本文選題：現(xiàn)金持有　切入點(diǎn)：產(chǎn)權(quán)　出處：《經(jīng)濟(jì)管理》2017年08期

【摘要】：基于近幾年證監(jiān)會(huì)出臺(tái)一系列鼓勵(lì)上市公司現(xiàn)金分紅的政策背景,本文以我國(guó)滬深A(yù)股上市公司為樣本,研究現(xiàn)金持有對(duì)企業(yè)代理成本的影響,并分析產(chǎn)權(quán)和公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)二者關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)作用。研究結(jié)果表明,現(xiàn)金持有增加會(huì)提高企業(yè)代理成本,產(chǎn)權(quán)對(duì)現(xiàn)金持有與代理成本的關(guān)系存在正向調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。本文進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)了公司治理機(jī)制的治理作用,并將公司治理機(jī)制分為兩類。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,外部治理機(jī)制對(duì)于約束國(guó)有企業(yè)代理問題更有效,內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制對(duì)緩解民營(yíng)企業(yè)代理問題更有效。本文結(jié)論說明,對(duì)于不同產(chǎn)權(quán)類型的企業(yè),需從不同治理機(jī)制入手以緩解企業(yè)代理問題。本文結(jié)論為當(dāng)前我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革方向和途徑提供了理論參考,同時(shí),也為當(dāng)前證監(jiān)會(huì)鼓勵(lì)上市公司現(xiàn)金分紅的政策提供實(shí)證依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Based on a series of policies to encourage cash dividends of listed companies in recent years, this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a sample to study the impact of cash holdings on corporate agency costs. The results show that the increase of cash holding will increase the agency cost. Property right has positive effect on the relationship between cash holding and agency cost. This paper further tests the governance function of corporate governance mechanism, and divides the corporate governance mechanism into two categories. The external governance mechanism is more effective in restricting the agency problems of state-owned enterprises, and the internal governance mechanism is more effective in alleviating the agency problems of private enterprises. It is necessary to start with different governance mechanisms in order to alleviate the problem of enterprise agency. The conclusion of this paper provides a theoretical reference for the direction and approach of the reform of state-owned enterprises in our country, at the same time, Also for the current Securities Regulatory Commission to encourage listed companies to cash dividend policy to provide empirical basis.
【作者單位】： 武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F275

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