本文選題：黨組織 + 高管腐敗��； 參考：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：自十八大召開以來,黨和國家反腐力度不斷加強(qiáng),越來越多的腐敗事件被公布,企業(yè)層面的高管腐敗現(xiàn)象越來越受到重視。企業(yè)高管腐敗的出現(xiàn)會損害企業(yè)和投資者的利益,阻礙企業(yè)的發(fā)展,特別是國企高管腐敗的頻繁發(fā)生,對國有資產(chǎn)的保護(hù)和增值提出了挑戰(zhàn)。因此,如何有效抑制高管腐敗行為對企業(yè)的健康發(fā)展以及社會資源的充分利用具有重要的意義。當(dāng)前我國正處于經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期,國有企業(yè)在深化改革的過程中逐漸建立和完善現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的同時(shí),黨委會等企業(yè)黨組織在公司治理中的地位也得到了鞏固和強(qiáng)化。國企黨組織作為國有企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的重要組成部分,在緩解內(nèi)部人控制矛盾,降低代理成本等方面發(fā)揮著重要的作用。關(guān)于國企黨組織參與公司治理與高管腐敗之間的關(guān)系,當(dāng)前鮮有文獻(xiàn)對其進(jìn)行理論分析和實(shí)證研究�；谏鲜隹紤],本文采用理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)相結(jié)合的方法,首先探討了國企黨組織參與公司治理對國有企業(yè)高管腐敗行為產(chǎn)生的影響。其次,本文揭示了國企黨組織在不同治理參與路徑下,其對企業(yè)高管腐敗行為產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響。最后,本文進(jìn)一步考慮治理環(huán)境因素的影響,從企業(yè)控制權(quán)層級和地區(qū)市場化程度兩個(gè)角度出發(fā),探究了企業(yè)在不同治理環(huán)境下,國企黨組織參與公司治理對高管腐敗的抑制作用會發(fā)生怎樣的變化。本文針對國有企業(yè)頻繁出現(xiàn)的高管腐敗現(xiàn)象,以2009-2014年在媒體和年報(bào)上公開報(bào)道出現(xiàn)高管腐敗行為的A股國有上市公司為研究對象,從公司治理機(jī)制的視角出發(fā),考察我國國企黨組織參與公司治理和高管腐敗之間存在的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)我國國企黨組織參與公司治理對企業(yè)高管腐敗行為具有顯著的抑制作用,并且相較于其他治理參與路徑,國企黨組織通過董事會參與公司治理對高管腐敗的抑制作用更加顯著;(2)不同政府控制層級的國有企業(yè),企業(yè)內(nèi)部的黨組織對高管腐敗的抑制作用會有顯著差異,相較于地方國有企業(yè),中央國有企業(yè)黨組織參與公司治理對高管腐敗的抑制作用更為顯著;(3)國企黨組織的治理參與對企業(yè)高管腐敗的抑制作用會受到地區(qū)市場化程度因素的影響,相較于市場化程度高的地區(qū),市場化程度低地區(qū)的國企黨組織參與公司治理對高管腐敗的抑制作用更為顯著。
[Abstract]:Since the 18th National Congress, the anti-corruption efforts of the Party and the state have been strengthened, more and more corruption incidents have been announced, and the corruption of executives at the enterprise level has been paid more and more attention.The appearance of executive corruption will harm the interests of enterprises and investors, hinder the development of enterprises, especially the frequent occurrence of senior executives corruption in state-owned enterprises, which challenges the protection and appreciation of state-owned assets.Therefore, how to effectively restrain the corrupt behavior of executives is of great significance to the healthy development of enterprises and the full utilization of social resources.At present, our country is in the economic transition period, while the state-owned enterprises gradually establish and perfect the modern enterprise system in the process of deepening the reform, the position of the party committee and other enterprise party organizations in the corporate governance has also been consolidated and strengthened.As an important part of the internal governance structure of state-owned enterprises, the Party organization of state-owned enterprises plays an important role in alleviating the contradictions of internal control and reducing agency costs.There are few theoretical analysis and empirical research on the relationship between the participation of state-owned party organizations in corporate governance and executive corruption.Based on the above considerations, this paper uses the method of theoretical analysis and empirical test to explore the influence of the participation of state-owned party organizations in corporate governance on the corrupt behavior of senior executives of state-owned enterprises.Secondly, this paper reveals how the party organizations of state-owned enterprises influence the corrupt behavior of enterprise executives under different ways of governance and participation.Finally, this paper further considers the influence of the environmental factors of governance, starting from the level of enterprise control and the degree of regional marketization, probes into the enterprise in different governance environment.How does the party organization of state-owned enterprises participate in corporate governance to restrain executive corruption?In view of the frequent phenomenon of executive corruption in state-owned enterprises, this paper focuses on the listed A-share companies which publicly reported the corruption of senior executives in the media and the annual newspapers in 2009-2014, starting from the perspective of corporate governance mechanism.This paper examines the relationship between the participation of SOE party organizations in corporate governance and executive corruption.The study found that the participation of state-owned party organizations in corporate governance has a significant inhibitory effect on corporate executives' corrupt behavior, and compared with other paths of governance participation,Party organizations in state-owned enterprises participate in corporate governance through the board of directors to inhibit the corruption of senior executives more significantly. (2) in state-owned enterprises with different levels of government control, there will be significant differences in the inhibitory effects of party organizations within enterprises on the corruption of senior executives.Compared with local state-owned enterprises,The inhibition effect of the participation of the central state-owned enterprise party organization on the executive corruption is more significant than that of the central state-owned enterprise party organization's participation in corporate governance. (3) the inhibition effect of the state-owned party organization's governance participation on the enterprise senior management corruption will be affected by the regional marketization factor.Compared with the regions with high degree of marketization, the party organizations of state-owned enterprises in the low degree of marketization play a more significant role in restraining the corruption of senior executives.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D267;F276.1

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