本文選題：高管晉升激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：并購(gòu)支付方式　出處：《軟科學(xué)》2017年12期

【摘要】：基于代理理論的研究框架,研究了高管晉升激勵(lì)與并購(gòu)支付決策的關(guān)系及其邊界條件。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):高管晉升激勵(lì)能夠顯著提高并購(gòu)支付決策的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平,表現(xiàn)為更有可能選擇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的現(xiàn)金支付,而不是相對(duì)謹(jǐn)慎的股權(quán)支付;高管任期和產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)能夠負(fù)面調(diào)節(jié)高管晉升激勵(lì)與現(xiàn)金支付之間的正向關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:Based on the framework of agency theory, this paper studies the relationship between executive promotion incentive and M & A payment decision and its boundary conditions, and finds that executive promotion incentive can significantly improve the risk-bearing level of M & A payment decision. They are more likely to opt for riskier cash payments than relatively cautious equity payments, and tenure and property rights can negatively regulate the positive relationship between executive promotion incentives and cash payments.
【作者單位】： 南京大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(71572075、71272108)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92
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本文編號(hào)：1675759