本文關(guān)鍵詞： 轉(zhuǎn)移定價 利潤轉(zhuǎn)移 關(guān)聯(lián)交易 影響因素　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：摘要：近些年來,轉(zhuǎn)移定價問題一直在學(xué)術(shù)界備受關(guān)注。究其原因,一方面,對轉(zhuǎn)移定價的關(guān)注起源于跨國公司出現(xiàn)后引發(fā)的國際稅收分配問題,另一方面,從盈余管理的角度來看,隨著我國會計準則的不斷完善,通過會計政策選擇和會計估計變更進行盈余管理的空間愈來愈小,而通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理已經(jīng)成為上市公司的首選方法,企業(yè)集團越來越傾向于利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易來達到降低稅負,操縱利潤、粉飾財務(wù)報表等目的。關(guān)聯(lián)交易是一種中性的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象,而衡量關(guān)聯(lián)交易是否正常的一個重要指標就是關(guān)聯(lián)交易的價格,即轉(zhuǎn)移定價(Transfer Pricing)。 本文通過理論分析和實證檢驗相結(jié)合的方法,研究了所得稅率、管理層薪酬與財務(wù)報告相關(guān)度、政府持股比例對上市公司轉(zhuǎn)移定價的影響。我國實行25%基本稅率和特殊行業(yè)區(qū)域優(yōu)惠減免稅政策,因而集團內(nèi)部可能存在不同等級稅率。為了達到降低集團整體稅負的目的,上市公司就存在強烈動機通過操控轉(zhuǎn)移定價改變集團內(nèi)部的利潤分布格局；在實行股權(quán)激勵政策的上市公司,管理層持股意味著管理層薪酬高低與財務(wù)報告盈余密切相關(guān),為了追求更高的個人報酬,管理層也存在動機操控轉(zhuǎn)移定價來增加上市公司報告盈余；政府控股或持股是我國上市公司的顯著特征,國有企業(yè)占用更多的社會資源,履行社會責(zé)任的壓力更大,作為控股母公司的中央或地方政府往往會通過強制抬高或降低轉(zhuǎn)移定價來“掏空”上市公司利潤。本文重點研究減輕稅負動機、管理層股權(quán)激勵動機、政府母公司的掏空行為動機下,稅率、管理層持股和政府持股對轉(zhuǎn)移定價的影響。在此基礎(chǔ)上進一步研究了雙重動機對于轉(zhuǎn)移定價的交互影響。 研究結(jié)果表明,通過提高或降低轉(zhuǎn)移定價來轉(zhuǎn)移利潤的行為受到稅率、管理層薪酬與報告盈余相關(guān)度和政府持股比例三個因素的影響。其中,管理層薪酬與報告盈余的相關(guān)程度越高或者上市公司稅率越低,上市公司利用抬高轉(zhuǎn)移定價轉(zhuǎn)入利潤的行為動機越強；上市公司中央或地方政府持股比例越高,上市公司通過降低轉(zhuǎn)移定價轉(zhuǎn)出利潤的可能性越大。同時具有稅率動機和政府持股動機的上市公司,研究結(jié)果沒有表明一個因素對于另一個因素的控制作用。本文的研究結(jié)果能夠在一定程度上幫助投資者更好的理解我國關(guān)聯(lián)交易中的轉(zhuǎn)移定價行為,而且為政策制定者提供一定的理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: in recent years, the issue of transfer pricing has attracted much attention in academic circles. On the one hand, the focus on transfer pricing originates from the international tax distribution problem caused by multinational corporations, on the other hand, From the perspective of earnings management, with the continuous improvement of accounting standards in China, there is less and less room for earnings management through the choice of accounting policies and changes in accounting estimates. However, earnings management through affiliated transactions has become the preferred method for listed companies. Enterprise groups are increasingly inclined to use related party transactions to reduce tax burden and manipulate profits. Related party transaction is a neutral economic phenomenon, and the price of related party transaction is the price of transfer pricing. This paper studies the correlation between income tax rate, management compensation and financial report through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical test. The influence of the proportion of the Government shareholding on the transfer pricing of listed companies. China implements the basic tax rate of 25% and the preferential tax reduction and exemption policy for special industries, so there may be different levels of tax rates within the group, in order to achieve the purpose of reducing the overall tax burden of the group. There is a strong motivation for listed companies to change the distribution of profits within the group by manipulating transfer pricing. In listed companies with equity incentive policies, managerial ownership means that the level of management compensation is closely related to the earnings of financial reports. In order to pursue higher personal reward, the management also has the motive to manipulate the transfer pricing to increase the reported surplus of the listed company, the government holding or holding the stock is the remarkable characteristic of the listed company in our country, and the state-owned enterprises occupy more social resources. The pressure to fulfill social responsibility is greater. The central or local government, as the holding parent company, often "empties" the profits of listed companies by forcing up or lowering transfer pricing. On the basis of the incentive motivation of management equity, the influence of tax rate, management ownership and government ownership on transfer pricing, the interaction between double motivation and transfer pricing is further studied. The results show that the behavior of transferring profits by increasing or lowering transfer pricing is affected by three factors: tax rate, the correlation between management compensation and reported earnings, and the proportion of government ownership. The higher the correlation between the management compensation and the reported earnings or the lower the tax rate of the listed company, the stronger the motivation of the listed company to use the elevated transfer pricing to turn into the profit, and the higher the proportion of the central or local government holding the stock. The more likely a listed company is to make a profit by lowering its transfer price, the more likely it is that the listed company has both a tax incentive and a government ownership incentive. The results of the study do not show the controlling effect of one factor on the other. To some extent, the results of this study can help investors to better understand the transfer pricing behavior in related party transactions in China. And to provide some theoretical basis for policy makers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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