本文選題：非控股股東董事　切入點：董事會　出處：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：董事會是公司治理的重要機(jī)制,在董事會組成成員方面,目前學(xué)術(shù)領(lǐng)域大部分學(xué)者研究主要集中在獨立董事對公司的治理效率,以及控股股東對公司的治理效率等方面,但是對于非控股股東董事表現(xiàn)的相關(guān)信息不充足,而且獲取有一定難度,因此也鮮有對非控股股東董事的研究。但是無論是從非控股股東董事作為內(nèi)部董事可以參與經(jīng)營的身份上,還是從非控股股東代表中小投資者的利益上,非控股股東的地位和作用都顯得如此重要。故而,就在這樣的背景下,通過案例分析,研究非控股股東董事對公司治理效率的效應(yīng)。由于公司盈余管理是代理理論下產(chǎn)生的嚴(yán)重問題,所以在公司治理效率方面主要研究的是非控股股東董事對盈余管理方面的作用和影響,以及當(dāng)非控股股東董事發(fā)揮治理作用時市場的反應(yīng)。首先對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理和分析,然后基于委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論提出盈余管理的動機(jī)和產(chǎn)生的影響和結(jié)果,進(jìn)一步在理論上證實盈余管理和公司治理的效率緊密相關(guān)。另外,基于有效市場和決策有用觀的作用,我們提出當(dāng)董事會有信息披露時,很可能引起市場的變動。由此,通過于.工收集,發(fā)現(xiàn)S公司有非控股股東董事發(fā)揮明顯治理效應(yīng)的條件,通過對S公司1998年到2015年數(shù)據(jù)的收集,2005年非控股股東董事投反對票情況下,分析非控股股東董事通過這種治理方式對應(yīng)計盈余管理和真實盈余管理產(chǎn)生治理效應(yīng),對異常經(jīng)營現(xiàn)金流量、異常生產(chǎn)成本、酌量性費用的治理效應(yīng),以及市場反應(yīng)的影響。由此提出要改變以凈利潤為考核的監(jiān)管辦法,多元化經(jīng)營和適當(dāng)?shù)莫剟顧C(jī)制等系列辦法,有利于降低治理成本,有利于公司長期向好運營。
[Abstract]:The board of directors is an important mechanism of corporate governance. In terms of the composition of the board of directors, at present, most scholars in the academic field mainly focus on the efficiency of corporate governance of independent directors and the governance efficiency of controlling shareholders. However, there is insufficient information on the performance of directors of non-controlling shareholders, and it is difficult to obtain, Therefore, there is little research on the directors of non-controlling shareholders. However, whether from the status that the directors of non-controlling shareholders can participate in the operation as internal directors, or from the non-controlling shareholders representing the interests of small and medium-sized investors, The status and role of non-controlling shareholders are so important. Therefore, in this context, through the case study, This paper studies the effect of directors of non-controlling shareholders on the efficiency of corporate governance. As earnings management is a serious problem under agency theory, Therefore, in terms of corporate governance efficiency, the role and impact of non-controlling shareholder directors on earnings management are mainly studied. And the market reaction when the directors of non-controlling shareholders play a governance role. Firstly, the relevant literature at home and abroad is combed and analyzed, and then based on the principal-agent theory, The information asymmetry theory puts forward the motivation, the influence and the result of earnings management, which further proves that earnings management is closely related to the efficiency of corporate governance. We propose that when the board of directors has information disclosure, it is likely to cause changes in the market. Thus, through the collection of. Through collecting the data of S Company from 1998 to 2015, this paper analyzes the governance effect of the non-controlling shareholder directors on the accrual earnings management and real earnings management through this kind of governance under the condition that the directors of the non-controlling shareholders cast a negative vote in 2005. The governance effect of abnormal operating cash flow, abnormal production cost, discretionary cost, and market reaction are discussed. Therefore, it is proposed to change the series of methods, such as supervision, diversification and appropriate incentive mechanism, which are assessed by net profit, etc. Is advantageous to reduce the management cost, is advantageous to the company long-term good operation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F279.26;F832.51

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本文編號：1598569