本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + CEO更替��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著跨國(guó)公司全球業(yè)務(wù)的高速拓展,企業(yè)決策層和執(zhí)行層需要面對(duì)和處理越來(lái)越多的內(nèi)部和外部信息,而傳統(tǒng)的董事會(huì)—董事長(zhǎng)—總經(jīng)理式的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)阻滯了決策層和執(zhí)行層之間的信息傳遞,影響了經(jīng)理層對(duì)企業(yè)重大決策的快速反應(yīng)和執(zhí)行能力,降低了企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)效率,一些大型跨國(guó)企業(yè)開(kāi)始重新審視這類公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)并對(duì)其進(jìn)行變革,CEO制度孕育而生,CEO的出現(xiàn)為企業(yè)更有效率的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理開(kāi)辟了新途徑,也體現(xiàn)了企業(yè)真真正正的所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的分離,CEO的設(shè)立體現(xiàn)了能者為之,以人為本和為人力資本合理定價(jià)的思想,目前設(shè)立CEO已成為國(guó)際上通行的一種公司治理方式。 CEO從某種意義上說(shuō)是公司的掌舵人,擁有最終的執(zhí)行經(jīng)營(yíng)管理決策的權(quán)力。由于行業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)環(huán)境愈加復(fù)雜多變,帶來(lái)了行業(yè)的深層次的洗牌,企業(yè)高層管理者尤其是CEO變動(dòng)越來(lái)越頻繁,全球領(lǐng)先的管理咨詢公司博斯于2013年4月18日發(fā)布了針對(duì)全球規(guī)模最大的2500家上市公司的CEO調(diào)查報(bào)告,據(jù)報(bào)告顯示：2012年全球范圍內(nèi)CEO更替率為15%,為近十年以來(lái)歷史第二高,計(jì)劃內(nèi)的CEO更替占到全部更替的72%,且新任CEO大多來(lái)自企業(yè)內(nèi)部,中國(guó)企業(yè)的CEO更替相對(duì)較低,但也達(dá)到8.1%，與2007-2011年的5.5%相比,增長(zhǎng)幅度還是較大,達(dá)到47.2%,其中CEO繼任來(lái)源上64%的新任CEO是來(lái)由內(nèi)部提拔產(chǎn)生,從另一個(gè)方面也反映出中國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)待CEO更替的積極態(tài)度,在面對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)好轉(zhuǎn)帶來(lái)的大好形勢(shì)時(shí),通過(guò)積極地制定繼任計(jì)劃,穩(wěn)定企業(yè)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層,幫助企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)發(fā)展和突破。 長(zhǎng)期以來(lái),CEO更替一直是國(guó)內(nèi)外資本市場(chǎng)和公司治理研究中的一項(xiàng)重要內(nèi)容,也是管理學(xué)研究中的一個(gè)熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。CEO更替作為最具影響力的管理層變動(dòng),影響到企業(yè)運(yùn)作的方方面面,他們處于企業(yè)的權(quán)力中心,其管理能力和企業(yè)家才能一定程度上決定著一個(gè)企業(yè)的成長(zhǎng)和績(jī)效,企業(yè)的生存和發(fā)展也與CEO個(gè)人的成敗息息相關(guān)。因此CEO更替被視為企業(yè)發(fā)展過(guò)程中最重要的戰(zhàn)略決策之一。 基于傳統(tǒng)的委托代理理論和早期的公司治理理論,西方學(xué)者于20世紀(jì)60年代就開(kāi)始對(duì)工業(yè)化國(guó)家上市公司的CEO更替問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了大量卓有成效的研究。經(jīng)過(guò)長(zhǎng)達(dá)10多年的實(shí)證研究,直到70年代CEO更替的理論框架才初具雛形。國(guó)外有關(guān)CEO更替的研究是在成熟的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)下展開(kāi)的,而我國(guó)目前正處于經(jīng)濟(jì)體制轉(zhuǎn)軌階段,自上世紀(jì)90年代,國(guó)有企業(yè)進(jìn)行了大規(guī)模的公司制改革,初步建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度,形成權(quán)責(zé)明確、相互制約的法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)并逐步上市,資本市場(chǎng)的不完善以及研究CEO更替的相對(duì)不足,國(guó)外的研究結(jié)果并不能解釋當(dāng)下中國(guó)上市公司CEO更替的深層次原因。另一方面,我國(guó)大多數(shù)上市公司是由國(guó)有企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)制而來(lái),這類具有強(qiáng)烈政府背景的企業(yè),他們的CEO更替相對(duì)比較復(fù)雜,且以行政任免居多。為盡量避免主觀成分(行政任免)對(duì)CEO更替的影響,本文將選取已初步建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)且較大規(guī)模的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為樣本,對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司CEO更替的動(dòng)因進(jìn)行深入研究。 由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)不夠成熟、社會(huì)的創(chuàng)業(yè)機(jī)制不夠完善及創(chuàng)業(yè)板風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與收益不對(duì)稱等原因,自2009年10月30日中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)開(kāi)市以來(lái),創(chuàng)業(yè)板迎來(lái)高管離職高潮,而CEO作為高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的核心人物,對(duì)企業(yè)的生存和發(fā)展有著不可估量的作用,因此專業(yè)、系統(tǒng)地去研究這類企業(yè)CEO更替的問(wèn)題顯得非常有意義。據(jù)此本文提出了主要研究對(duì)象,即中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司CEO更替的影響機(jī)制。相比國(guó)外較為成熟的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng),中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)目前還處于起步階段,還有許多不完善和需要改進(jìn)的地方,但其成長(zhǎng)速度驚人,截止2013年12月31日,短短的幾年時(shí)間內(nèi),總計(jì)355家自主創(chuàng)新型及創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)在深交所創(chuàng)業(yè)板成功上市。為了能更全面、系統(tǒng)地分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司CEO更替的影響機(jī)制,筆者認(rèn)為應(yīng)該從更替的結(jié)果和更替的過(guò)程兩方面進(jìn)行研究�；谝酝芯康某晒蜕鲜龇治�,本文的研究主要分為兩塊：一是探討創(chuàng)業(yè)板所有上市公司發(fā)生CEO更替的影響因素；二是以發(fā)生CEO更替的上市公司為樣本,研究其CEO更替過(guò)程的影響因素,其中CEO更替過(guò)程分為離任類型和繼任者來(lái)源,離任類型包括強(qiáng)迫離任和自愿離任,繼任者來(lái)源包括內(nèi)部繼任和外部繼任。 本文的總體研究思路是：基于委托代理理論、人力資本理論和資源依賴?yán)碚?總結(jié)和歸納以往的研究成果,以正處于快速發(fā)展期的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為樣本,從企業(yè)績(jī)效、公司特性、CEO特性、控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)這四個(gè)方面提出相應(yīng)的假設(shè)和建立模型,并用大量上市公司信息披露的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)和公司治理數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證假設(shè)。希望通過(guò)對(duì)該類企業(yè)CEO更替的動(dòng)因進(jìn)行全面、深入地研究,能為中國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)上的完善、證券市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管部門(mén)相關(guān)制度的完善以及市場(chǎng)環(huán)境的改善提供參考依據(jù)。 本文研究的邏輯框架為：(1)緒論：闡述研究背景,結(jié)合國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)CEO更替的研究,繼而提出本文的研究問(wèn)題；其次論述本研究的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義；在此基礎(chǔ)上總括本文的研究思路、研究方法、研究?jī)?nèi)容和研究架構(gòu)；最后總結(jié)本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。(2)文獻(xiàn)綜述：集中國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)CEO更替的研究成果,分別從企業(yè)績(jī)效、公司特性、CEO特性、公司控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)這四個(gè)方面整理成文獻(xiàn)綜述。(3)理論框架和假設(shè)：本章詳細(xì)論述了本文研究的三大理論基礎(chǔ)—委托代理理論、人力資本理論、資源依賴?yán)碚?并用這三大理論對(duì)CEO更替進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要的分析。建立在理論的基礎(chǔ)上和結(jié)合文獻(xiàn)的研究成果,提出本文的研究假設(shè)。本章首先結(jié)合中國(guó)具體的情景,從我國(guó)實(shí)際出發(fā),對(duì)CEO、CEO更替、CEO離任(強(qiáng)迫離任、自愿離任)、CEO繼任來(lái)源(內(nèi)部繼任、外部繼任)等概念加以清晰界定；其次詳細(xì)論述了本文研究的三大理論基礎(chǔ)—委托代理理論、人力資本理論、資源依賴?yán)碚?并用這三大理論對(duì)CEO更替進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的分析。(4)實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì)：首先對(duì)樣本和數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行整理和篩選；然后根據(jù)研究假設(shè)選取相應(yīng)的解釋變量和被解釋變量,并對(duì)CEO相關(guān)概念和變量進(jìn)行了界定；最后根據(jù)變量類別選擇本文研究的模型和模型設(shè)計(jì)。(5)實(shí)證研究：首先從CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)和深圳證券交易所官方網(wǎng)站上收集創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)和公司治理數(shù)據(jù),并進(jìn)行歸納和整理,對(duì)研究的樣本進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述；其次對(duì)建立的Logit模型進(jìn)行假設(shè)檢驗(yàn),在得到回歸結(jié)果后,通過(guò)進(jìn)一步分析得出實(shí)證結(jié)論。(6)結(jié)論與展望：總結(jié)本文的研究成果,指出本文研究的局限性與不足,并對(duì)未來(lái)研究的方向進(jìn)行展望。 本文通過(guò)回歸分析方法,運(yùn)用統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)軟件SPSS20.0,對(duì)理論模型中的假設(shè)進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證,主要得到以下結(jié)論： (1)公司績(jī)效與CEO更替顯著負(fù)相關(guān) (2)公司績(jī)效與CEO強(qiáng)迫離任顯著負(fù)相關(guān) (3)公司績(jī)效與CEO外部繼任顯著負(fù)相關(guān) (4)產(chǎn)業(yè)別與CEO更替顯著正相關(guān) (5)公司規(guī)模與CEO內(nèi)部繼任顯著正相關(guān) (6)第一大股東持股比例與外部繼任顯著正相關(guān) (7)董監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模與CEO更替顯著正相關(guān) (8)CEO年齡與CEO強(qiáng)迫離任顯著負(fù)相關(guān) (9)CEO教育程度與CEO更替顯著負(fù)相關(guān) (10)CEO教育程度與CEO強(qiáng)迫離任顯著負(fù)相關(guān) (11)CEO任職年限與CEO強(qiáng)迫離任顯著負(fù)相關(guān) (12)并購(gòu)重組與CEO更替顯著正相關(guān)
[Abstract]:With the rapid expansion of global business in MNCs, the decision layer and the executive layer need to face and deal with more and more internal and external information. The traditional board of directors general manager type corporate governance block the information transfer between the decision layer and the executive layer, which affects the rapid decision of the managers. The quick response and execution ability have reduced the business efficiency of the enterprise. Some large multinational enterprises have begun to reexamine the corporate governance structure and change them. The CEO system is born. The emergence of CEO has opened up a new way for the more efficient management of the enterprise, and it also embodies the real and true separation of ownership and management rights of the enterprise, CE The establishment of O embodies the idea of "people oriented" and "rational pricing for human capital". At present, the establishment of CEO has become a popular way of corporate governance in the world.
CEO, in a sense, is the company's helm, and has the ultimate power to carry out management decisions. As the business environment is increasingly complex and complex, it has brought the deep shuffle of the industry, and the top management of the enterprise, especially the CEO, is becoming more and more frequent. The leading global management consulting company, Bois, was released in April 18, 2013. The CEO survey report for the 2500 largest listed companies in the world shows that the global replacement rate of CEO in 2012 was 15%, which was second high in the past ten years. The CEO replacement in the plan accounted for 72% of the total replacement, and the new CEO was mostly from the internal enterprises, and the CEO turnover of Chinese enterprises was relatively low, but also reached 8.1%, Compared with the 2007-2011 year 5.5%, the growth rate is still larger, reaching 47.2%, of which the new CEO of CEO's successor source is produced by the new CEO. From another aspect, it also reflects the positive attitude of Chinese enterprises to the replacement of the CEO. The leadership, to help enterprises to achieve development and breakthrough.
For a long time, CEO replacement has been an important content in the research of capital market and corporate governance at home and abroad. It is also a hot issue in the study of management..CEO replacement is the most influential management change. It affects all aspects of the operation of the enterprise. They are in the power center of the enterprise, its management ability and entrepreneur ability. To a certain extent, the growth and performance of an enterprise are determined, and the survival and development of the enterprise are also closely related to the success or failure of CEO individuals. Therefore, the replacement of CEO is regarded as one of the most important strategic decisions in the process of enterprise development.
Based on the traditional principal-agent theory and the early corporate governance theory, western scholars began to make a great deal of fruitful research on the CEO replacement of the listed companies in the industrialized countries in 1960s. After more than 10 years of empirical research, the theoretical framework of the replacement of CEO was just in shape until 70s. The foreign related CEO is more important. The research is under the mature market economy, but China is now in the transition stage of the economic system. Since the 90s of last century, the state-owned enterprises carried out a large-scale corporate system reform, initially established a modern enterprise system to form a corporate governance structure with definite power and responsibility and mutual restriction, and the capital market is imperfect. And studying the relative insufficiency of the CEO replacement, the research results abroad can not explain the deep reasons for the CEO replacement of the listed companies in China. On the other hand, most of the listed companies in China are converted from state-owned enterprises, and these enterprises with strong government background are relatively complex in their CEO replacement and are mostly administrative and free. Try to avoid the influence of the subjective component (administrative appointment) on the replacement of the CEO. This article will select a sample of the initial establishment of a modern corporate governance structure and a larger scale of the GEM listed companies, and make an in-depth study of the motivation of the CEO replacement of the GEM listed companies.
Since the GEM market is not mature enough, the entrepreneurial mechanism of the society is not perfect and the risk and income of the gem are asymmetrical, since the opening of the Chinese gem market in October 30, 2009, the gem has ushered in the high tide of executive turnover. As the core figure of the executive team, CEO has an immeasurable effect on the survival and development of the enterprise. In this major, it is very meaningful to systematically study the CEO replacement of such enterprises. This paper puts forward the main research object, that is, the influence mechanism of the CEO replacement of the Chinese GEM listed companies. Compared with the more mature gem market in foreign countries, the Chinese gem market is still in its infancy at present, and there are still many imperfect and necessary. The improved place, but its growth rate is amazing, in December 31, 2013, in a few short years, a total of 355 independent innovation and entrepreneurial enterprises have been successfully listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In order to have more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the influence mechanism of the CEO replacement of the GEM listed companies, I think it should be from the result and replacement of the replacement. Two aspects of the process are studied. Based on the previous research results and the above analysis, the research of this paper is divided into two main parts: one is to discuss the influence factors of the CEO replacement of all listed companies on the gem; the two is to take the listed companies with CEO replacement as samples to study the influence factors of its CEO replacement process, of which the CEO replacement process is divided into the separation process. The type of appointment and the source of the successor, the outgoing type includes forced resigning and voluntary resigning, and the successor sources include internal succession and external succession.
The overall study of this paper is based on the principal-agent theory, human capital theory and resource dependence theory, summing up and summarizing the previous research results, taking the GEM listed companies in the rapid development period as samples, and putting forward the corresponding hypotheses and Jian Limo from the four aspects of enterprise performance, corporate characteristics, characteristics, and control market. In order to improve the corporate governance structure of the Chinese private enterprises, the improvement of the relevant regulations of the securities market supervision department and the improvement of the market environment, it is hoped that the motivation of the CEO replacement of this kind of enterprise will be thoroughly and deeply studied. Provide reference basis.
The logical framework of this study is as follows: (1) Introduction: introduction of the research background, combined with the research on CEO replacement at home and abroad, then put forward the research problems in this paper; secondly, discuss the theoretical and practical significance of this study; on this basis, we summarize the research ideas, research methods, research content and research framework; finally summarize this article Innovation points. (2) literature review: the research results of CEO replacement in China and abroad are collected from four aspects of enterprise performance, company characteristics, CEO characteristics and corporate control market. (3) theoretical framework and hypothesis: this chapter details the three theoretical basis of this study - principal-agent theory, human capital theory On the basis of the three theories, a brief analysis of the CEO replacement is made with these theories. Based on the theory and the research results of the literature, the research hypothesis is put forward. This chapter, first of all, combined with the specific situation in China, from the reality of China, the CEO, the CEO, the CEO departure (forced departure, voluntary departure), and the CEO succession source ( The concepts of internal succession and external successor are clearly defined. Secondly, the three theoretical foundations of this study are discussed in detail: principal-agent theory, human capital theory, and resource dependence theory, and the CEO replacement is analyzed in detail with these three theories. (4) empirical research and Design: first of all, the sample and data are arranged and screened. And then select the corresponding explanatory variables and the explanatory variables according to the research hypothesis, and define the related concepts and variables of CEO. Finally, the model and model design of this paper are selected according to the category of variables. (5) empirical study: first, we collect the GEM listed companies from the CSMAR database and the official website of Shenzhen securities exchange. Financial data and corporate governance data, and make a summary and collation, carry out a statistical description of the sample of the study; secondly, make a hypothesis test of the established Logit model. After getting the results of the regression, we can get the empirical conclusion through further analysis. (6) conclusion and Prospect: Summarize the research results of this article, and point out the limitations and the lack of the research. Foot, and look at the direction of future research.
In this paper, the hypothesis of the theoretical model has been verified by means of regression analysis and statistical software SPSS20.0.
(1) there is a significant negative correlation between company performance and CEO turnover
(2) there is a significant negative correlation between corporate performance and CEO forced departure
(3) there is a significant negative correlation between company performance and CEO's external successor
(4) there is a significant positive correlation between industry and CEO replacement
(5) there is a significant positive correlation between the size of the company and the internal successor of CEO
(6) the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is positively related to the external succession.
(7) a significant positive correlation between the size of the Tung's board and the replacement of the CEO
(8) there is a significant negative correlation between the CEO age and the forced departure of CEO
(9) the level of CEO education was negatively correlated with the replacement of CEO
(10) CEO education level is significantly negatively correlated with CEO forced resigning.
(11) the length of service of CEO is significantly negatively correlated with CEO's forced departure.
(12) a significant positive correlation between M & A and CEO replacement
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.91

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