本文選題：國際化 + 股價信息含量��； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度中,所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離促使所有者分解其職能,經(jīng)理人獲得企業(yè)的控制權(quán)履行公司契約的權(quán)力和義務(wù)。然而,經(jīng)理人往往以自身效益最大化為目標(biāo)謀取個人私利,實施如粉飾公司業(yè)績的盈余管理和獲得私有收益的無效率投資等機會主義行為,嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了企業(yè)所有者的權(quán)益,產(chǎn)生了至今仍未妥善解決的委托代理問題。因此,最優(yōu)薪酬契約理論逐漸進入人們的視野,Jensen和Meckling (1976)給出了一個可能解決代理問題的方案：緊密連結(jié)所有者與經(jīng)理人的利益,將經(jīng)理人的薪酬與公司業(yè)績掛鉤,這種形式下的薪酬激勵契約可能更為合理,使經(jīng)理人為所有者利益最大化進行持續(xù)有效經(jīng)營。所有者將部分股權(quán)償付給經(jīng)理人,使其變成一定程度意義上的所有者,風(fēng)險和收益同向變動,國外上市公司的股權(quán)激勵在眾多薪酬激勵方式中占據(jù)重要地位。隨著我國股權(quán)分置改革的逐步推進,資本市場獲得進一步的改革開放與平穩(wěn)發(fā)展,達成A股全流通的局面,這些為我國上市公司的股權(quán)激勵提供一定依據(jù)。股權(quán)激勵在我國起步較晚,現(xiàn)有關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵的部分研究支持股權(quán)激勵的有效性,然而,仍有大量研究結(jié)論存在明顯質(zhì)疑�？赡茉诓煌那榫诚�,股權(quán)激勵在公司治理機制中發(fā)揮的作用不盡相同。因此,所有者需要針對上市公司的具體特點,在提升經(jīng)理人努力程度的前提下,制訂合理的薪酬激勵契約,實現(xiàn)所有者與經(jīng)理人利益的“雙贏”。 我國實行的“改革開放”是一項重要的基本國策,實現(xiàn)“走出去”的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略也是奠定我國社會主義市場經(jīng)濟的重要舉措,國際化是中國上市公司的必然選擇。企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營能夠得到更多市場準(zhǔn)入并獲取更多資源機會,意在打開我國產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的優(yōu)勢,學(xué)習(xí)先進知識,提高我國企業(yè)的國際競爭力。但國際化經(jīng)營也增加了企業(yè)經(jīng)營的不確定性和國外市場宏觀波動所帶來的風(fēng)險,經(jīng)理人極有可能因道德風(fēng)險與逆向選擇做出損害投資者利益的舉動,代理問題較國內(nèi)經(jīng)營來說存在特殊性。為解決此問題,通過股價變動連接股東與經(jīng)理人共同財富的股權(quán)激勵可能是一個更好的選擇。然而,國際化經(jīng)營的企業(yè)中,股權(quán)激勵實施效果究竟如何,是一個非常值得探討的話題。 近期研究發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)理人激勵與市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)有較大關(guān)聯(lián)。市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)理論認(rèn)為股票市場整合了公司經(jīng)營信啟、而導(dǎo)致了股價的形成,股價整合的信息中可能顯示了經(jīng)理人行為與經(jīng)理人的努力程度,股東可以利用這些信息制訂最優(yōu)的薪酬契約以更好地激勵經(jīng)理人。另外,市場能夠通過股價信息傳遞改進公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的積極信號,股東利益最大化,成為經(jīng)理人努力工作的重要目標(biāo)。因此,最優(yōu)薪酬契約的制訂受到了市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)的影響,股權(quán)激勵作為一種基于市場的業(yè)績評價方法,其是否有效,很大程度上又取決于股票價格與經(jīng)理人努力程度的關(guān)系,股票價格能否反映企業(yè)的特質(zhì)信息,是否具有信息含量。股價信息含量很可能在企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營與股權(quán)激勵效果之間發(fā)揮了重要作用,有必要將其作為一個單獨的變量加以研究。那么企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營的深入是否有助于股權(quán)激勵效果的提升?如果存在影響,這種內(nèi)在的作用機制為何?股價信息含量在這種機制中扮演什么樣的角色?這些問題一直缺乏必要的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)加以探索與檢驗。 基于上述簡要分析,扎根于我國的實際情況,本文利用滬深A(yù)股上市公司的經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)進行檔案式研究。為回答上述三個問題,本文擬從以下思路展開論述：(1)企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營的深入對股權(quán)激勵有效性造成何種影響；(2)為打開這種影響的內(nèi)在機理,國際化經(jīng)營是否通過股價信息含量作用于股權(quán)激勵有效性,進一步而言,股價信息含量是否在國際化經(jīng)營與股權(quán)激勵有效性之間存在一定的中介作用。 本文的主要內(nèi)容安排如下： 第一章,導(dǎo)論。本部分從本文的研究背景和研究意義切入,概括主要的研究內(nèi)容,詳細(xì)介紹了文章的研究方法、研究框架以及創(chuàng)新點。 第二章,文獻綜述。本章結(jié)合國內(nèi)外已有的經(jīng)典與前沿文獻對企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營、股價信息含量和股權(quán)激勵有效性三者之間進行詳盡的理論綜述,了解系統(tǒng)性的研究理念,學(xué)習(xí)了一定的研究方法。 第三章,理論分析和研究假設(shè)。本文結(jié)合最優(yōu)薪酬契約理論與市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)理論提出了三個研究假設(shè),詳細(xì)定義了本文主要的研究變量,對數(shù)據(jù)選取進行說明并作初步的數(shù)據(jù)整理。 第四章,實證分析與研究結(jié)果。本章對樣本數(shù)據(jù)進行描述性統(tǒng)計與相關(guān)性分析,初步進行說明。進而建立回歸模型,運用Stata統(tǒng)計軟件對樣本數(shù)據(jù)進行多元回歸分析,對相關(guān)的研究結(jié)果進行闡述。另外,本文運用包括PSM等檢驗方法對研究結(jié)果作穩(wěn)健性檢驗。 第五章,研究結(jié)論、政策建議及不足。本章全面闡述并總結(jié)了本文的研究結(jié)論,針對中國國際化企業(yè)面臨的現(xiàn)實問題提出可嘗試的政策建議,最后,本章主要從研究內(nèi)容和研究方法說明本文不足,為后期研究作簡要展望。 本文以2008年至2011年中國滬深A(yù)股上市公司為樣本,通過股價信息含量實證探究企業(yè)國際化對股權(quán)激勵有效性影響的作用機理,研究結(jié)果表明： 第一,我國上市公司國際化經(jīng)營深入可能加劇了代理問題,降低了股權(quán)激勵有效性。這是因為國際化企業(yè)經(jīng)營地域多元化,區(qū)域拓展經(jīng)營造成經(jīng)營過程在地理、文化以及制度方面存在巨大的差異,這種復(fù)雜性極大增加了國際化公司對經(jīng)理人的監(jiān)督成本,產(chǎn)生了信息不對稱和外部經(jīng)營的不確定性,結(jié)果增加了“道德風(fēng)險”與“逆向選擇”發(fā)生的可能性。盡管授予經(jīng)理人部分的股權(quán),經(jīng)理人承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險仍然小于公司的所有者,信息不對稱可能帶來的私人收益大于被賦予的股權(quán)激勵收益時,經(jīng)理人仍有可能做出損害投資者利益的行為,股權(quán)激勵的方式在企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營逐漸深入的過程中是失效的。 第二,在企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營對股權(quán)激勵有效性作用機制的進一步研究中,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)股價信息含量在兩者之間具有一定的中介作用。具體而言,股價信息含量是提升股權(quán)激勵有效性的重要因素,企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營通過降低股價信息含量而削弱了股權(quán)激勵有效性,并且,股價信息含量在國際化經(jīng)營與股權(quán)激勵有效性之間具有明顯的中介作用。在企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理機制作用有限的情況下,市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)理論為我們提供了一個新的視角,市場外部運作機制提供的股價信息含量有益于經(jīng)理人薪酬激勵契約的制訂。企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營增加了投資者對經(jīng)理人的監(jiān)督成本,產(chǎn)生了信息不對稱,信息透明度較低,在外部市場來看,這無疑增加了投資者搜尋公司特質(zhì)信息的成本并且降低搜尋公司特質(zhì)信息的動機,在市場交易的過程中不利于公司特質(zhì)信息融入到股價中,降低了股價信息含量。市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)理論認(rèn)為股價信息含量為制定最優(yōu)薪酬激勵契約提供重要的價值參考,股價信息含量越豐富,薪酬激勵契約越有效。那么,國際化經(jīng)營對股價信息含量的作用最終傳遞到薪酬激勵契約的實施效果,因此,國際化經(jīng)營降低了股價信息含量,削弱了股權(quán)激勵有效性。 本文的創(chuàng)新和貢獻主要有以下幾點： 第一,本文結(jié)合最優(yōu)薪酬契約理論與市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)理論從股價信息含量這一全新視角揭示了中國企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營對經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵有效性的影響。具體來說,本文不僅關(guān)注國際化經(jīng)營對股權(quán)激勵有效性的影響,更從內(nèi)部的作用機理機制入手,探究股價信息含量在其中所扮演的角色。在國際貿(mào)易的視角下,拓展了最優(yōu)薪酬契約理論與市場微觀結(jié)構(gòu)理論,豐富了相關(guān)的研究文獻。 第二,本文從不同的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對研究內(nèi)容進行詳細(xì)探索,深刻比較不同類別企業(yè)下國際化經(jīng)營通過股價信息含量對經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵效果的作用機理。以往研究認(rèn)為國有企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵機制缺失,相比之下本文得出不同的結(jié)論,企業(yè)的國際經(jīng)營,通過影響競爭環(huán)境,打破部分國有企業(yè)在國內(nèi)市場的壟斷利潤,內(nèi)在的激勵機制設(shè)計得到一定的改善。造成股權(quán)激勵失效的原因并不在于激勵機制設(shè)計缺陷,而是國際化經(jīng)營深入面臨復(fù)雜的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境造成高程度的監(jiān)督成本以及低程度的股價信息含量。本文為我黨十八大以來制定的走向國際化戰(zhàn)略決策提供一定的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。 第三,本文提供的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)深化了對企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營后果的認(rèn)識,對于民營企業(yè)與國有企業(yè)而言,盡管在現(xiàn)階段國際化經(jīng)營中,股權(quán)激勵均存在一定的缺陷和問題,但改進的方向,在側(cè)重點上有所不同�；诖�,本文在防范國際化經(jīng)營風(fēng)險,理順企業(yè)管理體制問題提供了政策建議和啟示。 第四,行文中筆者選擇了具有一定特色的研究方法。在證明股價信息含量的中介作用時,使用了中介作用三步法；利用傾向得分匹配法以及Heckman兩階段法對文章結(jié)論進行穩(wěn)健性測試。 本文的局限性主要體現(xiàn)在： 第一,只選取股權(quán)激勵,并沒有選擇其他薪酬激勵方式進行研究。薪酬激勵契約有多種形式,如貨幣薪酬、在職消費、股權(quán)激勵與政治晉升等,本文只采用股權(quán)激勵進行研究,并未探究國際化經(jīng)營是否最終影響了其它薪酬激勵契約效果,股價信息含量在內(nèi)部作用機制中是否仍然發(fā)揮著重要作用,這些問題仍然需要進一步探討。 第二,變量度量存在一定的缺陷。企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營的度量指標(biāo)較為單一本文采用中國大陸以外的銷售收入與全部銷售收入的比值度量企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營,單一的國際化指標(biāo)不能充分體現(xiàn)企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營的所有特征。采用股權(quán)持股比例只能是經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵的粗略測度,受制于股權(quán)激勵方案數(shù)據(jù)的可獲得性以及樣本的規(guī)模,難以在現(xiàn)階段針對具體股權(quán)激勵樣本展開本文研究。待樣本規(guī)模擴大后,研究者將進一步針對該問題展開穩(wěn)健性檢驗。 第三,本文使用傾向得分匹配法以及Heckman兩階段方法克服了部分內(nèi)生性對研究結(jié)果進行穩(wěn)健性檢驗,并不能消除變量之間的全部影響,實證結(jié)果仍存在一定偏差,尚需更佳的方法對經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)加以檢驗。 第四,企業(yè)國際化經(jīng)營指標(biāo)是筆者在公開的財務(wù)報表中手工收集,收集過程可能存在一定的疏忽和錯漏,另外,公開的財務(wù)報表也可能存在錯報,這些對實證結(jié)果存在一定程度的負(fù)面影響。
[Abstract]:In the modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management power causes the owner to decompose its function, and the manager obtains the power and obligation of the company to fulfill the company's contract. However, the manager often takes the personal profit as the goal of maximizing its own benefit, and implements the surplus management and the inefficiency of obtaining private income, such as whitewashing the performance of the company. Opportunism, such as rate of investment, has seriously damaged the rights and interests of the owner of the enterprise, and produced the principal-agent problem that has still not been properly solved. Therefore, the theory of optimal compensation contract has gradually entered the field of vision. Jensen and Meckling (1976) give a possible solution to the agency problem: close the interests of the owner and the manager. The compensation incentive contract in this form may be more reasonable, which makes the manager make a continuous and effective management for the owner's benefit maximization. The owner pays a part of the stock to the manager to make the owner to a certain extent, the risk and the income change, the foreign listing public. The stock incentive of the company occupies an important position in many ways of compensation incentive. With the gradual advance of the reform of the share division in China, the capital market has gained further reform and opening up and smooth development, and reached a full circulation of A shares, which provide a certain basis for the equity incentive of listed companies in our country. There are some research on equity incentive to support the effectiveness of equity incentive. However, there are still a lot of research conclusions in question. In different situations, the role of equity incentive in the corporate governance mechanism is different. Therefore, the owner needs to improve the manager's effort in view of the specific characteristics of the listed company. Under the premise, a reasonable remuneration incentive contract should be worked out to achieve the "win-win" between owners and managers.
China's "reform and opening up" is an important basic national policy. To realize the development strategy of "going out" is also an important measure to establish the socialist market economy of our country. Internationalization is the inevitable choice of Chinese listed companies. The internationalization of enterprises can get more market access and gain more resource opportunities, which is intended to open me The advantages of the development of domestic industry, learning advanced knowledge, and improving the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. However, international management also increases the uncertainty of business management and the risks caused by macroeconomic fluctuations in foreign markets. Managers are likely to do harm to investors' interests due to moral risk and adverse selection. The agency problem is more domestic than domestic. In order to solve this problem, it may be a better choice to connect equity incentive to the common wealth of shareholders and managers through stock price changes. However, it is a very important question to discuss how the effect of equity incentive in the enterprise of international operation is very worthy of discussion.
Recent studies have found that manager incentives have a great relationship with market microstructures. The market microstructure theory holds that the stock market integrates the company's business credit and leads to the formation of the stock price. The information of the stock price integration may show the managers' behavior and the managers' effort, and the shareholders can use the information to make the best salary. In addition, the market can improve the positive signal of the company's governance structure through the stock price information, and the maximization of the shareholders' interest has become an important goal for the managers to work hard. Therefore, the formulation of the optimal compensation contract is influenced by the market microstructure, and the equity incentive is a market based industry. The effectiveness of the performance evaluation method depends largely on the relationship between the stock price and the manager's effort. Can the stock price reflect the characteristic information of the enterprise and whether it has the information content. The information content of the stock price may play an important role between the enterprise's international management and the incentive effect of equity incentive. A single variable is studied. Does the depth of enterprise internationalization help improve the effectiveness of equity incentive? If there is an impact, what is the internal mechanism? What role does the share price information play in this mechanism? These questions have not been explored and tested by the necessary empirical evidence.
Based on the above analysis, this paper takes root in the actual situation of our country. This paper uses the empirical data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies to carry out the archival research. In order to answer the above three questions, this paper intends to discuss the following ideas: (1) what effect is the effect of the deepening of the enterprise internationalization management on the effectiveness of equity incentive; (2) to open this effect Internal mechanism, whether international operation is effective on equity incentive through stock price information content, further, whether the information content of stock price has a certain intermediary role between international management and equity incentive effectiveness.
The main contents of this article are as follows:
The first chapter, introduction. This part from the research background and research significance of this article, summarize the main research content, detailed introduction of the research methods, research framework and innovation.
The second chapter, literature review. This chapter combines the classic and Frontier Literature at home and abroad to carry out a detailed theoretical overview of the enterprise internationalization management, stock price information content and equity incentive effectiveness, to understand the systematic research concept and learn a certain research method.
The third chapter, theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. This paper puts forward three research hypotheses based on the optimal compensation contract theory and the market micro structure theory, and defines the main research variables in this paper, and explains the data selection and makes preliminary data arrangement.
The fourth chapter, empirical analysis and research results. This chapter carries out descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of sample data, preliminarily explains, and then establishes a regression model, uses Stata statistical software to analyze the sample data by multiple regression analysis, and expounds the related research results. In addition, this paper uses PSM and other testing methods to study the research knot. Fruit is tested for robustness.
The fifth chapter, research conclusions, policy recommendations and shortcomings. This chapter comprehensively expounds and summarizes the conclusions of this paper, and puts forward some tentative policy suggestions for the practical problems faced by Chinese internationalized enterprises. Finally, this chapter mainly from the research content and research methods to explain the shortage of this paper, and make a brief prospect for the later research.
In this paper, from 2008 to 2011, China Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies as samples, through the stock price information content to explore the effect of enterprise internationalization on the effectiveness of equity incentive effectiveness. The results show that:
First, the internationalization of China's listed companies may deepen the agency problem and reduce the effectiveness of equity incentive. This is because the diversification of the international enterprises, the regional expansion and operation of the business process in the geographical, cultural and institutional aspects of the huge difference, this complexity greatly increases the international company to the classics The supervision cost of human beings leads to the uncertainty of information asymmetry and external management. The result increases the possibility of "moral hazard" and "reverse choice". Although the managers' equity is granted, the risk of managers is still less than the owner of the company, and the private income may be greater than that given by the asymmetric information. When the equity incentive returns, the manager may still be able to harm the interests of the investor, and the way of equity incentive is ineffective in the process of the enterprise's internationalization.
Second, in the further study of the effect mechanism of enterprise internationalization on the effectiveness of equity incentive, this paper finds that the information content of stock price has a certain intermediary role between the two. In particular, the information content of the stock price is an important factor to improve the effectiveness of equity incentive, and the enterprise internationalization management is weakened by reducing the information content of the stock price. In the case of the limited role of the internal governance mechanism of the enterprise, the market micro structure theory provides us a new angle of view, and the information content of the stock price provided by the external operation mechanism of the market is beneficial to the information content of the stock price. The enterprise internationalization management increases the supervision cost of the investor to the manager, produces the information asymmetry, the information transparency is low, and in the external market, it undoubtedly increases the investor's search for the cost of the company's characteristic information and reduces the motivation of the search for the company's idiosyncratic information, and deals in the market. The market micro structure theory holds that the information content of the stock price provides important value reference for the formulation of the optimal compensation incentive contract, the more information content of the stock price is, the more effective the compensation incentive contract is. With the final transfer to the implementation effect of the compensation incentive contract, international operation reduces the information content of stock price and weakens the effectiveness of equity incentive.
The innovation and contribution of this article are mainly as follows:
First, this paper, combining the theory of optimal compensation contract and the market microstructure theory, reveals the effect of the internationalization of Chinese enterprises on the effectiveness of managers' equity incentive from a new perspective of the information content of the stock price. In the perspective of international trade, we expand the optimal compensation contract theory and the market micro structure theory, and enrich the related research literature.
Second, this paper makes a detailed exploration of the research content from different property rights, and deeply compares the mechanism of the effect of international management under different categories of enterprises under the information content of the stock price on the incentive effect of managers' equity incentive. Management, by affecting the competitive environment, breaking the monopoly profits of some state-owned enterprises in the domestic market, the internal incentive mechanism design has been improved. The cause of the failure of equity incentive is not the design defects of the incentive mechanism, but the high degree of supervision cost and low level of the international operation in depth facing the complex economic environment. This article provides some empirical evidence for our party's eighteen strategic decisions towards internationalization.
Third, the empirical evidence provided by this article deepens the understanding of the consequences of enterprise internationalization. For private enterprises and state-owned enterprises, although there are some defects and problems in the current international operation, the direction of improvement is different. Based on this, this paper is to prevent the risk of international operation. It also provides policy suggestions and Enlightenment for straightening out the management system of enterprises.
Fourth, in this paper, the author chooses a research method with certain characteristics. In proving the intermediary role of the stock price information content, the three step method is used in the medium effect, and the consistency test of the conclusion of the article is carried out by using the tendency score matching method and the Heckman two stage method.
The limitations of this article are mainly reflected in the following:
First, we only choose equity incentive, and do not choose other remuneration incentive methods to study. There are many forms of compensation incentive contract, such as monetary compensation, on-the-job consumption, equity incentive and political promotion. This paper only uses equity incentive to study, and does not explore whether the internationalization of the camp ultimately affects the effect of other compensation incentive contracts. Whether price information content is still playing an important role in the internal mechanism of action remains to be further explored.
Second, there are some defects in the measurement of variables. The measurement index of enterprise internationalization is relatively simple. This paper uses the ratio of sales income outside China and all sales revenue to measure the internationalization of enterprises, and a single international index.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.3;F275

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