本文選題：官員任期 + 金融監(jiān)管�。� 參考：《財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì)》2017年04期

【摘要】：地方政府為促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長而干預(yù)銀行信貸,導(dǎo)致信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的積累,而中央金融監(jiān)管制度的創(chuàng)設(shè)旨在規(guī)制銀行行為,防范銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn),維護(hù)金融穩(wěn)定。本文將代表中央金融監(jiān)管的省級(jí)銀監(jiān)局局長,代表地方干預(yù)的地級(jí)市市委書記與城商行特征數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行匹配,考察銀監(jiān)局局長對(duì)城商行信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,以及銀監(jiān)局局長、市委書記在影響城商行信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上的相互作用。實(shí)證分析發(fā)現(xiàn),銀監(jiān)局局長任期與城商行不良貸款率負(fù)相關(guān),其作用主要體現(xiàn)為次級(jí)貸款率的下降,而市委書記任期則與次級(jí)貸款率正相關(guān)。通過建立銀監(jiān)局局長與市委書記任期的交互項(xiàng),發(fā)現(xiàn)局長任期的延長還會(huì)約束書記任期對(duì)信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的刺激作用。在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長下行期和貨幣政策寬松期,前述約束效應(yīng)更強(qiáng)。
[Abstract]:In order to promote economic growth, the local government interferes with bank credit, which leads to the accumulation of credit risk, while the establishment of central financial supervision system aims to regulate bank behavior, guard against bank risk and maintain financial stability. In this paper, the director of the provincial bank supervision bureau representing the central financial supervision, the secretary of the municipal party committee representing the local intervention, and the characteristic data of the city commercial bank are matched to investigate the influence of the director of the bank supervision bureau on the credit risk of the city commercial bank, and the director of the bank supervision bureau. City Party Secretary in the impact of the city commercial bank credit risk on the interaction. The empirical analysis shows that the term of directors of the Bureau of Banking Supervision is negatively correlated with the non-performing loan ratio of the City Commercial Bank, and its function is mainly reflected in the decline of the sub-loan ratio, while the term of office of the Municipal Party Secretary is positively related to the sub-loan ratio. By establishing the interaction between the director of the bank supervision bureau and the term of the secretary of the municipal party committee, it is found that the extension of the term of office of the director will also constrain the stimulating effect of the tenure of the secretary on the credit risk. In the economic growth downturn and monetary policy easing period, the above-mentioned restraint effect is stronger.
【作者單位】： 上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)金融學(xué)院;上海市金融信息技術(shù)研究重點(diǎn)實(shí)驗(yàn)室;北京大學(xué)國家發(fā)展研究院;上海新金融研究院;
【基金】：中國博士后科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目“中國金融監(jiān)管官員的激勵(lì)、治理與實(shí)際效應(yīng)研究”(2016M601554) 國家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目“央地關(guān)系視角下的新興金融業(yè)態(tài)監(jiān)管體制研究”(16CJY065);國家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重大項(xiàng)目“全球經(jīng)濟(jì)新格局下最后貸款人制度的理論前沿和實(shí)踐問題研究”(16ZDA035)
【分類號(hào)】：D630.3;F832.1;F832.4
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本文編號(hào)：1842837