發(fā)布時間：2018-02-13 23:28

  本文關鍵詞： 股東監(jiān)督 管理層權力 關鍵高管 高管變更　出處：《深圳大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國證券市場的發(fā)展,各項制度也在不斷的修正和完善,各高管的薪酬也在年報中進行了披露。由于高管薪酬與社會收入分配的公平性、高管腐敗等存在密切的聯(lián)系,因此備受關注。近年來,關于高管薪酬排名等報道頻現,也引起了眾多的評論。而在學術界,圍繞高管薪酬合理性方面的議題也受到了眾多學者的青睞。圍繞著高管薪酬的現狀和問題,眾多國內外文獻從不同的角度,用不同的方式以及不同的數據對其進行了分析,得到的結論也不盡相同。本文在參考現有文獻的基礎上,從股東監(jiān)督、關鍵高管以及高管變更三個方面進行了對高管薪酬的變動進行了實證研究。采用2013-2015年各上市公司在年報中披露的各位高管薪酬為樣本,經過處理之后得到高管薪酬的變動額。比之前的文獻,本文衡量高管薪酬變動的數據更具可比性,并且本文的高管包括了所有在年報中披露薪酬的高管,具有廣泛性。第四章中對整個數據的收集和處理過程有詳細的描述。本文以高管薪酬的變動(ΔPay)作為被解釋變量,以管理層權力(power)、股東監(jiān)督(Supervise)、關鍵高管(Key)和高管變更(Change)作為主要的解釋變量,并加入了職位(Duty)和行業(yè)(Industry)等控制變量。采用管理層規(guī)模等七個維度對管理層權力進行衡量,采用兩權分離度等四個維度對股東監(jiān)督的強度進行衡量。驗證了良好的股東監(jiān)督可以對高管薪酬的上升起到抑制作用,并進一步驗證了良好的股東監(jiān)督可以抑制管理層權力過大而導致的高管的自利行為。接著在股東監(jiān)督的基礎之上,本文研究了控股股東是否會增強關鍵高管的業(yè)績關聯(lián)性,通過激勵作用降低代理成本。結果表明,關鍵高管的業(yè)績薪酬的敏感性要高于非重要高管。最后,驗證了高管變更之后,股東更傾向于對新任高管制定一個相對較低的薪酬契約。隨后對所采用的模型進行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗,結果未發(fā)生變化。最后,對本文的假設和結論進行總結。對文章中存在的問題和局限性進行說明,對未來研究的方向提出了自己的看法。
[Abstract]:With the development of China's securities market, various systems are constantly being revised and perfected, and the compensation of senior executives is also disclosed in the annual report. Due to the fairness of executive compensation and social income distribution, there is a close link between executive compensation and social income distribution, senior executive corruption, etc. So much attention. In recent years, reports such as executive compensation rankings have attracted a lot of comments. And in academia, The issue of the rationality of executive compensation is also favored by many scholars. Around the status quo and problems of executive compensation, many domestic and foreign literature from different angles, using different ways and different data to analyze it. The conclusions are also different. Based on the reference of the existing literature, this paper, from the perspective of shareholder supervision, An empirical study of executive compensation changes has been conducted in three areas, namely, key executives and executive changes. The sample of executive compensation disclosed by listed companies in their annual reports from 2013 to 2015 is used as a sample. After processing, we get the change in executive compensation. This paper measures the change in executive pay more comparable than the previous literature, and the executives in this paper include all the executives who disclose the compensation in the annual report. The whole process of data collection and processing is described in detail in Chapter 4th. The main explanatory variables are management power, shareholder supervision, key executive change and executive change, and control variables, such as position Dutch) and industry industry), are added to measure management power using seven dimensions such as management size. The intensity of shareholder supervision is measured by four dimensions of separation degree of two rights. It is proved that good shareholder supervision can restrain the rise of executive compensation. Furthermore, it proves that good shareholder supervision can restrain the self-interest behavior of executives caused by excessive management power. Then, on the basis of shareholder supervision, this paper studies whether controlling shareholders can enhance the performance relevance of key executives. The results show that the performance pay of key executives is more sensitive than that of non-important executives. Shareholders were more inclined to create a relatively low compensation contract for new executives. The model was then tested for robustness, and the results did not change. This paper summarizes the assumptions and conclusions of this paper, explains the problems and limitations in the paper, and puts forward its own views on the future research direction.
【學位授予單位】：深圳大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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本文編號：1509346