本文選題：中小上市企業(yè) + 高管薪酬�。� 參考：《湖南工業(yè)大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在這個知識經濟時代，，隨著市場競爭的日趨激烈，人才的競爭直接關系到企業(yè)的核心競爭力，而作為企業(yè)核心決策層的高級管理者則直接影響到企業(yè)的健康成長。進而如何對他們實施有效的激勵措施來實現(xiàn)企業(yè)利益最大化的問題也就自然成為社會各界討論的熱點話題。本文就其一個支點，以2010-2012年深圳交易所中小板上市企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本，對我國中小上市企業(yè)高管薪酬對盈利能力的影響進行實證研究。 首先，闡述了我國中小上市企業(yè)對盈利能力影響的研究背景，指出進行該研究的必要性；通過閱讀和整理大量文獻資料，對國內外相關研究成果進行了梳理和總結，理清了研究思路和研究方法。 其次，介紹了我國中小上市企業(yè)、高管薪酬以及企業(yè)盈利能力的相關概念；闡述了我國中小上市企業(yè)高管薪酬對盈利能力影響研究的相關理論基礎；并通過描述性統(tǒng)計對我國中小上市企業(yè)的高管薪酬和企業(yè)盈利能力的現(xiàn)狀做了分析。 再次，在理論研究的基礎上，提出了相應的研究假設，并據(jù)以進行了相關的變量設計和模型構建；利用因子分析、回歸分析和獨立樣本T檢驗等統(tǒng)計方法將數(shù)據(jù)樣本代入進行實證研究。得到的研究結果顯示：我國中小上市企業(yè)的盈利能力與高管年薪有顯著的正向相關關系，與高管持股比例沒有顯著的相關關系；我國中小上市企業(yè)的高管薪酬在不同的股權集中度下沒有表現(xiàn)出顯著的差異性。 最后，根據(jù)研究結論，結合我國中小板上市企業(yè)自身的特征提出相關政策建議，主要建議如下：設計科學合理的薪酬考核制度，并增加其透明度；短期激勵和長期激勵相結合，完善高管薪酬激勵機制；控制適當?shù)墓蓹嗉卸�；完善中小上市企業(yè)的公司治理結構，加強企業(yè)內部監(jiān)督機制；優(yōu)化資本市場環(huán)境，改革和完善相關的法律和法規(guī)。
[Abstract]:In this era of knowledge economy, with the increasingly fierce competition in the market, the competition of talents is directly related to the core competitiveness of enterprises, and the senior managers as the core decision-making level of enterprises directly affect the healthy growth of enterprises. Then how to implement effective incentive measures to maximize the interests of enterprises has naturally become a hot topic of social discussion. Based on the data of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2012, this paper makes an empirical study on the effect of executive compensation on profitability of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China. First of all, it expounds the research background of the impact of small and medium-sized listed enterprises on profitability, points out the necessity of the research, through reading and sorting out a large amount of literature, combs and summarizes the relevant research results at home and abroad. The research ideas and methods are clarified. Secondly, it introduces the related concepts of the small and medium-sized listed enterprises, the executive compensation and the profitability of the small and medium-sized listed enterprises, and expounds the relevant theoretical basis of the research on the influence of the executive compensation on the profitability of the small and medium-sized listed enterprises in our country. Through descriptive statistics, the paper analyzes the current situation of executive compensation and profitability of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China. Thirdly, on the basis of theoretical research, the corresponding research hypotheses are put forward, and the relevant variable design and model construction are carried out. Statistical methods such as regression analysis and independent sample T test substitute data samples for empirical research. The results show that: the profitability of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China has a significant positive correlation with the annual executive salary, and there is no significant correlation with the proportion of executive ownership; There is no significant difference in executive compensation of small and medium-sized listed enterprises under different ownership concentration. Finally, according to the conclusions of the study, combined with the characteristics of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China, the relevant policy recommendations are put forward. The main suggestions are as follows: design a scientific and reasonable salary assessment system and increase its transparency; combine short-term incentive with long-term incentive. Improve the incentive mechanism of executive compensation; control the appropriate concentration of equity; improve the corporate governance structure of small and medium-sized listed enterprises, strengthen the internal supervision mechanism of enterprises; optimize the capital market environment, reform and improve the relevant laws and regulations.
【學位授予單位】：湖南工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92

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