晉升激勵(lì)與國(guó)有企業(yè)異常捐贈(zèng)
本文關(guān)鍵詞： 國(guó)有企業(yè) 晉升激勵(lì) 異常捐贈(zèng) 資源依賴?yán)碚?/strong> 出處：《財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué)》2017年04期 論文類型：期刊論文
【摘要】：結(jié)合資源依賴?yán)碚?以2008—2014年國(guó)有企業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本,對(duì)國(guó)企高管謀求政治晉升而產(chǎn)生的相關(guān)后果進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)并提供經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在國(guó)有企業(yè)中普遍存在著異常社會(huì)捐贈(zèng)問(wèn)題。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),國(guó)企中存在的異常社會(huì)捐贈(zèng)與其高管的任職年限呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,也即高管任職年限越短,其晉升的可能性越大,該企業(yè)的異常捐贈(zèng)額度越高。這從一定程度上說(shuō)明了國(guó)企高管為了謀求政治晉升而有意識(shí)地進(jìn)行了國(guó)企的社會(huì)形象管理,意在提高自身的社會(huì)形象,從而為自身的政治晉升做好鋪墊。央企高管比地方國(guó)企高管更加注重社會(huì)形象管理,公益類國(guó)企高管進(jìn)行社會(huì)形象管理的動(dòng)機(jī)比競(jìng)爭(zhēng)類國(guó)企高管更加強(qiáng)烈。此外,某些外部環(huán)境變量,如年度和行業(yè)等對(duì)實(shí)證結(jié)果沒(méi)有顯著影響。
[Abstract]:Combined with the theory of resource dependence, taking the listed companies of state-owned enterprises from 2008 to 2014 as the research sample, the paper empirically tests and provides empirical evidence on the related consequences of state-owned enterprise executives seeking political promotion. The problem of abnormal social donation exists generally in state-owned enterprises. Further study shows that the abnormal social donation in state-owned enterprises is negatively related to their seniority, that is, the shorter the seniority of senior executives, the more likely they are to be promoted. The higher the amount of unusual donations made by the enterprise, the more, to some extent, executives of state-owned enterprises have consciously managed the social image of state-owned enterprises in order to seek political advancement, with a view to improving their own social image. In order to pave the way for their own political advancement, executives of central enterprises pay more attention to social image management than local executives of state-owned enterprises, and executives of public enterprises are more motivated to conduct social image management than those of competitive state-owned enterprises. In addition, Some external environmental variables, such as year and industry, have no significant impact on empirical results.
【作者單位】： 北京工商大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F276.1
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前4條
1 馬蕾;;企業(yè)晉升公平激勵(lì)與優(yōu)化對(duì)策研究[J];中南林業(yè)科技大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2012年02期
2 廖理;廖冠民;沈紅波;;經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、晉升激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2009年08期
3 何偉杰;;企業(yè)員工晉升管理問(wèn)題探討[J];才智;2010年32期
4 ;[J];;年期
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條
1 吳婷;國(guó)企高管政治晉升激勵(lì)對(duì)政治迎合行為的影響研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2015年
2 王海蓮;我國(guó)企業(yè)員工的晉升激勵(lì)模式與策略研究[D];中國(guó)海洋大學(xué);2009年
3 勞潤(rùn)夏;NN機(jī)場(chǎng)員工晉升激勵(lì)存在問(wèn)題及對(duì)策研究[D];廣西大學(xué);2014年
4 白曉萍;CEO繼任、晉升激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效[D];新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年
，本文編號(hào)：1549983
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/xmjj/1549983.html
