本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板　切入點(diǎn)：上市公司　出處：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：完善的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是公司穩(wěn)定運(yùn)行、持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)、健康發(fā)展的基礎(chǔ),對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)有著重要意義。我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)大多數(shù)上市公司處于成長(zhǎng)階段的初期或者中期,一方面以高科技含量作為發(fā)展支撐擁有較高成長(zhǎng)潛力,另一方面又尚未建立起有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),導(dǎo)致其治理問(wèn)題層出不窮,經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)兩級(jí)分化,一些公司成長(zhǎng)后勁不足,難以保證持續(xù)成長(zhǎng)。本文通過(guò)理論與實(shí)證相結(jié)合的方法,深入剖析了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與成長(zhǎng)性的內(nèi)生關(guān)系,為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司完善自身治理結(jié)構(gòu),從而促進(jìn)公司成長(zhǎng)提出現(xiàn)實(shí)指導(dǎo),同時(shí)也為廣大投資者提高決策水平,規(guī)避投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供有效建議,因此這一選題對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展,增強(qiáng)投資者信心有著一定的理論意義和重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了綜述,然后界定了相關(guān)概念,重點(diǎn)闡述了公司治理理論和成長(zhǎng)理論,對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司進(jìn)行了成長(zhǎng)性評(píng)價(jià),并將計(jì)算得出的成長(zhǎng)性綜合評(píng)分與反映公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的十個(gè)具體指標(biāo)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,從公司治理的四個(gè)維度:股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)治理、高管激勵(lì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)特征深入探討了公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)其成長(zhǎng)性的影響作用,得出了以下結(jié)論:股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)方面,第一大股東持股比例與公司成長(zhǎng)性有正相關(guān)關(guān)系,第二至第五大股東持股比例與公司成長(zhǎng)性也有正相關(guān)關(guān)系;董事會(huì)治理方面,董事會(huì)規(guī)模與董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)性影響不大,董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)有促進(jìn)作用;高管激勵(lì)方面,高管薪酬與高管持股比例的增長(zhǎng)對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)均有明顯促進(jìn)作用;監(jiān)事會(huì)特征方面,監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模對(duì)成長(zhǎng)性沒(méi)有影響,監(jiān)事會(huì)持股比例與監(jiān)事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)均與公司成長(zhǎng)性正相關(guān)。這一結(jié)論說(shuō)明創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)仍存在很多問(wèn)題,如董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模對(duì)成長(zhǎng)性均無(wú)影響,說(shuō)明董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)的設(shè)置大多是為了符合法律要求,并未真正發(fā)揮其科學(xué)決策和有效監(jiān)督的作用。最后,本文根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果結(jié)合我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司特征,對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)促進(jìn)企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)提出了相應(yīng)的對(duì)策和建議:1.在保持股權(quán)相對(duì)集中的現(xiàn)狀下,提高股權(quán)制衡度,同時(shí)適度引入機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,增強(qiáng)股權(quán)制衡力度;2.優(yōu)化董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu),充分發(fā)揮董事會(huì)的決策作用,同時(shí)也要根據(jù)公司實(shí)際情況,靈活配置領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán);3.長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)與短期激勵(lì)相結(jié)合,建立完善的經(jīng)理層激勵(lì)機(jī)制,同時(shí)建立完善的高管層績(jī)效考核體系,培育職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng);4.構(gòu)建合理的監(jiān)事會(huì)治理結(jié)構(gòu),強(qiáng)化監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)督職能。
[Abstract]:The perfect corporate governance structure is the basis for the stable operation, sustained growth and healthy development of the company, which is of great significance to the growth of the company. Most listed companies in the gem market are in the early or middle stage of their growth. On the one hand, it has higher growth potential with high-tech content as the support of development, on the other hand, it has not yet established an effective corporate governance structure, which leads to endless problems of governance, the division of two levels of business performance, and the lack of growth stamina of some companies. It is difficult to ensure sustainable growth. This paper analyzes the endogenous relationship between the governance structure and growth of gem listed companies through the combination of theory and empirical methods, in order to perfect their own governance structure. So as to promote the growth of the company to provide practical guidance, but also for the majority of investors to improve the level of decision-making, to avoid investment risks to provide effective advice, so this topic for China's gem market healthy and stable development, Enhancing investor confidence has certain theoretical significance and important practical significance. This paper first summarizes the current research situation at home and abroad, then defines the related concepts, focusing on the theory of corporate governance and growth theory. This paper evaluates the growth of the listed companies on the gem, and analyzes the comprehensive growth score and ten specific indicators reflecting the corporate governance structure. It analyzes the four dimensions of corporate governance: equity structure, board governance, and so on. The characteristics of executive incentive and board of supervisors deeply discuss the influence of corporate governance structure on its growth, and draw the following conclusions: in terms of equity structure, the proportion of the first largest shareholder holding shares has a positive correlation with the growth of the company. There is also a positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of the second to fifth largest shareholders and the growth of the company. In the governance of the board of directors, the size of the board of directors and the independence of the board of directors have little effect on the growth of the company. The combination of chairman and general manager can promote the growth of the company; in the aspect of executive incentive, the increase of executive compensation and the proportion of executive stock have a significant effect on the growth of the company; the characteristics of the board of supervisors, The scale of the board of supervisors has no effect on the growth, and the proportion of the board of supervisors and the number of meetings of the board of supervisors are all positively related to the growth of the company. This conclusion shows that there are still many problems in the governance structure of listed companies in the gem. If the size of the board of directors and the board of supervisors has no effect on the growth, it shows that most of the board of directors and the board of supervisors are set up to meet the requirements of the law and do not really play their role of scientific decision-making and effective supervision. Finally, Based on the empirical results and the characteristics of listed companies on the gem, this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions to improve the corporate governance structure and promote the growth of enterprises in the gem. Improve the degree of equity balance, at the same time introduce institutional investors appropriately, strengthen equity checks and balances 2.optimize the structure of the board of directors, give full play to the decision-making role of the board of directors, and at the same time, according to the actual situation of the company, Flexible allocation of leadership 3.The combination of long-term incentive and short-term incentive, the establishment of a sound manager incentive mechanism, at the same time, the establishment of a perfect executive performance appraisal system, foster the professional manager market 4. build a reasonable board of supervisors governance structure, Strengthen the supervisory function of the board of supervisors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51

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