本文選題：股權(quán)激勵　切入點：國有控股上市公司　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的兩權(quán)分離導(dǎo)致了代理問題的產(chǎn)生。我國國有上市公司在國民經(jīng)濟(jì)中占有極為重要的地位,但其特殊的雙層代理關(guān)系及缺少長期激勵約束機(jī)制阻礙了其自身的發(fā)展。股權(quán)激勵是處理長期激勵問題的一種有效方法。該制度在許多西方國家得到了廣泛應(yīng)用。而我國對股權(quán)激勵的實踐開始的相對較晚。隨著《國有控股上市公司(境內(nèi))實施股權(quán)激勵試行辦法》的正式頒布,這一制度才開始被國有上市公司廣泛應(yīng)用。但公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)缺陷、高管任命制等問題的存在,使其方案的設(shè)計與實施易受到管理層控制,從而引發(fā)道德風(fēng)險、分配不公等問題。我國國有企業(yè)實施股權(quán)激勵制度能否產(chǎn)生良好的激勵效果,成為政府與學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)注的焦點。在此背景下,本文對國有上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的現(xiàn)狀以及取得了何種效果進(jìn)行分析,具有很強(qiáng)的理論與現(xiàn)實意義。本文在已有研究的基礎(chǔ)上,首先,對股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了梳理,并對相關(guān)概念及理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行了闡述,據(jù)此得出國有控股上市公司進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵的原因;其次,對我國國有上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵整體情況進(jìn)行了概括描述,對其方案要素進(jìn)行了統(tǒng)計分析,并與非國有上市公司進(jìn)行了對比;再次,本文采用實證研究的方法,對股權(quán)激勵的效果進(jìn)行研究,其中,以激勵比例來衡量股權(quán)激勵水平,凈資產(chǎn)收益率作為企業(yè)業(yè)績的替代變量,經(jīng)過嚴(yán)格篩選,得到了國有上市公司2011-2015年宣告并實施的52套股權(quán)激勵方案數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,為進(jìn)行對比分析,本文篩選了 261套同時期的非國有上市公司的股權(quán)激勵方案數(shù)據(jù)作為對照樣本;為驗證不同激勵模式對激勵效果的影響,本文對不同模式下的公司業(yè)績進(jìn)行了方差分析;最后,對國有上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵所存在的問題進(jìn)行了總結(jié),并給出了本文的建議。通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn),國有上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵存在行業(yè)分布分散、激勵比例較低、激勵模式較為單一、股票來源方式選擇集中以及有效期較短等特點。通過實證分析發(fā)現(xiàn),國有上市公司股權(quán)激勵水平與公司業(yè)績呈負(fù)相關(guān),但不顯著,非國有上市公司呈正相關(guān),也不顯著。在激勵的模式選擇對激勵效果的影響方面,國有上市公司各激勵模式產(chǎn)生的激勵效果不存在顯著差異,而在非國有上市公司中,股票期權(quán)模式產(chǎn)生的激勵效果相比限制性股票模式更好。產(chǎn)生這種結(jié)果的主要原因在于我國企業(yè)實施股權(quán)激勵制度的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境仍不利于激勵效果的發(fā)揮。為改善國有企業(yè)實施該制度的現(xiàn)狀,本文提出了完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、建立競爭性經(jīng)理人市場、培育有效的資本市場和健全相關(guān)政策法規(guī)的建議。而在股權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計上,股權(quán)激勵模式的選擇對國有上市公司業(yè)績的影響不大,設(shè)計激勵方案時可以結(jié)合自身內(nèi)外部環(huán)境,選取合適的激勵模式。
[Abstract]:The separation of two rights in modern enterprises leads to the emergence of agency problems.China's state-owned listed companies play an extremely important role in the national economy, but their special double-level agency relationship and the lack of long-term incentive and restraint mechanism hinder their own development.Equity incentive is an effective method to deal with long-term incentive problem.This system has been widely used in many western countries.However, the practice of equity incentive in China began relatively late.With the formal promulgation of the implementation of the pilot measures for Stock incentive of State-owned listed companies (in China), this system has only been widely used by state-owned listed companies.However, the defects of corporate governance structure and executive appointment system make the design and implementation of the scheme easy to be controlled by the management, which leads to moral hazard and unfair distribution.Whether the equity incentive system of state-owned enterprises in China can produce a good incentive effect has become the focus of attention of the government and academic circles.Under this background, this paper analyzes the current situation and the effect of the state-owned listed companies' equity incentive, which is of great theoretical and practical significance.On the basis of the existing research, firstly, this paper combs the relevant literature on equity incentive, and expounds the related concepts and theoretical basis, according to which the reasons for equity incentive of state-owned listed companies are obtained; secondly,This paper gives a general description of the implementation of equity incentive in state-owned listed companies in China, and makes a statistical analysis of the elements of the scheme, and compares it with the non-state-owned listed companies. Thirdly, this paper adopts the method of empirical research.The effect of equity incentive is studied, in which the equity incentive level is measured by incentive ratio, and the return on net assets is regarded as the substitute variable of enterprise performance.The data of 52 equity incentive schemes announced and implemented by state-owned listed companies from 2011 to 2015 are obtained as research samples. In order to carry out comparative analysis, 261 sets of equity incentive scheme data of non-state-owned listed companies in the same period are selected as control samples.In order to verify the influence of different incentive modes on the incentive effect, this paper analyzes the variance of corporate performance under different models. Finally, the paper summarizes the problems existing in the implementation of equity incentive in state-owned listed companies, and gives some suggestions in this paper.Through the research, it is found that the state-owned listed companies have the characteristics of dispersed industry distribution, low incentive ratio, single incentive mode, centralized stock source selection and short validity period.Through the empirical analysis, it is found that the equity incentive level of the state-owned listed companies is negatively correlated with the corporate performance, but not significant, and that the non-state-owned listed companies are positively correlated and not significant.In the aspect of the influence of incentive mode selection on the incentive effect, there is no significant difference in the incentive effect of each incentive model of the state-owned listed company, but in the non-state-owned listed company,The incentive effect of stock option model is better than restrictive stock model.The main reason for this result is that the internal and external environment of the equity incentive system is still unfavorable to the exertion of the incentive effect.In order to improve the present situation of implementing the system in state-owned enterprises, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect the corporate governance structure, establish a competitive manager market, foster an effective capital market and improve the relevant policies and regulations.However, in the design of equity incentive scheme, the choice of equity incentive mode has little effect on the performance of state-owned listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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