本文選題：股權(quán)投資 + 股權(quán)激勵�。� 參考：《暨南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)投資向企業(yè)注入資金后，，通過投資后管理來促進(jìn)企業(yè)快速升值也是重要工作內(nèi)容。監(jiān)督控制是投資后管理的兩大內(nèi)容之一，股權(quán)投資者通過監(jiān)督控制來降低其與被投資企業(yè)家之間的委托-代理風(fēng)險，企業(yè)激勵機(jī)制是監(jiān)督控制內(nèi)容的重要組成部分。激勵機(jī)制包括短期激勵和長期激勵，其中，短期激勵機(jī)制容易使激勵者做出短視行為，不能與企業(yè)一起面向未來。因此，作為長期激勵的股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制設(shè)計就變得尤為重要。 基于以上，本文主要研究股權(quán)投資的介入是否為被投資企業(yè)長期激勵——股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制的設(shè)計帶來新的特征。結(jié)合理論分析和實(shí)證回歸分析，本文得出以下結(jié)論：（1）有股權(quán)投資介入的企業(yè)，股權(quán)激勵強(qiáng)度更高，激勵股權(quán)數(shù)量、對象人數(shù)都顯著高于無股權(quán)投資介入的企業(yè)；（2）股權(quán)激勵強(qiáng)度與企業(yè)業(yè)績呈現(xiàn)顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，激勵對象人數(shù)越多企業(yè)業(yè)績越好。研究結(jié)論證明股權(quán)投資的介入確為企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制設(shè)計帶來新特征，這一新特征能有效促進(jìn)企業(yè)業(yè)績提升，這一結(jié)論可為投資后管理的實(shí)踐提供理論指導(dǎo)。本文通過量化、實(shí)證的研究在已有文獻(xiàn)的感性認(rèn)知上有所進(jìn)步，但是也由于數(shù)據(jù)的搜集和整理較為困難，文中所用數(shù)據(jù)可能不夠成熟，這也是在今后的研究中需要改進(jìn)的地方。
[Abstract]:After equity investment injects funds into enterprises, it is also important to promote the rapid appreciation of enterprises through post-investment management. Supervision and control is one of the two major contents of post-investment management. Equity investors reduce the principal-agent risk between them and the entrepreneurs through supervision and control. The incentive mechanism of enterprises is an important part of supervision and control. The incentive mechanism includes short-term incentive and long-term incentive, among which, short-term incentive mechanism is easy to make the motivator make short-sighted behavior, and can not face the future together with the enterprise. Therefore, as a long-term incentive equity incentive mechanism design has become particularly important. Based on the above, this paper mainly studies whether the intervention of equity investment brings new features to the design of long-term incentive-equity incentive mechanism of invested enterprises. Combined with theoretical analysis and empirical regression analysis, this paper draws the following conclusion: 1) the enterprises with equity investment have higher intensity of equity incentive and the number of incentive shares. The number of subjects is significantly higher than that of enterprises without equity investment.) the intensity of equity incentive has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance, and the more the number of incentive objects, the better the performance of enterprises. It is proved that the intervention of equity investment can bring new features to the design of equity incentive mechanism, and this new feature can effectively promote the performance of enterprises. This conclusion can provide theoretical guidance for the practice of post-investment management. Through quantification, the empirical research has made some progress in the perceptual cognition of the existing literature, but also because of the difficulty of collecting and arranging the data, the data used in this paper may not be mature enough, which is also the place that needs to be improved in the future research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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