本文選題：內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露　切入點(diǎn)：投資效率　出處：《蘭州理工大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：2002年美國(guó)SOX法案的頒布對(duì)企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制信息披露產(chǎn)生了重大影響,我國(guó)2008年頒布的《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制基本規(guī)范》和2010年頒布的《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制配套指引》也相繼出臺(tái)了要求上市公司披露包含內(nèi)部控制缺陷在內(nèi)的內(nèi)部控制自我評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告。在資本市場(chǎng)中披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷作為一種有效緩解信息不對(duì)稱的信號(hào)傳遞行為,其產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果受到了國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者的廣泛關(guān)注和研究。企業(yè)在披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷后通過(guò)引發(fā)信號(hào)傳遞,可以有效地緩解經(jīng)營(yíng)治理層面的信息不對(duì)稱,使企業(yè)利益相關(guān)者意識(shí)到企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)治理等層面的漏洞。迫于各利益相關(guān)者施加的有形無(wú)形的壓力,管理層必定會(huì)加大對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)治理等方面的監(jiān)督控制,抑制企業(yè)外部投資者的逆向選擇和企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),使得企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)治理更加公開(kāi)化、透明化,企業(yè)的投資決策得到更好的監(jiān)督和制約,優(yōu)化了企業(yè)有限資金的配置效率,進(jìn)而提高企業(yè)的投資效率。本文基于2012年我國(guó)上市公司內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露由自愿性轉(zhuǎn)入到強(qiáng)制性階段這一現(xiàn)狀,以我國(guó)2010——2014年滬深兩市A股非金融類上市公司數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,結(jié)合信號(hào)傳遞理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、委托代理理論以及投資理論,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了不同融資約束程度下內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率的影響,以及自愿性內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露與強(qiáng)制性內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率的影響差異。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)不受融資約束的企業(yè)在披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷的前一年通常會(huì)投資過(guò)度;受到融資約束的企業(yè)在披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷的前一年通常會(huì)投資不足。(2)不受融資約束的企業(yè)在披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷后一到兩年,投資過(guò)度會(huì)得到緩解;受到融資約束的企業(yè)在披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷后一到兩年,投資不足會(huì)得到緩解。(3)在不受融資約束的企業(yè)中,強(qiáng)制性內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露比自愿性內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露對(duì)過(guò)度投資的緩解作用更強(qiáng);在受到融資約束的企業(yè)中,強(qiáng)制性內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露比自愿性內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露對(duì)投資不足的緩解作用更強(qiáng)。本文的研究拓寬了我國(guó)內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的研究;為評(píng)價(jià)2010年《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制配套指引》頒布實(shí)施后的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果提供了微觀證據(jù)支持。本文的研究結(jié)果有助于政策制定部門完善內(nèi)部控制缺陷披露規(guī)范,強(qiáng)化內(nèi)部控制缺陷強(qiáng)制性披露力度;有助于企業(yè)完善內(nèi)部控制建設(shè),提高企業(yè)投資效率。
[Abstract]:The promulgation of the SOX Act in 2002 has had a great impact on the disclosure of internal control information in enterprises.The basic norms of internal control of enterprises promulgated in 2008 and the supporting guidelines of internal control of enterprises issued in 2010 also require listed companies to disclose internal control self-evaluation reports including internal control defects one after another.The disclosure of internal control defects in the capital market is an effective way to alleviate the information asymmetry, and its economic consequences have been widely paid attention to and studied by scholars at home and abroad.After disclosure of internal control defects, enterprises can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry at the level of management and governance by triggering signal transmission, and make the stakeholders aware of the loopholes in the level of enterprise management and governance.Under the visible and intangible pressure from the stakeholders, the management will strengthen the supervision and control of the enterprise management, and restrain the adverse selection of the external investors and the moral hazard of the management.It makes the management of the enterprise more open and transparent, and the investment decision of the enterprise gets better supervision and restriction, which optimizes the allocation efficiency of the limited capital of the enterprise, and then improves the investment efficiency of the enterprise.Based on the fact that the disclosure of internal control defects in China's listed companies changed from voluntary to mandatory in 2012, this paper takes the data of non-financial A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2010-2014 as a sample, and combines with the theory of signal transmission.The information asymmetry theory, the principal-agent theory and the investment theory empirically test the influence of internal control defect disclosure on the investment efficiency of enterprises under different financing constraints.And the difference between voluntary internal control defect disclosure and mandatory internal control defect disclosure on investment efficiency.This paper finds that: (1) firms that are not subject to financing constraints usually overinvest in the year before disclosure of internal control defects;Enterprises subject to financing constraints usually have insufficient investment in the year before disclosure of internal control defects.) firms that are not subject to financing constraints will have excessive investment mitigated one to two years after disclosure of internal control defects;A year or two after disclosure of deficiencies in internal controls, underinvestment will be alleviated by companies subject to financing constraints.) in enterprises that are not subject to financing constraints,Mandatory internal control defect disclosure has a stronger mitigation effect on overinvestment than voluntary internal control defect disclosure; in enterprises subject to financing constraints,Mandatory internal control defect disclosure is more effective than voluntary internal control defect disclosure in alleviating underinvestment.The research in this paper broadens the research on the economic consequences of the disclosure of internal control defects in China, and provides microcosmic evidence for evaluating the economic consequences after the promulgation and implementation of the "Internal Control supporting guidelines for Enterprises" in 2010.The research results of this paper are helpful for the policy-making department to perfect the internal control defect disclosure standard, to strengthen the internal control defect mandatory disclosure strength, to help the enterprise to perfect the internal control construction, to improve the enterprise investment efficiency.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F275

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