本文選題：獨立董事兼任 + 質(zhì)量假說��； 參考：《審計研究》2017年05期

【摘要】：本文利用我國債券市場中發(fā)債上市公司2010~2013年數(shù)據(jù),通過檢驗獨立董事兼任與債券違約風(fēng)險之間的關(guān)系,實證檢驗了獨立董事兼任對企業(yè)債務(wù)融資成本的影響,分析了獨立董事兼任的質(zhì)量假說與忙碌假說在中國債券市場的存在性。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),獨立董事兼任席位越多,獨立董事監(jiān)督效率越低。總體上來看,債券市場中獨立董事兼任的忙碌假說占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位。具體表現(xiàn)為,隨著獨立董事兼任數(shù)量的增加,企業(yè)債務(wù)融資成本將增大。進(jìn)一步從公司層面和個體層面進(jìn)行檢驗后,發(fā)現(xiàn)提高機構(gòu)投資者持股比率和增加獨立董事薪酬,減弱了獨立董事兼任的忙碌假說效應(yīng),即降低了企業(yè)債券融資成本。
[Abstract]:In this paper, by using the 2010~2013 data of debt listed companies in China's bond market, by examining the relationship between independent directors and bond default risks, this paper empirically examines the influence of independent directors on the cost of corporate debt financing, and analyzes the existence of the quality hypothesis and the busy hypothesis of independent directors in the Chinese bond market. The study found that the more independent directors have more seats, the less efficient the independent directors supervise. In general, the busy hypothesis of the independent directors in the bond market is dominant. The specific performance is that with the increase of the number of independent directors, the cost of debt financing will increase. Further from the corporate and individual levels, the test will be further tested. After that, it is found that raising the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and increasing the salary of independent directors has weakened the busy hypothesis effect of independent directors, that is, reducing the cost of corporate bond financing.
【作者單位】： 中央財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計學(xué)院;中國人民銀行;湘潭大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年項目“賣空機制、信息傳遞與債券市場反應(yīng)”(項目批準(zhǔn)號:16YJC630065) 湖南省教育廳湘潭大學(xué)科研項目“上市公司CEO變更與財務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移效應(yīng)研究”(項目批準(zhǔn)號:KZ08063) 湖南省預(yù)算與會計理論研究基地的資助
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

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