本文選題：總經(jīng)理薪酬 + 公司業(yè)績��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：委托代理理論認(rèn)為，薪酬是能夠很好的解決所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)分離所產(chǎn)生的代理問題；最優(yōu)契約理論認(rèn)為，通過設(shè)置合理的薪酬契約（將薪酬與公司業(yè)績掛鉤）可以使高管按照股東的利益做出決策。然而，越來越多的研究結(jié)果則表明設(shè)置薪酬的過程會產(chǎn)生新的代理問題；薪酬契約并不能很好的激勵高級管理人員。由于股東與高管之前存在著信息不對稱，使得高管可以利用手中的權(quán)力自設(shè)薪酬。 本文以總經(jīng)理薪酬與業(yè)績不掛鉤為出發(fā)點，將超出總經(jīng)理控制范圍的業(yè)績變動定義為“運氣”，，并且以行業(yè)加權(quán)平均的ROE（權(quán)益收益率）——剔除公司自身的ROE和賬面總資產(chǎn)的權(quán)重——作為“運氣”的工具變量，來檢驗總經(jīng)理薪酬中是否包含運氣成分，以及通過改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)能否降低支付給總經(jīng)理的運氣薪酬。本文的理論部分基于信息不對稱理論、委托代理理論和最優(yōu)契約理論，概述了薪酬作為解決代理問題的理論基礎(chǔ)；本文的實證部分，首先以Excel、Stata10等統(tǒng)計軟件對各個變量進行描述性統(tǒng)計分析；然后以2008——2012年間的非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)（共9535個觀測值）為樣本，通過2SLS回歸，研究了滬深兩市A股上市公司（非銀行金融）總經(jīng)理薪酬與運氣的關(guān)系，并且以董事會規(guī)模、股權(quán)集中度、董事長與總經(jīng)理是否兼任作為公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的代理變量來研究公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與總經(jīng)理運氣薪酬的關(guān)系。 本文的研究結(jié)果主要有以下四點：（1）我國上市公司總經(jīng)理薪酬中普遍存在運氣薪酬的現(xiàn)象；（2）股權(quán)集中度高的公司能夠有效的減少公司支付給總經(jīng)理的運氣薪酬；（3）當(dāng)公司總經(jīng)理與董事長不是同一人時，會降低支付給總經(jīng)理的運氣薪酬；（4）董事會規(guī)模越小的公司支付給總經(jīng)理的運氣薪酬越少并沒有得到很好的驗證。最后，根據(jù)文章的實證結(jié)果，證實了總經(jīng)理薪酬中存在的運氣成分，提出通過提高股權(quán)集中度、避免出現(xiàn)總經(jīng)理與董事長兩職合一的情形出現(xiàn)等措施可以有效的改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，從而降低公司支付給總經(jīng)理的運氣薪酬的這一建議。
[Abstract]:According to the principal-agent theory, salary is a good solution to the problem of agency caused by the separation of ownership and management, and the optimal contract theory holds that, By setting up a reasonable compensation contract (linking compensation to the company's performance), executives can make decisions in the interests of shareholders. However, more and more research results show that the process of setting up the compensation will lead to new agency problems; the compensation contract is not a good incentive for senior managers. Because of the information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, executives can use their power to set their own compensation. Based on the fact that the salary of the general manager is not linked to the performance, this paper defines the change of the performance beyond the control of the general manager as "luck". And the industry-weighted average ROE-excluding the company's own ROE and the weight of the total book assets as a tool variable of "luck" to test whether the general manager's compensation includes luck. And by improving the corporate governance structure can reduce the pay to the General Manager's luck pay. The theoretical part of this paper is based on information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory. First, the statistical software Excel Stata10 was used to analyze the variables, and then the non-equilibrium panel data from 2008 to 2012 (9535 observations) were used as samples, and then the data were regressed by 2SLS. This paper studies the relationship between the compensation and luck of the general manager of A-share listed companies (non-bank finance) in Shanghai and Shenzhen, and the size of the board of directors and the degree of equity concentration. Whether the chairman and the general manager are the agent variables of the corporate governance structure to study the relationship between the corporate governance structure and the general manager's luck compensation. The main findings of this paper are as follows: 1) there is a common phenomenon of luck compensation in the salary of general managers of listed companies in China. (2) companies with high concentration of equity can effectively reduce the salary of luck paid by companies to the general manager. When the general manager and the chairman of the company are not the same person, The smaller the board size, the less luck the company pays to the managing director and the less proven it is. Finally, according to the empirical results of the article, confirmed the existence of luck in the compensation of the general manager, and proposed to improve the degree of ownership concentration, The suggestion that measures such as avoiding the combination of the general manager and the chairman can effectively improve the corporate governance structure and reduce the compensation of the company's luck to the general manager.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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