發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-05 18:29

  本文選題：上市公司　切入點(diǎn)：新增投資　出處：《河北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度起源于上個(gè)世紀(jì)的美國,是企業(yè)薪酬激勵(lì)制度的一項(xiàng)巨大創(chuàng)新,能夠有效的激發(fā)員工的工作熱情,縮小所有人與經(jīng)營者之間的目標(biāo)差距。本文以中國證監(jiān)會(huì)于2005年12月31日頒布的《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法(試行)》為背景,以2011年至2015年在滬深上市的實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的A股上市公司為樣本,將規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合,檢驗(yàn)了股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度、激勵(lì)方式以及控股股東的經(jīng)濟(jì)性質(zhì)與上市公司投資規(guī)模之間的關(guān)系。首先,論文闡述了本文的研究背景和研究意義,提出本文的切入點(diǎn)和基本研究方法,通過對(duì)國內(nèi)外股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的回顧,分析了以往研究的不足之處,指出本文的切入點(diǎn)和創(chuàng)新之處。論文對(duì)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)的概念進(jìn)行了界定,包括投資概念、股權(quán)激勵(lì)概念以及相關(guān)概念的拓展;闡述了本文的理論基礎(chǔ),包括委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、人力資本理論以及這些理論對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)和投資決策的作用機(jī)理。接著,對(duì)2011—2015年滬深兩市宣告實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析,本文發(fā)現(xiàn):2011—2015年間,實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司數(shù)量呈增長趨勢(shì);實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的上市公司行業(yè)特征明顯;中小企業(yè)板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板成為實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃主體;上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度普遍較低;限制性股票越來越受到上市公司追捧;定向增發(fā)成為激勵(lì)股票的主要來源。然后,檢驗(yàn)了上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)投資規(guī)模的影響。這部分主要從股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度、激勵(lì)方式和控股股東的經(jīng)濟(jì)性質(zhì)三個(gè)角度,來研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)投資規(guī)模的影響。最后,針對(duì)本文的研究結(jié)論,從宏觀和微觀兩個(gè)層面提出有效實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的相關(guān)建議,希望對(duì)我國上市公司提供一些啟示和思考,以促進(jìn)企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)長期發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive system originated in the last century in the United States, is a great innovation of enterprise's salary incentive system, can effectively stimulate the enthusiasm of the staff, reduced between owner and operator. In this paper, Chinese gap Commission issued in December 31, 2005 "on company equity incentive management (Trial)" as the background from 2011 to 2015, in Shanghai and Shenzhen listed the implementation of equity incentive plan of A sample of A-share listed companies, the combination of normative and empirical research, test of the equity incentive intensity, the relationship between investment incentives and economic nature of controlling shareholders and listed companies. Firstly, this paper elaborates the research background and research meaning, this point of entry and basic research methods, through the review of domestic and foreign equity incentive related literature, analyzes the shortcomings of previous studies, and points out the The starting point of the paper and the innovation. The thesis related to equity incentive concepts, including the concept of investment, expand the equity incentive concept and related concepts; expounds the theoretical basis of this paper, including the principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, the mechanism of human capital theory and the theory about equity incentive and investment decisions then, the status of implementation of equity incentive plans of listed companies from 2011 to 2015 in Shanghai and Shenzhen two city declaration is analyzed, it is found that: 2011 - 2015 years, the number of the implementation of equity incentive plans of listed companies is increasing; the implementation of equity incentive of Listed Companies in the industry characteristics; SME board and the gem to become the main incentive plan implementation equity; equity incentive of listed companies is generally low; the restricted stock is more and more listed companies pursued; private placement for incentive stock The main sources. Then, test the listed company equity incentive effect on corporate investment. This part is mainly from the equity incentive, incentive mode and controlling shareholder of the economic nature of the three aspects, to study the effects of equity incentives on the investment scale. Finally, the conclusion of this paper, put forward relevant proposals for the effective implementation of equity incentive plan from two macro and micro level, hoping to provide some enlightenment and Reflection on China's listed companies, in order to promote enterprises to achieve long-term development.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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