本文選題：公司治理　切入點：過度投資　出處：《暨南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：投資決策作為財務(wù)運作的重要決策之一，直接影響著企業(yè)當(dāng)前的市場價值和未來的發(fā)展前景。所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離的現(xiàn)代企業(yè)經(jīng)營模式使得上市公司普遍面臨委托代理成本問題，我國尚未成熟的資本市場加劇了信息不對稱程度，加上我國國有企業(yè)面臨著國有控股股東缺位、自由現(xiàn)金流較充裕、政府干預(yù)較多等特殊背景，國有控股上市公司過度投資問題較普遍，資源配置效率低下，國有資產(chǎn)流失嚴(yán)重。因此，提高國有控股上市公司的投資效率，降低過度投資程度對于保護(hù)國有資產(chǎn)的完整性，提高經(jīng)濟(jì)運作效率具有重要的現(xiàn)實意義。良好的公司治理能有效緩解委托代理成本問題和信息不對稱帶來的非效率投資問題，董事會制度作為公司治理的核心機(jī)制之一，設(shè)置合理、運作良好的董事會能否發(fā)揮抑制過度投資的公司治理作用，這是本文研究的問題。 本文借鑒Richardson（2006）的預(yù)期投資模型，使用預(yù)期投資規(guī)模與實際投資規(guī)模之間的差額衡量非效率投資。本文將董事會特征劃分為獨立性、勤勉性、激勵性和能力背景特征四大類，對于每類特征分別采用兩個衡量指標(biāo)加以反映，并以2009~2012年我國滬深兩市A股上市的國有控股上市公司為研究樣本，，檢驗我國國有控股上市公司董事會是否發(fā)揮著抑制經(jīng)理人過度投資行為的作用。 本文研究結(jié)果表明，我國國有控股上市公司的獨立董事制度并不能發(fā)揮有效的公司治理作用，提高獨立董事比例和獨立董事的董事會會議出勤率并不能對經(jīng)理人的過度投資行為產(chǎn)生抑制作用；董事會下設(shè)專業(yè)委員會也無法降低過度投資程度；但董事的個人能力與投資效率之間存在顯著關(guān)系，非獨立董事的平均年齡越大，過度投資程度越低，這為上市公司選拔董事提供了參考；董事會會議頻率與過度投資之間也不存在顯著相關(guān)關(guān)系；而上市公司的激勵機(jī)制部分有效，董事薪酬激勵機(jī)制對過度投資產(chǎn)生了顯著的抑制作用，但是由于董事會成員持股比例較低，董事持股機(jī)制尚未發(fā)揮顯著的公司治理作用，因此，完善薪酬制度設(shè)計，提高董事持股比例具有一定的公司治理意義。
[Abstract]:Investment decision is one of the important decisions in financial operation. It has a direct impact on the current market value and future development prospects of enterprises. The modern business model, which separates ownership and management rights, makes listed companies generally face the problem of principal-agent cost. China's immature capital market has aggravated the degree of information asymmetry, coupled with the fact that state-owned enterprises are facing the absence of state-owned controlling shareholders, free cash flow is abundant, government intervention is more and other special background. The overinvestment of state-owned holding listed companies is common, the efficiency of resource allocation is low, and the loss of state-owned assets is serious. Therefore, improving the investment efficiency of state-owned holding listed companies and reducing the degree of overinvestment can protect the integrity of state-owned assets. It is of great practical significance to improve the efficiency of economic operation. Good corporate governance can effectively alleviate the problem of principal-agent cost and inefficient investment caused by asymmetric information. As one of the core mechanisms of corporate governance, the board of directors system is one of the core mechanisms of corporate governance. Whether the board of directors with reasonable setting and good operation can play the role of corporate governance to restrain overinvestment is the problem studied in this paper. This paper uses the expected investment model of Richardson's 2006) and uses the difference between the expected investment scale and the actual investment scale to measure the inefficient investment. In this paper, the characteristics of the board of directors are divided into four categories: independence, diligence, motivation and ability background. For each type of characteristics, two measurement indexes are used to reflect the characteristics, and a sample of state-owned holding listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2009 to 2012 is taken as the research sample. To test whether the board of directors of the state-owned listed company plays a role in restraining managers' overinvestment. The results of this paper show that the independent director system of the state-owned listed companies can not play an effective role in corporate governance. Increasing the proportion of independent directors and the attendance of independent directors' meeting can not restrain the managers' over-investment behavior, nor can the establishment of professional committee under the board of directors reduce the degree of over-investment. However, there is a significant relationship between the individual ability of directors and investment efficiency. The older the average age of non-independent directors, the lower the degree of overinvestment, which provides a reference for the selection of directors of listed companies. There is no significant correlation between the frequency of board meetings and overinvestment, and the incentive mechanism of listed companies is partly effective, and the incentive mechanism of directors' compensation has a significant inhibitory effect on overinvestment. However, due to the low proportion of board members holding shares, the mechanism of directors holding shares has not played a significant role in corporate governance. Therefore, it is of certain significance to improve the design of compensation system and increase the proportion of directors holding shares.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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