. Because of the restriction of capital, it is difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises to develop rapidly and healthily, and the long-term development will inevitably have a negative impact on the economic development of our country. The emergence of supply chain finance has brought new solutions to the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. This new flexible financial service greatly alleviates the financing difficulties of SMEs and helps them to obtain the required funds. The financial financing model of supply chain can not only effectively solve the problem of financial constraints for small and medium-sized enterprises, but also enhance the efficiency of the whole supply chain and enhance the competitiveness of the whole supply chain at the same time. When suppliers are constrained by funds, factoring financing can be made based on the credit guarantee of the core retailer. This paper will discuss the related problems of factoring financing. This paper first studies the decision of factoring financing proportion of factoring accounts receivable with recourse and factoring without recourse. Then, under the two financing modes of recourse factoring financing and non-recourse factoring financing, the order quantity of retailers and the wholesale price of suppliers are studied in detail, and the above problems are analyzed quantitatively by mathematical modeling. At the same time, the paper makes a comparative analysis and research on the related decision-making under the two financing modes. Finally, this paper studies the profit sharing contract model based on factoring financing. This paper discusses the revenue-sharing contract under the two financing modes of recourse factoring financing and non-recourse factoring financing. Through the research, it is found that the increase of factoring financing interest rate and loss compensation rate in the mode of non-recourse factoring financing and recourse factoring financing will reduce the order quantity of retailers and increase the wholesale price of suppliers. The quantity of retailer ordering under the mode of non-recourse factoring financing is smaller than that under the mode of recourse factoring financing under certain circumstances, and the wholesale price of supplier is larger than the wholesale price under the mode of recourse factoring financing. It is of great significance for financial institutions and supply chain players to make relevant decisions. In addition, the revenue-sharing contract model based on recourse factoring financing and non-recourse factoring financing can make the retailers in the dominant two-level supply chain to achieve coordination. And the core retailer can make the supplier obtain the minimum profit as agreed by the contract so as to maximize the profit of the supply chain.
【學位授予單位】：南京理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F832.4

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本文編號：1777394