本文選題：金融行業(yè)上市公司　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬激勵(lì)　出處：《陜西科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：高管激勵(lì)與盈余管理的關(guān)系一直是公司治理與財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)領(lǐng)域的研究熱點(diǎn)。近年來,我國政府部門陸續(xù)出臺(tái)一系列文件,對(duì)國有及國有控股企業(yè)的高管薪酬體系進(jìn)行持續(xù)改革。金融行業(yè)在國民經(jīng)濟(jì)中處于重要地位,一方面,金融企業(yè)高管激勵(lì)問題始終為社會(huì)各界所關(guān)注,另一方面,較之于其他行業(yè),金融企業(yè)盈余管理特殊性顯著。因此,迫切需要開展金融行業(yè)上市公司高管激勵(lì)與盈余管理關(guān)系的理論研究,從而為合理構(gòu)建金融行業(yè)高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制、規(guī)范盈余管理行為提供理論支撐和路徑選擇。本文以42家金融行業(yè)上市公司為樣本,選取其2010-2015年的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),從金融行業(yè)上市公司高管激勵(lì)與盈余管理現(xiàn)狀分析出發(fā),選取高管薪酬與高管持股作為高管激勵(lì)衡量指標(biāo)、以操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤的絕對(duì)值作為盈余管理的衡量指標(biāo),通過多元線性回歸分析方法,開展高管激勵(lì)與盈余管理關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究,檢驗(yàn)不同的公司特征與公司治理狀況下,高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制對(duì)盈余管理的作用。本文主要研究結(jié)論為:(1)高管薪酬與盈余管理呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即高管薪酬越高,盈余管理程度越小,說明金融行業(yè)上市公司基本符合“高薪養(yǎng)廉論”,較高的高管薪酬有利于減少盈余管理行為。(2)高管持股與盈余管理呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,即高管持股比例越高,盈余管理程度越大,說明較高程度的高管持股反而會(huì)刺激盈余管理行為的發(fā)生,但是二者關(guān)系不顯著。(3)良好的公司業(yè)績、完善的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)下,可以更有效地發(fā)揮高管激勵(lì)作用,從而降低盈余管理程度�；诖�,本文提出以下三點(diǎn)建議:(1)優(yōu)化金融行業(yè)高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制,發(fā)揮激勵(lì)約束作用;(2)完善公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu),優(yōu)化企業(yè)內(nèi)部監(jiān)督;(3)完善外部監(jiān)管制度體系,提高信息披露透明度。
[Abstract]:The relationship between executive incentive and earnings management has always been a hot topic in the field of corporate governance and financial accounting. In recent years, government departments in China have issued a series of documents. The financial industry plays an important role in the national economy. On the one hand, the incentive of senior executives in financial enterprises has always been concerned by all walks of life, on the other hand, Compared with other industries, earnings management of financial enterprises has obvious particularity. Therefore, it is urgent to carry out a theoretical study on the relationship between executive incentive and earnings management of listed companies in financial industry, so as to build a reasonable incentive mechanism for senior executives in financial industry. This paper takes 42 listed companies in financial industry as a sample, selects its financial data from 2010 to 2015, and analyzes the current situation of executive incentive and earnings management of listed companies in financial industry. The executive compensation and stock ownership are selected as the measure of executive incentive, and the absolute value of accrual profit is taken as the measure of earnings management, and the multiple linear regression analysis method is adopted. The empirical research on the relationship between executive incentive and earnings management is carried out to test the different corporate characteristics and corporate governance. The main conclusion of this paper is: (1) there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation and earnings management, that is, the higher the executive compensation, the smaller the earnings management. It shows that the listed companies in financial industry basically accord with the theory of "keeping clean with high pay", and higher executive compensation can reduce earnings management behavior. (2) there is a positive correlation between executive stock holding and earnings management, that is, the higher the proportion of senior management is, the greater the earnings management degree is. It shows that the higher degree of executive ownership will stimulate earnings management behavior, but the relationship between the two is not significant. Good corporate performance, perfect corporate governance structure, can play a more effective role in the incentive role of executives. So as to reduce the degree of earnings management. Based on this, this paper puts forward the following three suggestions: 1) optimizing the incentive mechanism of senior executives in financial industry, giving play to the role of incentive and restraint, and perfecting the internal governance structure of the company. Improve the external supervision system and improve the transparency of information disclosure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F830.42;F272.92

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