本文關(guān)鍵詞： 母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)分布 子公司多元化 高管薪酬激勵(lì)　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股東與董事會(huì)依據(jù)高管行動(dòng)產(chǎn)出來(lái)激勵(lì)高管,并以業(yè)績(jī)作為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)計(jì)薪酬契約。依據(jù)最優(yōu)薪酬契約理論中激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度原則,薪酬水平與薪酬-業(yè)績(jī)掛鉤程度取決于高管努力對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)的邊際貢獻(xiàn)與業(yè)績(jī)偏離高管真實(shí)努力程度的大小(Milgrom and Roberts,1992;張維迎,2014)。根據(jù)信息量原則,應(yīng)將能夠反映高管努力與才能信息的業(yè)績(jī)與非業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)納入薪酬契約(Holmstrom,1979;Taylor,2013)。面對(duì)上市公司中普遍存在的業(yè)務(wù)下沉子公司與子公司多元化的情況,現(xiàn)有關(guān)于高管薪酬激勵(lì)的研究多是基于整體合并業(yè)績(jī)進(jìn)行的,并未考慮不同母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)分布與子公司多元化因素導(dǎo)致的合并業(yè)績(jī)內(nèi)在來(lái)源的差異,以及由此導(dǎo)致的激勵(lì)機(jī)理差異。當(dāng)業(yè)務(wù)主要分布在子公司的情況下,雖然上市公司高管仍需要對(duì)整體經(jīng)營(yíng)負(fù)責(zé),但業(yè)績(jī)一部分取決于子公司自身努力(陸正飛、張會(huì)麗,2010)。在這種情況下,高管努力對(duì)合并業(yè)績(jī)所能施加的影響有限。不同的母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)分布下,高管薪酬契約中高管努力對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)的邊際貢獻(xiàn)與業(yè)績(jī)偏離高管努力程度存在差異。同時(shí),子公司多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)使得上市公司高管面對(duì)的業(yè)務(wù)跨多個(gè)行業(yè)與地區(qū),對(duì)高管才能的要求與高管所需付出的努力更多。高管薪酬契約若未將母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)分布與子公司多元化納入,將導(dǎo)致激勵(lì)基礎(chǔ)與高管的才能與努力不匹配,進(jìn)而降低高管薪酬激勵(lì)的有效性。本文按照母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)的規(guī)模分布與子公司多元化的不同情況將高管薪酬激勵(lì)基礎(chǔ)展開,分析由此帶來(lái)的業(yè)績(jī)來(lái)源、高管努力與才能信息等差異,主要采用大樣本實(shí)證研究方法,并選取高管薪酬水平模型與高管薪酬-業(yè)績(jī)敏感性模型,研究了母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)的分布與子公司多元化對(duì)高管薪酬激勵(lì)的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)子公司業(yè)務(wù)比重越高,高管薪酬水平越高。當(dāng)業(yè)務(wù)主要分布在子公司時(shí),具有更低的高管薪酬-業(yè)績(jī)敏感性;(2)子公司行業(yè)與地區(qū)多元化程度越高,高管薪酬水平越高。相比于子公司行業(yè)與地區(qū)多元化程度較低時(shí),子公司行業(yè)與地區(qū)多元化程度較高時(shí),具有更高的高管薪酬-業(yè)績(jī)敏感性;(3)綜合考慮母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)分布與子公司多元化對(duì)高管薪酬激勵(lì)的影響,業(yè)務(wù)下沉子公司加強(qiáng)了子公司多元化程度對(duì)高管薪酬激勵(lì)的影響。擴(kuò)展研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)相比于民營(yíng)上市公司,國(guó)有上市公司中子公司業(yè)務(wù)比重、子公司行業(yè)多元化與子公司地區(qū)多元化對(duì)高管薪酬水平的正向影響更大;(2)區(qū)分高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在與否,研究業(yè)務(wù)分布與子公司多元化對(duì)高管薪酬激勵(lì)的影響時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn):高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)在一定程度上對(duì)高管薪酬激勵(lì)具有削弱與替代作用。本文為基于母子公司間業(yè)務(wù)的縱向規(guī)模分布與橫向行業(yè)與地區(qū)布局視角的上市公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)研究提供了參考。
[Abstract]:The shareholders and the board of directors in accordance with executive action produced incentive executives, and performance as the basis for the design of compensation contract. On the basis of the principle of incentive intensity theory of optimal compensation contract, salary level and salary - performance depends on the marginal contribution and performance to executives on the performance of the deviation from the true effort degree of executives (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Zhang Weiying, 2014). According to the principle of information quantity, the index can reflect the information to executives efforts and performance and non performance in compensation contracts (Holmstrom, 1979; Taylor, 2013). In the face of widespread listed companies in the business of sinking sub company and the subsidiary company diversified situation, the existing research on executive compensation incentive how is the overall merger based on performance, did not consider the difference in the different sources of lead between the parent company and subsidiary business distribution and diversified factors combined results in ISO, and the incentive mechanism of the resulting difference. When the business is mainly distributed in the sub company, although the executives of listed companies still need to be responsible for the overall operation, but the performance depends in part on a subsidiary's own efforts (Lu Zhengfei, Zhang Huili, 2010). In this case, executives can be applied to the combined results the parent company limited. Between different business distribution, executive compensation contract executives trying to marginal contribution and performance on the performance of the different from executives trying to degree difference. At the same time, a subsidiary of the diversification of the listed companies in the face of high tube business across multiple industries and areas, to the requirements on executive and executive pay required more effort. Executive compensation contract if not the business between the parent company and subsidiary company diversified into distribution, will lead to efforts and incentive based and executives do not match, and reduce the high Effective salary incentive. According to different size distribution and between parent company and subsidiaries of the diversification of the business will be the executive compensation incentive basis, analysis of the resulting source of performance differences, and to executives trying to information, mainly by the large sample empirical research methods, and selected the level of executive compensation and executive compensation model performance sensitivity model, to study the influence between the parent company and the subsidiary company of diversified business distribution of executive compensation incentive. The study found that: (1) the proportion of subsidiary business is higher, higher levels of executive compensation. When the business is mainly distributed in the subsidiary, has a lower pay performance sensitivity; (2) more the high degree of industry and regional diversification subsidiary, executive compensation level is higher. Compared to the degree of industry and regional diversification subsidiary is low, subsidiary industry and regional diversification degree That has a higher pay performance sensitivity; (3) considering the parent company and the subsidiary company of diversified business distribution effects of executive pay incentives, business sink subsidiary to strengthen the effect of the sub degree of diversification of executive compensation incentive. Extensive research has found that: (1) compared to the private listed companies, the proportion of state-owned the listed company neutron business, subsidiary and subsidiary diversified industry area diversification positive influence on the level of executive pay more; (2) to distinguish between executive equity incentive exists or not, the research found the business distribution and subsidiary diversified effect on executive compensation incentive: to a certain extent to the executive compensation incentive is weakening and substitution the role of equity incentive for executives. In this paper, from the perspective of vertical scale distribution between the parent company and the business and industry and the layout of the lateral area of listed company executives pay incentives based on the research The reference is provided.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

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