本文關(guān)鍵詞：國(guó)資控股公司在職消費(fèi)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)替代效應(yīng)研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 國(guó)資控股 股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案 在職消費(fèi) 替代效應(yīng)

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)與在職消費(fèi)同屬于高管激勵(lì)契約的一部分,兩種的激勵(lì)契約擁有不同的契約成本,一種激勵(lì)方式的可獲得性與否與收益的高低會(huì)影響高管對(duì)另一種激勵(lì)方式的選擇,因此在職消費(fèi)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)之間可能會(huì)存在著替代效應(yīng)。然而,現(xiàn)有成果中分別對(duì)這兩者進(jìn)行研究的文章雖多,深入研究在職消費(fèi)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)之間替代效應(yīng)的卻很少。因此,本文從股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的制定環(huán)節(jié)出發(fā),以國(guó)資控股公司為樣本,結(jié)合國(guó)企激勵(lì)制度的特殊性,重點(diǎn)探討國(guó)資控股公司的在職消費(fèi)水平與股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的福利性程度之間的相關(guān)性關(guān)系。具體本文以2008年1月1日至2014年12月31日期間所有公布股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的國(guó)資控股公司為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)在職消費(fèi)如何影響國(guó)資控股公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案類型的選擇,以及公司的內(nèi)部股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和管理層權(quán)力在該影響過(guò)程中扮演了怎樣的角色進(jìn)行了理論探討和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：在職消費(fèi)水平對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案類型存在顯著的替代效應(yīng)；股權(quán)制衡度的提高,會(huì)弱化在職消費(fèi)對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案類型的替代效應(yīng)影響；管理層權(quán)力的提高也會(huì)弱化國(guó)資控股公司在職消費(fèi)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案選擇之間的替代效應(yīng)。這意味著,改善一股獨(dú)大的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),實(shí)現(xiàn)股權(quán)制衡,可以有效抑制高管的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),并將促成最有利于公司發(fā)展的激勵(lì)契約的達(dá)成；同時(shí)在國(guó)資控股公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的制定過(guò)程中,要密切關(guān)注行權(quán)業(yè)績(jī)條件等條款的設(shè)定,避免股權(quán)激勵(lì)淪為管理層彌補(bǔ)在職消費(fèi)方面福利損失的工具。
[Abstract]:A portion of the equity incentive and perquisite consumption belong to executive incentive contract, two kinds of incentive contracts with different contract costs, an incentive mechanism can be obtained or not and the income will affect the level of executives on another incentive options, so between on-the-job consumption and equity incentive may exist substitution effect. However, although there are many articles on the two, there are few alternative effects between on-the-job consumption and equity incentive. Therefore, starting from the formulation of equity incentive program and taking the state owned holding company as a sample, combined with the particularity of the incentive system of state-owned enterprises, this paper focuses on the correlation between the incumbency level of state owned holding companies and the welfare degree of equity incentive programs. This paper from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2014 all announced equity incentive plan of state-owned holding company as the research object, how to influence the state owned holding company equity incentive plan to choose the type of service consumption, and the company's internal ownership structure and management power in the process of how to play the role of theoretical discussion and empirical test. The study found: scheme types have a significant substitution effect on the consumption level of the equity incentive; equity balance degree of substitution effect will weaken the influence of consumption equity incentive plan types; management of power will improve the substitution effect between consumption and equity weakening of state owned holding company incentive scheme selection. This means that the improvement of shareholder ownership structure, to achieve the balance of ownership, moral hazard can effectively restrain executive, and to reach the most conducive to the development of the company's equity incentive contract; at the same time in the state owned holding company scheme, should pay close attention to exercise performance conditions in terms of the set. To avoid becoming the management equity incentive for on-the-job consumption welfare loss tool.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉志遠(yuǎn);毛淑珍;樂(lè)國(guó)林;;控股股東對(duì)上市公司股權(quán)集中度影響的實(shí)證分析[J];財(cái)貿(mào)研究;2008年01期

2 韓蔥慧;胡國(guó)柳;;股權(quán)集中度與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量相關(guān)性的實(shí)證研究[J];瓊州學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2009年05期

3 劉華;鄭軍;;高新技術(shù)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司業(yè)績(jī)——基于自主創(chuàng)新的視角[J];會(huì)計(jì)之友(上旬刊);2010年12期

4 李垣;郭海;弋亞群;劉益;;股權(quán)集中度影響產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新與學(xué)習(xí)導(dǎo)向[J];新財(cái)經(jīng);2011年08期

5 石勁磊;中外券商股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)比較研究[J];貴州商專學(xué)報(bào);2001年04期

6 張華,鄢華;企業(yè)股權(quán)集中度的決定因素[J];西南民族學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2002年03期

7 鄭德s，

本文編號(hào)：1342627