本文選題：家族企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：超額控制權(quán)　出處：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái)資本市場(chǎng)風(fēng)云動(dòng)蕩,個(gè)股股票價(jià)格暴跌現(xiàn)象時(shí)常發(fā)生。股票市值的迅速蒸發(fā)極大損害了股東的利益,影響了企業(yè)的形象,動(dòng)搖了投資者信心,不利于資本市場(chǎng)健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。家族對(duì)控制權(quán)有著天生的偏好,家族終極控股股東在上市家族企業(yè)的股東大會(huì)、董事會(huì)上配置控制權(quán),并通過(guò)金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)、交叉持股、差異化股份、參與管理等方式獲得了超額控制權(quán)。那么疊加在名義控制權(quán)之上的超額控制權(quán)究竟體現(xiàn)了什么效應(yīng)?超額控制權(quán)究竟是增加了還是削弱了股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)?本研究以家族企業(yè)為樣本,研究家族超額控制權(quán)與股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的相關(guān)關(guān)系。本文通過(guò)對(duì)2011-2015年A股主板上市的家族企業(yè)共計(jì)890個(gè)觀測(cè)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)了如下結(jié)論:第一,家族董事席位占有率與股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,家族成員任職董事會(huì)職位體現(xiàn)了利益協(xié)同效應(yīng),家族董事為實(shí)現(xiàn)家族財(cái)富與企業(yè)價(jià)值的最大化,有動(dòng)機(jī)妥善經(jīng)營(yíng)公司,從而可減輕管理層的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,緩解代理問(wèn)題,從而降低股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。第二,家族董事會(huì)層面超額控制權(quán)與股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。董事會(huì)層面家族超額控制體現(xiàn)了利益協(xié)同效應(yīng),增強(qiáng)了公司戰(zhàn)略決策制定及執(zhí)行的一致性,有利于緩解代理問(wèn)題,從而降低了股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。第三,家族企業(yè)股東大會(huì)層面超額控制權(quán)與股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,但實(shí)證結(jié)果不顯著,兩者的相關(guān)關(guān)系沒(méi)有得到有效驗(yàn)證�？赡苡捎诒狙芯繕颖玖枯^小因而未能證明關(guān)系。第四,家族總超額控制權(quán)與股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。說(shuō)明董事會(huì)層面超額控制權(quán)體現(xiàn)的利益協(xié)同效應(yīng)大于股東大會(huì)層面超額控制權(quán)體現(xiàn)的掏空效應(yīng),家族總超額控制權(quán)體現(xiàn)了支持效應(yīng),家族為了企業(yè)的健康發(fā)展會(huì)勤勉經(jīng)營(yíng),努力提升企業(yè)價(jià)值,提高信息披露質(zhì)量,從而降低了股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于本文將家族企業(yè)超額控制權(quán)按層次分解為董事會(huì)層面超額控制權(quán)和股東大會(huì)層面超額控制權(quán),使用代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)理論分層探討超額控制權(quán)與股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的關(guān)系,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了兩者關(guān)系。本研究在一定程度上填補(bǔ)了超額控制權(quán)與股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)關(guān)系的研究空白,研究結(jié)果對(duì)家族企業(yè)合理配置控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)從而降低股價(jià)暴跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)具有一定的理論指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the capital market has been turbulent and individual stock prices have plummeted. The rapid evaporation of stock market value has greatly damaged the interests of shareholders, affected the image of enterprises, and shaken the confidence of investors. It is not conducive to the healthy and stable development of the capital market. The family has a natural preference for control. The ultimate controlling shareholder of the family allocates the control right in the shareholders' meeting and board of directors of the listed family enterprise, and through the pyramid structure, cross-shareholding. Differential shares, participation in management and other ways to obtain excess control. So what effect does the superposition of the excess control over nominal control reflect? Has excess control increased or weakened the risk of a stock crash? This study takes the family firm as a sample to study the correlation between the family excess control right and the risk of the stock price plummeting. This paper makes an empirical test on 890 family firms listed on the main board of A shares in 2011-2015. The conclusions are as follows: first, the share of family board seats is negatively related to the risk of stock price plummeting, and the position of family members in the board of directors reflects the benefit synergy effect, in order to achieve the maximum of family wealth and enterprise value, the family directors have a negative correlation with the risk of stock price plummeting. Having the motivation to run a company properly can reduce the opportunistic behavior of the management, ease the agency problem, and thus reduce the risk of the stock price plummeting. Second, There is a significant negative correlation between the excess control of the family board and the risk of stock price collapse. The family excess control at the board level reflects the benefit synergy and enhances the consistency of the company's strategic decision making and execution. It can alleviate the agency problem and reduce the risk of stock price collapse. Thirdly, there is a positive correlation between the excess control right at the level of shareholders' meeting and the risk of stock price collapse, but the empirical results are not significant. The correlation between the two has not been effectively verified. It may be that the relationship is not proved because of the small sample size in this study. 4th, There is a significant negative correlation between the total excess control of the family and the risk of stock price collapse, which indicates that the benefit synergy of the excess control at the board level is greater than the tunneling effect of the excess control at the level of the shareholders' general meeting. The total excess control of the family reflects the support effect. For the healthy development of the enterprise, the family will work diligently to enhance the value of the enterprise and improve the quality of information disclosure. The innovation of this paper is that the excess control of the family firm is divided into the excess control at the board level and the excess control at the general meeting of the shareholders, and the agency theory is used. The theory of information asymmetry delamination explores the relationship between excess control and the risk of stock price collapse, and empirically tests the relationship between the two. To some extent, this study fills up the blank in the study of the relationship between excess control and the risk of stock price collapse. The research results have certain theoretical guiding significance for family firms to allocate control structure rationally and reduce the risk of stock price collapse.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51

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