本文關(guān)鍵詞： 低碳環(huán)境友好技術(shù) 創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散 非對(duì)稱演化博弈　出處：《中國(guó)科技論壇》2017年08期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：根據(jù)影響企業(yè)策略選擇的技術(shù)互補(bǔ)比例、政府激勵(lì)參數(shù)和行業(yè)內(nèi)懲罰損益等參數(shù)構(gòu)建支付矩陣,構(gòu)建企業(yè)間的低碳環(huán)境友好技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散非合作演化博弈模型,并利用matlab進(jìn)行數(shù)字仿真分析。仿真結(jié)果表明:技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散需要政府部門(mén)優(yōu)化環(huán)境規(guī)制制度,同時(shí)需要行業(yè)自身凈化行業(yè)內(nèi)部環(huán)境;技術(shù)互補(bǔ)性越強(qiáng)博弈主體雙方選擇擴(kuò)散策略的比例越大,企業(yè)間進(jìn)行技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散的概率越大。政府恰當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)政策有利于企業(yè)進(jìn)行擴(kuò)散策略的選擇。
[Abstract]:According to the ratio of technology complementation, the parameters of government incentive and intra-industry penalty profit and loss, the payment matrix is constructed, and the non-cooperative evolution game model of low-carbon environment-friendly technological innovation diffusion among enterprises is constructed. The simulation results show that the diffusion of technology innovation needs the government to optimize the environmental regulation system and the industry to purify the internal environment of the industry. The more complementary the technology, the greater the proportion of the players choosing the diffusion strategy, the greater the probability of technological innovation diffusion among enterprises. The appropriate government incentive policy is conducive to the choice of diffusion strategy.
【作者單位】： 昆明理工大學(xué)復(fù)雜有色金屬資源清潔利用國(guó)家重點(diǎn)實(shí)驗(yàn)室;昆明理工大學(xué)質(zhì)量發(fā)展研究院;
【基金】：世界銀行CRESP項(xiàng)目“中國(guó)應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化技術(shù)需求評(píng)估”(TF012536)
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F273.1
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本文編號(hào)：1536234