本文選題：信息不對稱　切入點：成本粘性　出處：《沈陽航空航天大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)之間的競爭日趨激烈,成本管理與控制上升為企業(yè)決策重點,企業(yè)資源成本利用效率直接影響經(jīng)營收益。成本粘性概念自提出以來,國內(nèi)外學者對其的研究熱度一直居高不下。截至目前,學術(shù)界對成本粘性的研究角度有限,尚未形成一套完整體系。鑒于企業(yè)實踐與理論研究現(xiàn)狀,本文從信息不對稱角度切入,對企業(yè)成本粘性成因進行分析,將其歸結(jié)為信息不對稱引發(fā)的委托代理問題——逆向選擇與道德風險,針對不同原因分別設計信息甄別和顯性、隱性激勵模型,構(gòu)建企業(yè)成本粘性控制機制,進而控制企業(yè)成本粘性程度,提高資本、成本利用效率,最終使企業(yè)效益最大化。首先,本文介紹選題背景和意義,并對研究思路、內(nèi)容和方法進行簡要介紹。然后,對確定文章選題的檢索過程予以簡述,并系統(tǒng)、有條理的回顧與梳理了國內(nèi)外成本粘性及機制設計理論研究現(xiàn)狀。其次,討論信息不對稱與委托代理關系,結(jié)合成本信息傳遞流程分析企業(yè)內(nèi)部信息不對稱形成原因,并對信息不對稱產(chǎn)生的委托代理問題——逆向選擇和道德風險進行分析,闡述信息不對稱引發(fā)企業(yè)成本粘性機理。此外,針對信息不對稱引發(fā)的成本粘性問題,以委托代理理論為基礎,建立、分析信息甄別模型和顯性激勵模型、隱性激勵模型,并對顯性激勵模型加以改進。最終,通過建立的模型機制,構(gòu)建信息不對稱下的企業(yè)成本粘性控制機制,從而對控制粘性實施有效控制,為改善成本粘性影響企業(yè)效益問題提出對策與建議。本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于以信息不對稱為切入點,采用委托代理理論模型、博弈論分析的方法對企業(yè)成本粘性形成原因深入分析,通過構(gòu)建激勵模型和信息甄別的方式分析,并在文章的第六部分構(gòu)建成本粘性控制機制使上述模型得到進一步證明。通過本文的研究擴大了成本粘性研究范圍,對其今后研究具有一定的指導意義。
[Abstract]:The competition among enterprises is becoming more and more intense, and cost management and control become the key points of enterprise decision-making. The efficiency of enterprise resource cost utilization directly affects the operating income. Since the concept of cost stickiness was put forward, the concept of cost viscosity has been put forward. Up to now, the academic research on cost stickiness is limited and has not yet formed a complete system. In view of the present situation of enterprise practice and theory research, From the angle of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the cause of enterprise cost stickiness, which is reduced to the principal-agent problem caused by asymmetric information-adverse selection and moral hazard, and designs information discrimination and dominance respectively for different reasons. The implicit incentive model constructs the cost viscosity control mechanism of enterprises, and then controls the degree of cost stickiness of enterprises, improves the efficiency of capital and cost utilization, and finally maximizes the benefits of enterprises. First, this paper introduces the background and significance of the selected topics. Then, the retrieval process of determining the topic of the article is briefly described, and the research status of the theory of cost stickiness and mechanism design at home and abroad is systematically reviewed and combed. This paper discusses the relationship between information asymmetry and principal-agent, analyzes the reasons for the formation of information asymmetry in enterprises, and analyzes the principal-agent problem, adverse selection and moral hazard, which is caused by asymmetric information. The mechanism of enterprise cost stickiness caused by information asymmetry is expounded. In addition, aiming at the cost stickiness problem caused by information asymmetry, based on the principal-agent theory, the information discrimination model, explicit incentive model and implicit incentive model are established and analyzed. Finally, through the established model mechanism, the enterprise cost viscosity control mechanism under asymmetric information is constructed, which can effectively control the corporate cost viscosity. In order to improve the effect of cost stickiness on enterprise benefit, the innovation of this paper is that the information asymmetry is the breakthrough point, and the principal-agent theory model is adopted. The method of game theory analysis deeply analyzes the reasons for the formation of enterprise cost stickiness, and analyzes the way of incentive model and information screening. In the 6th part of the paper, the cost viscosity control mechanism is constructed to further prove the above model. The research in this paper expands the scope of the cost viscosity research, and has certain guiding significance for its future research.
【學位授予單位】：沈陽航空航天大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275

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