本文選題：股權(quán)激勵　切入點：風(fēng)險承擔(dān)　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵被稱為管理人員的金手銬,一直被視為解決代理問題的良方。代理問題的產(chǎn)生是因為委托代理關(guān)系中的雙方股東和管理者在公司中獲得收益的方式不同,他們具有不同的效用函數(shù)。而管理者又是不可監(jiān)督的,是風(fēng)險規(guī)避的理性人,為實現(xiàn)自身效用的最大化就會偏離股東的預(yù)期,產(chǎn)生了代理成本。代理問題體現(xiàn)在公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)上就是股東和管理者所希望公司的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)不同。公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)是一種公司的行為,這種行為是企業(yè)對風(fēng)險所做出的反應(yīng),也稱為風(fēng)險保留,風(fēng)險自留。公司風(fēng)險來源于公司的投資、籌資及經(jīng)營活動,風(fēng)險承擔(dān)就表現(xiàn)為對這些活動中的風(fēng)險采取接受的態(tài)度,進而采取一定的行為。本文認(rèn)為作為解決代理問題良方的股權(quán)激勵也能夠解決股東與管理者之間關(guān)于公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的沖突。首先,本文支持了股權(quán)激勵與公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平的正向相關(guān)關(guān)系。股權(quán)激勵使委托人與代理人利益趨于一致,減少了代理沖突。股權(quán)激勵的設(shè)置使管理人員承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險設(shè)置了下限,而沒有限制風(fēng)險上限。所以委托代理理論的結(jié)論是股權(quán)激勵能夠使管理人員克服風(fēng)險厭惡的傾向,增加符合股東利益的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)行為,管理者薪酬理論的結(jié)論是股權(quán)激勵可能會增加管理者的違規(guī)性的投機行為,也導(dǎo)致了公司增加風(fēng)險承擔(dān)行為�；谶@兩點,提出股權(quán)激勵提高了公司的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平的觀點。其次在企業(yè)行為理論下,結(jié)合前景理論,研究了不同績效反饋下導(dǎo)致的心理感知對二者之間關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)作用:在企業(yè)正向績效反饋時,管理者認(rèn)為其處于價值函數(shù)的收益區(qū)間,傾向于規(guī)避風(fēng)險;在企業(yè)負(fù)向績效反饋時,管理者認(rèn)為其處于損失區(qū)間,傾向于追求風(fēng)險。不同方向的績效反饋對股權(quán)激勵與公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平的調(diào)節(jié)方向不同。本文認(rèn)為公司的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)行為最終會體現(xiàn)在公司的風(fēng)險指標(biāo)中,所以以股票市場收益率的波動作為風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的替代變量,實證研究了現(xiàn)行股權(quán)激勵制度下股權(quán)激勵對公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的影響,驗證了本文理論分析得出的觀點。本文認(rèn)為基于企業(yè)自身的歷史績效預(yù)期而形成的績效反饋,對企業(yè)的行為更有解釋力。所以以此形成的績效反饋作為調(diào)節(jié)變量實證檢驗了正、負(fù)績效反饋對股權(quán)激勵對風(fēng)險承擔(dān)關(guān)系的影響情況。本文期望能夠理清股權(quán)激勵對公司風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平的影響機理,從而有助于企業(yè)根據(jù)自身情況,合理運用股權(quán)激勵這種激勵手段,完善股權(quán)激勵實施辦法,使公司的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)水平符合需要。企業(yè)的績效反饋將影響二者間的關(guān)系,如果過去的績效好于預(yù)期,股權(quán)激勵作用減弱。如果過去的績效低于預(yù)期水平,股權(quán)激勵作用加強。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is called the golden handcuffs of managers, which is always regarded as the best way to solve the problem of agency. The problem of agency comes into being because the shareholders and managers of both parties in the principal-agent relationship get profits in the company in different ways. They have different utility functions, and managers are unsupervised and risk averse rational people. In order to maximize their own utility, they will deviate from shareholders' expectations. The agency problem lies in the fact that shareholders and managers want the company to bear different risks. Corporate risk-taking is a kind of corporate behavior, which is the response of the enterprise to the risk. Also known as risk retention, risk retention. Corporate risk comes from the company's investment, financing, and operating activities, and risk-taking is manifested by the acceptance of the risks in these activities. This paper argues that equity incentive, as a good solution to the agency problem, can also solve the conflict between shareholders and managers about the risk bearing of the company. First of all, This paper supports the positive correlation between equity incentive and corporate risk assumption level. Equity incentive makes principal and agent interests converge and reduces agency conflict. The setting of equity incentive sets a lower limit for managers to take risks. Therefore, the conclusion of the principal-agent theory is that equity incentive can enable managers to overcome the tendency of risk aversion and increase risk-taking behavior in line with the interests of shareholders. The conclusion of the executive compensation theory is that equity incentives may increase managers' irregular speculation and lead companies to increase risk-taking behavior. The paper puts forward the view that equity incentive improves the risk-bearing level of the company. Secondly, under the theory of enterprise behavior, combining with the theory of prospect, The effects of psychological perception under different performance feedback on the relationship between them are studied. In the positive performance feedback, managers think that they are in the profit range of value function and tend to avoid risk; When the firm has negative performance feedback, the manager thinks it is in the loss range, Different performance feedback has different adjustment direction on equity incentive and corporate risk-taking level. This paper thinks that the risk-taking behavior of the company will eventually be reflected in the risk index of the company. Therefore, taking the fluctuation of stock market yield as the alternative variable of risk assumption, the paper empirically studies the influence of equity incentive on corporate risk taking under the current equity incentive system. This paper argues that the performance feedback based on the enterprise's own historical performance expectation has more explanatory power to the enterprise's behavior. This paper hopes to clarify the influence mechanism of equity incentive on the risk-bearing level of the company so as to help the enterprise according to its own situation. Reasonable use of equity incentive this incentive means, improve the implementation of equity incentives, so that the company's risk-taking level meets the needs. The performance feedback of the enterprise will affect the relationship between the two, if the past performance is better than expected, Equity incentive is weakened. If past performance is lower than expected, equity incentive will be strengthened.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F272.3

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