本文選題：政企關(guān)系　切入點(diǎn)：信貸融資　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2014年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：理順政府與企業(yè)的關(guān)系是中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革中的重要問(wèn)題。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，由于國(guó)有企業(yè)和政府之間的“父子關(guān)系”，國(guó)有企業(yè)受到政府在政策上的特殊照顧，與民營(yíng)企業(yè)之間存在不公平的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，由此破壞了市場(chǎng)在資源配置中的基礎(chǔ)作用。本文從分析國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)的信貸融資差異入手，并從對(duì)企業(yè)投資適度性影響的角度分析這種差異化信貸所造成的消極影響。研究結(jié)論有助于深化對(duì)現(xiàn)階段我國(guó)政企關(guān)系存在問(wèn)題的認(rèn)識(shí)。黨的十八屆三中全會(huì)提出“使市場(chǎng)在資源配置中起決定性作用”，理順政府和企業(yè)，尤其是和國(guó)有企業(yè)之間的關(guān)系也是使市場(chǎng)機(jī)制發(fā)揮有效作用的關(guān)鍵因素。本文的研究具有重要的理論價(jià)值和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于政府與市場(chǎng)之間的關(guān)系、政企關(guān)系以及民營(yíng)企業(yè)的政治關(guān)系對(duì)其財(cái)務(wù)行為影響的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理。通過(guò)總結(jié)相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)，提出近年來(lái)國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者對(duì)企業(yè)政治關(guān)系的研究存在研究視角的局限和研究方法上的不足，進(jìn)而把本文的研究視角放在政府與國(guó)有企業(yè)以及政府與民營(yíng)企業(yè)兩類不同政企關(guān)系上。通過(guò)對(duì)現(xiàn)階段我國(guó)政企關(guān)系的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行考察，指出經(jīng)過(guò)這些年來(lái)的國(guó)有企業(yè)改革和國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)略重組，在壟斷性行業(yè)中形成政府和國(guó)有企業(yè)的“政企聯(lián)盟”。由于政府權(quán)力過(guò)于集中，政府掌握著企業(yè)生存和發(fā)展中的關(guān)鍵資源，民營(yíng)企業(yè)為了爭(zhēng)取良好的發(fā)展環(huán)境，與政府建立政治關(guān)系成為其戰(zhàn)略之一。 緊接著，本文對(duì)企業(yè)外部融資環(huán)境和融資現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行考察，通過(guò)文獻(xiàn)和數(shù)據(jù)的整理，說(shuō)明在企業(yè)最主要的融資渠道——信貸資本市場(chǎng)中，國(guó)有銀行占據(jù)壟斷地位；在企業(yè)的直接融資渠道——股票市場(chǎng)和債券市場(chǎng)中，政府牢牢地控制著發(fā)行審批權(quán)。政府掌控著企業(yè)生存和發(fā)展中最重要的金融資源，也就意味著政府在一定程度上能夠決定企業(yè)的命運(yùn)。 本文以實(shí)證研究為核心，研究重心在最后的實(shí)證研究部分。通過(guò)研究有以下發(fā)現(xiàn)： 首先，本文研究了不同政企關(guān)系的信貸融資差異。本文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，國(guó)有企業(yè)與民營(yíng)企業(yè)之間存在信貸融資差異，體現(xiàn)在國(guó)有企業(yè)獲得的借款數(shù)量、借款中的長(zhǎng)期借款和信用借款比重高于民營(yíng)企業(yè)。本文還考察了實(shí)施“抓大放小”和“有進(jìn)有退”的國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)略重組政策對(duì)這種信貸差異的影響，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)占主導(dǎo)地位的行業(yè)，，國(guó)有企業(yè)與民營(yíng)企業(yè)的借款數(shù)量和債務(wù)期限差異更加明顯，在一般競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性行業(yè)，這種差異有所減輕。本文的研究還發(fā)現(xiàn)地區(qū)信貸市場(chǎng)化水平提高有助于減輕這種信貸融資差異。 其次，本文研究了這種信貸融資差異所產(chǎn)生的后果。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，民營(yíng)企業(yè)投資對(duì)內(nèi)源融資更加敏感。偏離適度投資規(guī)模的投資不足和投資過(guò)度是企業(yè)非效率投資的一種表現(xiàn)形式。本文建立適度投資模型把全部樣本區(qū)分為投資不足、投資適度和投資不足三個(gè)子樣本。在對(duì)投資不足樣本組的研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)，國(guó)有企業(yè)投資受信貸融資的制約程度低于民營(yíng)企業(yè)；在對(duì)投資過(guò)度樣本組的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，信貸融資總體上對(duì)過(guò)度投資具有一定的抑制作用，但對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)過(guò)度投資的制約明顯弱于民營(yíng)企業(yè)。這些研究結(jié)果說(shuō)明國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)的信貸差異對(duì)信貸資源配置效率產(chǎn)生了消極影響。 金融市場(chǎng)在資源配置中所起的作用應(yīng)該是降低交易成本，減輕企業(yè)的融資約束，進(jìn)而提高企業(yè)的投資效率。本文的研究結(jié)果說(shuō)明由于政府對(duì)金融市場(chǎng)的控制，政府和國(guó)有企業(yè)之間的特殊關(guān)系導(dǎo)致不公平融資環(huán)境，因此要使市場(chǎng)在資源配置中起決定性作用，就要限制政府的權(quán)力，理順政企之間的關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:Rationalize the relationship between government and enterprises is an important problem in China economic reform. For a long time, because between the state-owned enterprises and the government's "father and son", the state-owned enterprises by the government in special care policy, there is unfair competition between private enterprises, by the destruction of the basic role of the market in resource allocation. Based on the analysis of the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises financing differences start, and analyze the negative effects of this credit caused by the difference from the moderation effect on business investment perspective. The research conclusion is helpful to deepen the understanding of the problems at the present stage in our country. The relationship between the party's the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed make the market play a decisive role "in the allocation of resources, government and enterprises, especially the relationship between state-owned enterprises and also make the market mechanism play a key factor in the effective role. The study of the article is of great theoretical and practical significance.
Firstly, the relationship of domestic and foreign scholars on the government and the market, it will affect the relationship between private enterprises and political relations on the financial behavior analysis. Through summarizing the relevant literature, put forward in recent years the domestic scholars on corporate political relations research lack of research perspective and research methods, and the research perspective of this paper on the government and the state-owned enterprises and government and private enterprises two kinds of relations between government and enterprises. By studying the status quo of the current stage of China's government relations, pointed out that after all these years of reform of state-owned enterprises and state-owned economy strategic reorganization, in the monopoly industry in the formation of the government and state-owned enterprises "enterprises the alliance". Due to excessive concentration of government power, the government holds the key resource for the survival and development of enterprises, private enterprises to strive for the development of good ring The establishment of political relations with the government has become one of its strategies.
Then, the paper discusses the external financing environment of enterprises and the financing situation, through the literature and data collection, in the enterprise the main financing channel of credit in the capital market, the state-owned banks occupy a monopoly position in the enterprise; direct financing channels, the stock market and bond market, the government firmly in control of the issuance examination and right. The government holds the most important survival and development of enterprises in the financial resources, which means that the government can decide the fate of the enterprise in a certain extent.
This paper takes empirical research as the core and focuses on the final empirical research.
First of all, this paper studied the relationship between the different financing differences. This study found that the existence of credit financing differences between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, state-owned enterprises in the number of loans, borrowing in long-term loans and credit loans higher than the proportion of private enterprises. This paper also discusses the implementation of "large" and ". Take" policy on the strategic restructuring of state-owned economy credit differences influence, the study found that the state-owned economy dominant industry, state-owned enterprises and private enterprises loan amount and debt maturity difference is more obvious, in general competitive industries, this difference has been reduced. This study also found that the level of market credit this increase is helpful to reduce the financing credit differences.
Secondly, in this paper the credit financing is the consequence of this difference. This study found that the investment of private enterprises is more sensitive to internal financing. From moderate investment underinvestment and overinvestment is a manifestation of the inefficiency investment of the enterprises. This paper establish appropriate investment model to distinguish all samples for lack of investment, investment and the lack of investment in the three sub samples. In a study of the lack of investment group, investment in state-owned enterprises is restricted by the degree of credit financing is lower than that of private enterprises; research on investment over the sample group, the credit financing of over investment have a certain effect, but restrict the over investment of state-owned enterprises was weak in the private enterprises. The research results indicate that credit differences between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises have a negative impact on the efficiency of the allocation of credit resources.
The financial market plays a role in the allocation of resources should be to reduce transaction costs, reduce the financing constraints of enterprises, and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises. The research results show that due to government control of the financial market, the special relationship between the government and state-owned enterprises lead to unfair financing environment, so to make the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources, it is necessary to limit the power of the government, straighten out the relationship between the government and enterprises.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.4;D630

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