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  本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈　切入點：委托代理　出處：《南京航空航天大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：信息技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展和市場環(huán)境的瞬息變化使得企業(yè)之間的競爭逐漸演變?yōu)閯討B(tài)供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭,在動態(tài)供應(yīng)鏈中成員之間的關(guān)系可以理解成委托代理關(guān)系。在這種委托代理關(guān)系中,代理方為了更好的完成委托方的任務(wù)總是嘗試做各種努力,而在電子商務(wù)和移動互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的大環(huán)境下代理方的這種努力往往是具有溢出效應(yīng)的。伴隨著行為運籌學(xué)的發(fā)展,人們逐漸認識到?jīng)Q策者并非是完全理性,他們不僅關(guān)注自身的收益也關(guān)注其他行為人的收益。當(dāng)考慮代理方的努力具有溢出效應(yīng)時供應(yīng)鏈成員在有限理性的情況下將會如何決策?在努力溢出效應(yīng)方面本文選取渠道商的銷售努力為主要代表,在決策者的有限理性方面本文以公平關(guān)切為主要視角,研究了兼顧公平行為和努力溢出效應(yīng)下的供應(yīng)鏈委托代理模型和供應(yīng)鏈成員的決策策略。本文具體研究內(nèi)容分理論和實踐兩個層面,在理論層面根據(jù)代理商數(shù)量的不同,分為多代理商和單代理商兩個方面,在擁有多代理商時,以代理商之間的努力溢出效應(yīng)為研究對象,建立了縱橫公平偏好下考慮渠道商努力具有溢出效應(yīng)的供應(yīng)鏈委托代理模型;在擁有單代理商時,以單代理商多任務(wù)之間的努力溢出效應(yīng)為研究對象,提出了投入產(chǎn)出公平概念并建立了考慮投入產(chǎn)出公平和努力溢出效應(yīng)的供應(yīng)鏈多任務(wù)委托代理模型;在供應(yīng)鏈實際層面,本文將Nash討價還價的參考解作為公平關(guān)切的對象來研究渠道商公平關(guān)切下和努力具有溢出效應(yīng)的供應(yīng)鏈委托代理模型。根據(jù)不同章節(jié)具體內(nèi)容的不同,分別建立了公平偏好中性和不同公平偏好下的供應(yīng)鏈委托代理模型,并在信息對稱(或集中決策)和信息不對稱(或分散決策)情況下進行模型求解和分析,求解出固定支付、努力水平、產(chǎn)出分享系數(shù)、最優(yōu)定價和最優(yōu)訂貨量等委托代理主要參數(shù),通過算例分析和MATLAB仿真,得出了在公平偏好系數(shù)和努力溢出效應(yīng)變化時對委托代理模型以及供應(yīng)鏈各方利益的影響關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of information technology and the rapid change of market environment, the competition among enterprises is gradually evolving into the competition between dynamic supply chains. In the dynamic supply chain, the relationship between members can be understood as principal-agent relationship. In this principal-agent relationship, the agent always tries to do all kinds of work in order to better fulfill the task of the client. However, in the context of electronic commerce and mobile Internet, this kind of agent's efforts often have spillover effects. With the development of behavioral operational research, people have come to realize that the decision makers are not completely rational. They pay attention not only to their own benefits but also to the benefits of other actors. When considering the spillover effect of agents' efforts, how will supply chain members make decisions in the case of limited rationality? In the aspect of the spillover effect of effort, this paper chooses the sales efforts of the channel operators as the main representative, and takes the equity concern as the main angle of view in the limited rationality of the decision-makers. This paper studies the principal-agent model of supply chain and the decision strategy of supply chain members under the consideration of fair behavior and effort spillover effect. The content of this paper is divided into two levels: theory and practice. It is divided into two aspects: multiple agents and single agents. When there are many agents, the spillover effect between agents is taken as the object of study. This paper establishes a supply chain principal-agent model considering the spillover effect of channel firms' efforts under the preference of vertical and horizontal equity, and takes the effort spillover effect between single-agent and multi-task as the object of study when there are single agents. This paper puts forward the concept of input-output equity and establishes a supply chain multi-task principal-agent model considering input-output equity and effort spillover effect. In this paper, the reference solution of Nash bargaining is taken as the object of fair concern to study the supply chain principal-agent model with spill-over effect under the fair concern of the channel provider and the effort. According to the different contents of different chapters, this paper studies the supply chain principal-agent model. The supply chain principal-agent models with neutral and different fair preferences are established, and the fixed payment is solved and analyzed in the case of information symmetry (or centralized decision) and information asymmetry (or decentralized decision). The principal parameters of principal-agent, such as effort level, output sharing coefficient, optimal pricing and optimal order quantity, are analyzed by example and simulated by MATLAB. The influence of fair preference coefficient and effort spillover effect on the principal-agent model and the interests of all parties in the supply chain is obtained.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京航空航天大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F274

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