本文關(guān)鍵詞： 家族企業(yè) 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 企業(yè)價值　出處：《新疆大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著中國經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革,家族企業(yè)在民營企業(yè)中的比重在逐年增加,它對國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的貢獻(xiàn)也越來越大。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理的重點,如何利用股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)來提高企業(yè)價值,這也是家族企業(yè)面臨的難點。在不同類型的實際控制人所持股控制的家族企業(yè)中,大股東通過參與決策和經(jīng)營管理,對掏空公司利益的動機和能力存在很大差別。因此,本文以股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)出發(fā),探討在不同類型的家族企業(yè)中股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對家族企業(yè)價值的影響,從而提高家族企業(yè)價值。本文選用2011-2015年663家中國家族企業(yè)為研究對象,采用多元線性和非線性回歸模型來分析家族企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對企業(yè)價值的影響,并以實際控制人類型為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)將家族企業(yè)分為三類即:將全樣本記為情景1;將實際控制人是業(yè)主一人的家族企業(yè)記為情景2;將實際控制人是以業(yè)主為核心的親緣關(guān)系如夫妻、父母、兄弟姐妹等的家族企業(yè)記為情景3;將實際控制人是以業(yè)主為核心的創(chuàng)業(yè)伙伴記為情景4。研究結(jié)果表明:1.在情景1中第一大股東持股比例與企業(yè)價值呈顯著非線性三次函數(shù)關(guān)系,企業(yè)價值會隨第一大股東持股比例的增加而先下降后上升再下降的趨勢,并且最優(yōu)股權(quán)在20%—25%之間;但針對不同類型的家族企業(yè),第一大股東持股比例對企業(yè)價值的影響各具特異:情景2中,第一大股東持股比例對企業(yè)價值的影響并非單純的線性關(guān)系,而是呈顯著倒“U”型關(guān)系;在情景3中,兩者之間呈顯著的非線性三次函數(shù),與情景1一致。在情景4中,第一大股東持股比例對企業(yè)價值的影響呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,表明在以業(yè)主為核心的創(chuàng)業(yè)伙伴所持股控制的家族企業(yè)中,第一大股東持股比例會抑制企業(yè)價值的增長。2.在情景1、情景2、情景3、情景4中前十大股東持股比例和赫芬達(dá)爾指數(shù)(HHI10)會促進(jìn)企業(yè)價值的增長,兩者之間呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系。但從系數(shù)上看,情景4中HHI10的系數(shù)比情景2、情景3的系數(shù)大,表明在以業(yè)主為核心的創(chuàng)業(yè)伙伴持股控制的家族企業(yè)中赫芬達(dá)爾指數(shù)對企業(yè)價值的正向促進(jìn)作用要大于以業(yè)主一人持股控制和以業(yè)主為核心的親緣持股控制的家族企業(yè)。3.在情景1、情景2、情景3、情景4中股權(quán)制衡度與企業(yè)價值呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,但情景3中ZH5的系數(shù)絕對值大于情景2和情景4,表明以業(yè)主為核心的親緣家族成員所控股的家族企業(yè),前五大股東中家族成員股東占比高,其制衡度對企業(yè)價值的負(fù)向影響會大于情景2和情景4。4.企業(yè)壽命與企業(yè)價值顯著成正相關(guān)關(guān)系,但是影響程度不大。在情景1、情景2、實際控制人的職位與企業(yè)價值呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。據(jù)此本文針對家族企業(yè)提出以下建議:1.適當(dāng)降低第一大股東持股比例;2.利用制衡機制,建立合理的監(jiān)督體系。
[Abstract]:With the reform of China's economic system, the proportion of family enterprises in private enterprises is increasing year by year, and its contribution to the national economy is increasing. The ownership structure is the focus of corporate governance. How to make use of the ownership structure to improve the enterprise value, which is also the difficulty faced by the family business. In the family business controlled by different types of actual controllers, the majority shareholders participate in the decision-making and management. There are great differences in the motivation and ability of tunneling companies. Therefore, this paper discusses the influence of equity structure on the value of family firms in different types of family firms. In order to improve the value of family business. This paper selected 663 Chinese family enterprises from 2011-2015 as the research object. The multivariate linear and nonlinear regression models are used to analyze the influence of the ownership structure of the family firm on the enterprise value, and the family firm is divided into three categories according to the type of actual controller: the whole sample is recorded as scenario 1; The family business in which the actual controller is an owner is recorded as scenario 2; The family business in which the actual controlling person is the owner as the core, such as husband and wife, parents, brothers and sisters, etc., is recorded as scenario 3; The research results show that the proportion of the largest shareholder in scenario 1 has a significant nonlinear cubic function relationship with the enterprise value. With the increase of shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, the enterprise value will decrease first and then rise and then decrease, and the optimal equity will be between 20% and 25%; However, for different types of family enterprises, the proportion of the first largest shareholder has a unique impact on the value of the enterprise: scenario 2, the impact of the proportion of the largest shareholder on the value of the enterprise is not a simple linear relationship. The relationship between U and U is obvious. In scenario 3, there is a significant nonlinear cubic function between them, which is consistent with scenario 1. In scenario 4, there is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of the first largest shareholder holding shares and the value of the firm. It shows that in the family firm controlled by the owner as the core venture partner, the proportion of the largest shareholder holding shares will inhibit the growth of enterprise value. 2. In scenario 1, scenario 2, scenario 3. In scenario 4, the proportion of the top ten shareholders and the HHI 10) will promote the growth of firm value, and there is a significant positive correlation between the two. But from the coefficient point of view. The coefficient of HHI10 in scenario 4 is higher than that in scenario 2 and the coefficient of scenario 3 is larger. The results show that the positive effect of Huffendal index on enterprise value in the family firm with owner as the core partner ownership control is greater than that in the family firm with owner holding control and kinship ownership control with owner as the core. Ethnic enterprises. 3. In scenario 1. In scenario 2, scenario 3 and scenario 4, there is a significant negative correlation between equity balance and enterprise value, but the absolute value of ZH5 in scenario 3 is greater than that in scenario 2 and scenario 4. It shows that the proportion of family members in the first five major shareholders is high in the family business which is controlled by the related family members with the owner as the core. The negative impact of the degree of balance on enterprise value will be greater than scenario 2 and scenario 4.4.There is a significant positive correlation between enterprise life and enterprise value, but the degree of influence is not significant. In scenario 1, scenario 2. There is a significant negative correlation between the position of the actual controller and the value of the enterprise. Accordingly, this paper puts forward the following suggestions for the family firm: 1. Appropriately reduce the proportion of the largest shareholder; 2. To establish a reasonable supervision system by means of checks and balances.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：新疆大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F276.5;F275

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