本文選題：控制權(quán)市場　切入點(diǎn)：國有控股　出處：《廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2005年證監(jiān)會頒布了《股權(quán)分置改革辦法》后,非流通股開始向流通股轉(zhuǎn)化;之后2006年證監(jiān)會頒布了《上市公司收購管理辦法》,我國對資本市場并購的態(tài)度更加溫和。這兩者構(gòu)成了我國控制權(quán)市場發(fā)展的前提條件。而隨著我國股權(quán)分置改革的完成以及全流通時代的到來,我資本市場不斷完善發(fā)展以及上市公司質(zhì)量的不斷提高,控制權(quán)市場才慢慢形成。公司控制權(quán)對現(xiàn)代公司治理有著不可取代的核心地位,而公司控制權(quán)市場也是公司治理中重要的市場外部機(jī)制,通過對公司現(xiàn)有管理層造成持續(xù)的接管威脅來達(dá)到監(jiān)督約束管理層,進(jìn)而提高公司治理,是提升公司業(yè)績的重要途徑。雖然股權(quán)分置改革一定程度上完善了我國的資本市場,也激活了控制權(quán)市場,但由于我國特殊的國情以及控制權(quán)市場在我國發(fā)展的時間較短,我國的控制權(quán)市場效率相比國外較為低下。本文以國有控股E公司的控制權(quán)之爭為例,分析了在股權(quán)分置改革后,我國控制權(quán)市場被激活的大背景之下,國有控股企業(yè)的控制權(quán)之爭對其績效的影響,來檢驗(yàn)我國國有控股企業(yè)控制權(quán)市場這一外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制的有效性。首先,本文回顧了控制權(quán)市場的相關(guān)概念和理論、國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,分析了控制權(quán)市場與公司治理、公司績效之間的關(guān)系以及作用路徑;其次,本文以國家控股E公司為例,用事件研究法、會計(jì)研究法分析了在其控制權(quán)爭奪前后公司短期市場績效、長期市場績效、長期財(cái)務(wù)績效的變化;同時對比了控制權(quán)之爭前后其公司治理,進(jìn)而分析了E公司的控制權(quán)市場對公司績效之間的影響。經(jīng)過分析發(fā)現(xiàn):E公司的控制權(quán)爭奪對公司的短期市場績效(CAR)有著正面的積極影響,在短期內(nèi)增加了股東財(cái)富;而在控制權(quán)爭奪之后公司的長期市場績效(BHAR)呈現(xiàn)下降趨勢;且通過財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)分析以及EVA(經(jīng)濟(jì)附加值)的計(jì)算發(fā)現(xiàn)控制權(quán)之爭在當(dāng)年給公司的績效帶來負(fù)面影響,從長期(5年期)來看也沒有能夠給其公司績效帶來積極正面的影響。本文更進(jìn)一步地對E公司控制權(quán)爭奪前后的公司治理水平進(jìn)行了衡量,發(fā)現(xiàn)在E公司的控制權(quán)之爭后,其公司治理水平并沒有得到提高。因而本文通過分析得出E公司的控制權(quán)市場缺乏效率,其國資背景對其控制權(quán)效率也有削弱作用。最后,通過對案例分析,得出可從完善資本市場的法律體系、規(guī)范控制權(quán)市場主體的行為、深化國有企業(yè)的改革、發(fā)揮公司治理的內(nèi)外部機(jī)制的相互作用、提高資本市場本身的競爭機(jī)制等方面,來提高我國控制權(quán)市場的效率,促進(jìn)我國控制權(quán)市場的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In 2005, the Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "measures for the Reform of Non-tradable shares", and the non-tradable shares began to transform into tradable shares. Then, in 2006, CSRC promulgated the "Management measures for takeover of listed companies", which resulted in a more moderate attitude towards capital market mergers and acquisitions in China, which constituted a prerequisite for the development of the market of control rights in China. The completion of the revolution and the arrival of the era of full circulation, With the continuous improvement of our capital market and the continuous improvement of the quality of listed companies, the market of control rights has gradually formed. Corporate control rights have an irreplaceable core position in modern corporate governance. The market of corporate control is also an important external market mechanism in corporate governance. It can supervise and restrain the management by making continuous takeover threats to the existing management of the company, and then improve corporate governance. Although the reform of split share structure has improved the capital market and activated the control market to a certain extent, because of the special situation of our country and the short period of the development of the control market in our country, The efficiency of control market in our country is lower than that in foreign countries. This paper takes the dispute of control right of state-owned holding E company as an example, analyzes the background that the control market of our country is activated after the reform of split share structure. In order to test the effectiveness of the external supervision mechanism of the control market of state-owned holding enterprises, this paper reviews the relevant concepts and theories of the control rights market. At home and abroad, this paper analyzes the relationship between control market and corporate governance, corporate performance, as well as the role of the path. Secondly, this paper takes the state-controlled E company as an example, using the event research method, The accounting research method analyzes the changes of the company's short-term market performance, long-term market performance and long-term financial performance before and after the struggle for control rights, and compares its corporate governance before and after the struggle for control rights. After analyzing the influence of the control market of E company on the performance of the company, it is found that the scramble for control of the company has a positive effect on the short-term market performance of the company and increases the shareholder wealth in the short term. The long-term market performance (BHARs) shows a downward trend after the contention for control rights, and through the analysis of financial indicators and the calculation of EVA (Economic value added), it is found that the contention of control rights has a negative impact on the performance of the company in that year. From the long-term (5 years) point of view, there is no positive impact on the corporate performance. This paper further measures the corporate governance level before and after the E company control competition, and finds that after the E company control dispute, The corporate governance level has not been improved. Therefore, through the analysis of the lack of efficiency of E company's control market, the background of its state capital has weakened its control efficiency. Finally, through the case study, From the aspects of perfecting the legal system of the capital market, standardizing the behavior of the main body of the control market, deepening the reform of the state-owned enterprises, giving full play to the interaction of the internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance, and improving the competition mechanism of the capital market itself, etc. To improve the efficiency of China's control market, promote the further development of China's control market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F721;F715.5;F832.51

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