本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者　切入點(diǎn)：證券分析師　出處：《南京理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)股市建立20多年來(lái),已經(jīng)在國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)快速增長(zhǎng)中占據(jù)了重要的地位。但是,我們同時(shí)也要看到上市公司違法違規(guī)事件屢禁不止,使廣大中小投資者蒙受慘重?fù)p失,也阻礙了證券市場(chǎng)資源優(yōu)化配置功能的有效發(fā)揮。防范和治理上市公司違規(guī)行為變得極為重要和迫切。公司內(nèi)部治理對(duì)上市公司違規(guī)行為的影響一直受到學(xué)術(shù)界的關(guān)注,但是相對(duì)外部的一些治理因素研究甚少。一方面,作為證券市場(chǎng)的專業(yè)投資人士,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者因持股比例高而受到拋售自由度的限制,同時(shí)隨著證券市場(chǎng)和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的不斷發(fā)展,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司的積極影響日益凸顯。另一方面,作為上市公司信息的搜集、加工和傳遞者,證券分析師在降低公司的信息不對(duì)稱程度的同時(shí)也能對(duì)管理層的行為加以監(jiān)督,并且也有學(xué)者研究發(fā)現(xiàn)其在揭發(fā)公司財(cái)務(wù)丑聞等發(fā)面也具有一定的優(yōu)勢(shì),可謂是一種重要的外部治理機(jī)制。 本文以我國(guó)滬深兩市的A股上市公司為研究對(duì)象,深入探討了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、證券分析師跟隨狀況對(duì)上市公司違規(guī)行為的影響。首先,從我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)特有的制度背景出發(fā),對(duì)近年來(lái)年我國(guó)上市公司違規(guī)行為的數(shù)量特征和質(zhì)量特征進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)及深層次的原因分析,從而對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司違規(guī)行為概況有一個(gè)整體的把握。其次,本文以2008-2011年滬深A(yù)股上市公司為研究樣本,分別考察了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股和證券分析師跟隨對(duì)上市公司違規(guī)行為的影響,并重點(diǎn)考察了同時(shí)考慮機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與證券分析師跟隨相互作用情況下的影響差異。最后,基于自變量與因變量的內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題,本文檢驗(yàn)了上一期機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與分析師跟隨情況對(duì)當(dāng)期上市公司違規(guī)行為的影響,從而對(duì)回歸結(jié)果進(jìn)行內(nèi)生性控制。 統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),近年來(lái)我國(guó)上市公司違規(guī)被公開處罰的數(shù)量呈現(xiàn)由增到減再增的變化趨勢(shì),違規(guī)類型主要以信息披露違規(guī)為主。實(shí)證研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、證券分析師跟隨與上市公司違規(guī)行為顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。同時(shí),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與證券分析師跟隨之間相互影響,一方的存在減弱了另一方在上市公司中發(fā)揮的監(jiān)督作用。在控制內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題后得到的結(jié)果仍然穩(wěn)健。以上研究結(jié)果說(shuō)明我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和證券分析師在預(yù)防上市公司違規(guī)行為方面發(fā)揮了重要的監(jiān)督作用,同時(shí)也提供了治理和防范公司違規(guī)行為的線索。
[Abstract]:China's stock market has occupied an important position in the sustained and rapid growth of the national economy since the establishment of the stock market more than 20 years ago.But at the same time, we should also see that the illegal and illegal events of listed companies do not stop repeatedly, which makes the majority of small and medium-sized investors suffer heavy losses, and also hinders the effective exertion of the function of optimizing the allocation of resources in the securities market.It is very important and urgent to prevent and manage the illegal behavior of listed companies.The influence of corporate internal governance on listed companies' illegal behavior has been concerned by academic circles, but there are few researches on some external governance factors.On the one hand, as a professional investor in the securities market, institutional investors are restricted by the freedom to sell because of their high shareholdings. At the same time, with the continuous development of the securities market and institutional investors,The positive influence of institutional investors on listed companies is increasingly prominent.On the other hand, as the information collection, processing and transmission of listed companies, securities analysts can also monitor the behavior of management while reducing the degree of information asymmetry.And some scholars find that it also has some advantages in exposing corporate financial scandals, which is an important external governance mechanism.This paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research object, and discusses the influence of institutional investors' shareholding and the stock analyst's follow on the listed companies' illegal behavior.First of all, based on the unique institutional background of China's securities market, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of illegal behaviors of listed companies in China in recent years are analyzed by descriptive statistics and deep-seated reasons.Thus, the general situation of illegal behavior of listed companies in China has a holistic grasp.Secondly, taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research samples from 2008 to 2011, this paper examines the influence of institutional investors' shareholding and securities analysts' following on the listed companies' illegal behavior.The influence of institutional investor holding and securities analyst following is considered.Finally, based on the endogenous problem of independent variables and dependent variables, this paper examines the influence of institutional investors' shareholding and analyst's follow on the current listed companies' illegal behavior in the last period, and then carries on the endogenous control to the regression results.The statistical results show that in recent years, the number of listed companies' illegal punishment has changed from increasing to decreasing and increasing, and the main types of violations are information disclosure violations.The empirical results show that institutional investors' shareholding and securities analysts' followings are negatively correlated with listed companies' irregularities.At the same time, institutional investor holdings and securities analysts follow each other, with the presence of one attenuating the other's supervisory role in listed companies.The results obtained after controlling the endogenetic problem are still robust.The results show that institutional investors and securities analysts play an important supervisory role in preventing listed companies from violating the regulations, and also provide clues to the governance and prevention of corporate irregularities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F830.42;F832.51

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