發(fā)布時間：2018-04-14 23:20

  本文選題：CFO + 角色定位　； 參考：《陜西科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：CFO是Chief Financial Officer的英文縮寫,中文稱作首席財務(wù)官,是伴隨著現(xiàn)代公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善而產(chǎn)生的高級管理人員。隨著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的推動,現(xiàn)代公司的經(jīng)營環(huán)境發(fā)生了巨大的變化,經(jīng)營決策過程中面臨的不確定性也在擴(kuò)大,傳統(tǒng)的依靠規(guī)模擴(kuò)張和經(jīng)驗(yàn)決策的管理模式已經(jīng)無法很好的滿足公司的發(fā)展,必須在經(jīng)營戰(zhàn)略上進(jìn)行全面把控。CFO作為財務(wù)資源管理者,承擔(dān)著將財務(wù)信息從數(shù)據(jù)轉(zhuǎn)化為公司戰(zhàn)略決策依據(jù)的職能,對公司的投融資活動尤其是投資效率具有至關(guān)重要的作用。本文以CFO為研究對象,將CFO角色定位及對投資效率的影響進(jìn)行了專題研究。首先闡述了CFO的發(fā)展歷程,并對其角色定位做了界定,認(rèn)為CFO角色定位應(yīng)包含CFO的能力,CFO在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的定位、CFO的職責(zé)以及CFO的角色激勵這四個方面。接著對西方發(fā)達(dá)國家的CFO角色定位進(jìn)行了分析,通過對比分析為我國的CFO發(fā)展提供了借鑒。然后以中國上市公司為研究對象,以CFO的薪酬、持股、是否進(jìn)入董事會,以及是否兼任公司其他重要職位這四個變量來衡量CFO的角色激勵,實(shí)證分析了CFO角色激勵與投資效率的關(guān)系,最后根據(jù)相關(guān)結(jié)論提出對策建議。本文認(rèn)為,CFO在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中應(yīng)處于高管層,是財務(wù)資源管理者、財務(wù)創(chuàng)新的推動者以及戰(zhàn)略分析決策者。公司應(yīng)當(dāng)充分認(rèn)識到CFO的這些重要角色和獨(dú)特作用,對其在薪酬、股權(quán)、權(quán)力和職務(wù)方面選擇合適的方式給予激勵,以保障CFO職能優(yōu)勢的發(fā)揮。在CFO角色激勵與投資效率的實(shí)證研究中發(fā)現(xiàn),薪酬激勵有利于緩解投資不足,但是不利于抑制過度投資;股權(quán)激勵有利于抑制過度投資,卻不利于緩解投資不足;權(quán)力激勵即讓CFO進(jìn)入董事會對于投資效率的影響沒有顯著效果;職務(wù)激勵有利于緩解投資不足,但對于抑制過渡投資沒有顯著效果。因此公司要注意激勵機(jī)制的“雙刃”效應(yīng),做好相應(yīng)的監(jiān)督管理。本文建議,首先要從法律法規(guī)上對CFO的角色進(jìn)行明確規(guī)定,從法律層面給予CFO真正履行職能的權(quán)力。其次要完善上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu),保證CFO進(jìn)入董事會參與決策,提高決策的專業(yè)性與準(zhǔn)確性。最后CFO應(yīng)當(dāng)致力于打造自己的核心競爭力,讓自己成為行業(yè)精英,保證自己的勝任能力。
[Abstract]:CFO is the acronym of Chief Financial Officer, which is called CFO in Chinese. It is a senior manager with the improvement of modern corporate governance structure.With the promotion of global economic integration, great changes have taken place in the business environment of modern companies, and the uncertainty in the process of business decision-making is also expanding.The traditional management model based on scale expansion and experience decision can not satisfy the development of the company well. We must take the control of. CFO as the financial resource manager in the management strategy.Taking the function of transforming financial information from data into the basis of corporate strategic decision, it plays an important role in the investment and financing activities of the company, especially in the investment efficiency.In this paper, CFO is taken as the research object, the role of CFO and its impact on investment efficiency are studied.Firstly, this paper expounds the development course of CFO and defines its role orientation. It holds that the role orientation of CFO should include four aspects: the ability of CFO and the responsibility of CFO in corporate governance structure and the role incentive of CFO.Then it analyzes the role of CFO in western developed countries, and provides reference for the development of CFO in China.Then taking the listed companies in China as the research object, using the four variables of CFO compensation, shareholding, whether to join the board of directors, and whether to hold other important positions of the company to measure the role incentive of CFO.This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between CFO role incentive and investment efficiency, and finally puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions according to the relevant conclusions.This paper holds that CFO should be in the executive level in the corporate governance structure, and be the manager of financial resources, the promoter of financial innovation and the decision-maker of strategic analysis.Companies should fully recognize these important roles and unique roles of CFO and give incentives to them in terms of compensation, equity, power and position, so as to ensure the exertion of the advantages of CFO functions.In the empirical study of CFO role incentive and investment efficiency, it is found that salary incentive is beneficial to alleviate underinvestment, but is not conducive to restraining overinvestment, equity incentive is conducive to restraining overinvestment, but is not conducive to alleviating underinvestment.Power incentive, that is, the entry of CFO into the board of directors, has no significant effect on the investment efficiency, while the position incentive is helpful to alleviate the underinvestment, but it has no significant effect on restraining the transition investment.Therefore, the company should pay attention to the "double-edged" effect of incentive mechanism, and do a good job of supervision and management.This paper suggests that the role of CFO should be clearly defined in terms of laws and regulations, and that CFO should be given the power to perform its functions from the legal level.Secondly, it is necessary to perfect the governance structure of listed companies, to ensure that CFO enters the board of directors to participate in decision-making, and to improve the professionalism and accuracy of decision-making.Finally, CFO should focus on building its core competence, making itself an industry elite and ensuring its competence.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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