本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司　切入點(diǎn)：委托代理　出處：《廣西科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：有效的公司治理是我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司獲取較高經(jīng)營利潤和實(shí)現(xiàn)可持續(xù)發(fā)展的前提條件。當(dāng)前我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司在治理機(jī)制和規(guī)范化運(yùn)作方面存在許多缺陷，如內(nèi)部人控制、決策監(jiān)督及激勵機(jī)制殘缺和股權(quán)激勵缺失等有效治理不足問題。這些問題的出現(xiàn)已經(jīng)成為我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司提高利潤和獲取競爭優(yōu)勢的絆腳石。為此，有效地解決上述公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)問題，優(yōu)化和改善我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理顯得尤為重要和迫切。 公司治理理論眾多，尤其以委托代理理論最受國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的關(guān)注和重視。本文在對公司治理和委托代理文獻(xiàn)綜述研究和我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理問題的分析基礎(chǔ)上，認(rèn)為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理的代理機(jī)制缺乏、獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會功能弱化的內(nèi)部治理效率偏低、利益相關(guān)者治理不足的外部治理缺失等是我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理問題產(chǎn)生的根源。通過對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理問題的委托代理分析發(fā)現(xiàn)公司治理的基本任務(wù)就是協(xié)調(diào)兩者的利益關(guān)系，并使得所有權(quán)人和控制權(quán)人的利益最大化目標(biāo)趨于一致。 本文構(gòu)建了我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理的委托代理完全信息靜態(tài)博弈模型，通過委托人和代理人的最優(yōu)策略選擇，求出了博弈的混合納什均衡。本文還對混合納什均衡進(jìn)行求解和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析，指出了相關(guān)因素變量對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。得出的結(jié)論包括四點(diǎn)：一是構(gòu)建適合我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司規(guī)范化發(fā)展的委托代理經(jīng)濟(jì)契約關(guān)系，進(jìn)一步明確有關(guān)各方的權(quán)利和義務(wù)，實(shí)現(xiàn)對控制權(quán)的有效管控，最小化監(jiān)管成本，發(fā)揮外部市場監(jiān)管功能；二是擴(kuò)大代理人的職權(quán)范圍，使代理人的努力成本最小化；三是強(qiáng)化代理人激勵措施的幅度和力度，如提高代理人的基本薪酬和求償份額，同時給予代理人適當(dāng)?shù)娘L(fēng)險收入等；四是提高委托人對代理人違規(guī)（不盡職）的罰款數(shù)額，，使得代理人的違規(guī)概率下降�；谖写淼奈覈鴦�(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理博弈分析，進(jìn)一步提出完善我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的內(nèi)外部治理對策和建議。一是優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，增強(qiáng)決策科學(xué)性；二是增強(qiáng)董事會治理的創(chuàng)造力；三是健全監(jiān)事會監(jiān)督職權(quán)；四是完善和拓展經(jīng)理市場；五是提升利益相關(guān)者共同治理水平；六是健全法律體系和監(jiān)管機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Effective corporate governance is a prerequisite for gem companies to obtain higher operating profits and achieve sustainable development. At present, there are many defects in the governance mechanism and standardized operation of gem companies, such as insider control. Lack of effective governance, such as incomplete decision-making supervision and incentive mechanism and lack of equity incentive. These problems have become a stumbling block for gem companies to increase profits and gain competitive advantage. It is very important and urgent to solve the above problems effectively and optimize and improve the governance of gem in our country. There are many theories of corporate governance, especially the principal-agent theory, which is paid more attention by scholars at home and abroad. The author holds that the agency mechanism with unreasonable ownership structure is lacking, and the internal governance efficiency of the weakening function of independent director and board of supervisors is on the low side. The lack of external governance of stakeholders is the root of the governance problems of gem companies in China. Through the principal-agent analysis of the governance problems of gem companies in China, it is found that the basic task of corporate governance is to cooperate with each other. Adjusting the interests of the two, And makes the owner and the control person's benefit maximization goal tends to be consistent. In this paper, we construct a static game model of principal-agent complete information in the governance of gem companies in China, and choose the optimal strategy of the principal and agent. The mixed Nash equilibrium of the game is obtained, and the solution and economic analysis of the mixed Nash equilibrium are also given in this paper. The paper points out the influence of relevant factor variables on the governance structure of gem companies in our country. The conclusions include four points: one is to construct the principal-agent economic contract relationship suitable for the standardized development of gem companies in our country. To further clarify the rights and obligations of the parties concerned, to achieve effective control of control, to minimize the regulatory costs, to play the role of external market supervision, second, to expand the scope of authority of the agent, so as to minimize the cost of the agent's efforts; Third, to strengthen the scope and intensity of the agent's incentives, such as increasing the agent's basic salary and compensation share, and giving the agent appropriate risk income at the same time, and fourth, increasing the amount of fines imposed by the principal on the agent's violation (failure to do his duty). Based on the principal-agent game analysis of the governance of gem companies in China, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the governance of gem companies. First, it should optimize the ownership structure and enhance the scientific decision-making; The second is to enhance the creativity of the board of directors governance; the third is to improve the supervisory authority of the board of supervisors; the fourth is to improve and expand the manager market; the fifth is to improve the level of common governance of stakeholders; sixth, to improve the legal system and supervision mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

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