本文選題：CEO權(quán)力 + 媒體關(guān)注��； 參考：《西北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)前,中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)處于轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期,投資作為帶動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的“三駕馬車(chē)”之一,在推動(dòng)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)平穩(wěn)轉(zhuǎn)軌,實(shí)現(xiàn)又好又快發(fā)展進(jìn)程中發(fā)揮著舉足輕重的作用。投資效率,從宏觀角度而言,影響資本市場(chǎng)資源配置效率及國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展;從微觀企業(yè)而言,損害了股東及公司價(jià)值,造成資源浪費(fèi)。過(guò)度投資作為一種非效率投資,指企業(yè)把資金投向了凈現(xiàn)值(NPV)為負(fù)的項(xiàng)目,這會(huì)帶來(lái)一系列惡劣后果。兩權(quán)分離的現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度,公司CEO權(quán)力過(guò)于集中,其有可能將自身利益凌駕于股東利益之上,利用權(quán)力尋租,引發(fā)公司過(guò)度投資行為。在信息化浪潮推進(jìn)和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)普及的信息時(shí)代,媒體從輿論宣傳角色過(guò)渡到社會(huì)治理角色,在企業(yè)層面表現(xiàn)為媒體對(duì)企業(yè)進(jìn)行信息報(bào)道和社會(huì)監(jiān)督。媒體關(guān)注成為公司外部監(jiān)督的一種重要力量,連接著企業(yè)、市場(chǎng)和投資者,有可能約束CEO權(quán)力的過(guò)度膨脹和尋租行為。本文選取2011年至2015年中國(guó)滬深兩市A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,考察了 CEO權(quán)力對(duì)企業(yè)過(guò)度投資問(wèn)題的影響,并檢驗(yàn)媒體關(guān)注如何影響CEO權(quán)力與企業(yè)過(guò)度投資之間的關(guān)系,最后,進(jìn)一步考察了上述影響關(guān)系在不同制度環(huán)境下的差異。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),CEO權(quán)力越大,上市公司過(guò)度投資行為越嚴(yán)重;媒體關(guān)注能夠降低CEO權(quán)力—過(guò)度投資的敏感性,即,媒體關(guān)注能夠有效抑制CEO權(quán)力引發(fā)的過(guò)度投資;在其他條件一定的情況下,相比于制度環(huán)境“差”的地區(qū),制度環(huán)境“好”的地區(qū)媒體關(guān)注抑制CEO權(quán)力引發(fā)的過(guò)度投資效果更顯著。該研究對(duì)于提高上市公司的投資效率,擴(kuò)展媒體關(guān)注治理作用以及制度環(huán)境建設(shè),具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:At present, China's economy is in a transitional period. Investment, as one of the "troika" that drives economic growth, plays an important role in promoting the smooth transition of China's economy and realizing the process of sound and rapid development. Investment efficiency, from a macro point of view, affects the efficiency of resource allocation in the capital market and the development of the national economy, while from the micro enterprise perspective, it damages the value of shareholders and companies and causes waste of resources. Overinvestment, as an inefficient investment, refers to projects in which companies invest their funds in NPV (net present value), which can bring about a series of adverse consequences. In the modern enterprise system with the separation of two rights, the CEO power of the company is too centralized, which may put its own interests above the interests of the shareholders, and make use of the power to seek rent, which leads to the over-investment behavior of the company. In the information age with the information tide advancing and the Internet popularizing, the media transition from the role of public opinion and propaganda to the role of social governance, and at the enterprise level, the media carries on the information report and the social supervision to the enterprise. Media attention has become an important force in the external supervision of the company, connecting enterprises, markets and investors, which may constrain the excessive expansion of CEO power and rent-seeking behavior. From 2011 to 2015, the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China are selected as samples to examine the influence of CEO power on corporate overinvestment, and to examine how the media pay attention to the relationship between CEO power and corporate overinvestment. The differences of the above-mentioned influence relations in different institutional environments are further investigated. The study found that the greater the CEO power, the more serious the overinvestment behavior of listed companies, the more sensitive the CEO power-over-investment can be reduced by media attention, that is, media attention can effectively restrain the over-investment caused by CEO power. Under certain conditions, the regional media with "good institutional environment" pay more attention to the suppression of excessive investment caused by CEO power than the regions where the institutional environment is "poor". This research has important theoretical and practical significance for improving the investment efficiency of listed companies, expanding media attention to the role of governance and institutional environment construction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51
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本文編號(hào)：1929113