本文關鍵詞： 金融市場發(fā)展 銀行借款規(guī)模 銀行借款期限 在職消費　出處：《石河子大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)理層在職消費行為是股權(quán)代理成本的典型表現(xiàn)之一，雖然在高管激勵框架中有一定的存在價值，但在我國特殊的制度背景下，經(jīng)理層的過度在職消費問題變得尤為突出，引發(fā)了高昂的代理成本，對公司的績效和市場價值產(chǎn)生了負面影響。在職消費是第一類代理成本的表現(xiàn)之一，但在代理問題的研究中，對在職消費的關注還較少。作為公司治理機制的重要組成部分，債務發(fā)揮著重要的治理效應。但是我國債券市場尚不發(fā)達，上市公司主要融資渠道為銀行借款。作為我國企業(yè)最主要的融資渠道的銀行貸款，對企業(yè)行為具有較強的監(jiān)督作用，因而在治理效應的發(fā)揮上，有其特有的優(yōu)勢。此外，金融環(huán)境的改善可以進一步提升債務的治理功能，因此本文結(jié)合金融環(huán)境從銀行債務融資這一視角研究對管理層在職消費的治理。 本文選擇我國滬市和深市A股上市公司2007—2011年數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本，結(jié)果顯示：銀行債務規(guī)模總體上對經(jīng)理層在職消費行為發(fā)揮了顯著治理效應，長期借款比短期借款的治理作用更強，這是因為短期借款的期限較短，風險較小，銀行的監(jiān)管動力有所減弱，而與之相反的是，長期借款期限相對較長，，銀行面臨的不確定因素較多，從而風險也較大，銀行對貸款企業(yè)的監(jiān)管動機也較大；考慮產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)，相對于國有企業(yè)，銀行債務對非國有企業(yè)的治理作用更顯著，這是普遍存在的預算軟約束問題所導致的；就目前我國宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境來看，我國處于經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)軌時期，金融環(huán)境的優(yōu)劣必然會對微觀企業(yè)行為產(chǎn)生相應的影響，于是本文以金融環(huán)境為宏觀背景分析銀行借款對在職消費行為的治理作用，從金融發(fā)展的視角研究金融環(huán)境改善對銀行債務治理作用的影響。研究表明：金融發(fā)展程度越高的地區(qū)，銀行借款對高管在職消費的治理作用越強，并且這一作用在非國有企業(yè)中更為明顯。 本文的貢獻在于：為在職消費的治理提供新的視角，促進了公司治理理論中的第一類代理成本理論的完善發(fā)展，同時也豐富和完善了企業(yè)融資理論、公司治理理論，另外考慮了宏觀金融環(huán)境的影響，豐富和發(fā)展了宏觀經(jīng)濟政策與微觀企業(yè)行為之間的研究。
[Abstract]:The in-service consumption behavior of managers is one of the typical manifestations of equity agency cost. Although there is some value in the framework of executive incentive, under the special system background of our country, the problem of excessive on-the-job consumption of managers becomes more and more prominent. It leads to high agency cost, which has a negative impact on the company's performance and market value. On-the-job consumption is one of the performance of the first kind of agency cost, but in the study of agency problem, As an important part of the corporate governance mechanism, debt plays an important governance effect. However, the bond market in China is not yet developed. The main financing channel of listed company is bank loan. As the most important financing channel of Chinese enterprises, bank loan has a strong supervisory function on enterprise behavior, so it has its own advantages in the exertion of governance effect. The improvement of financial environment can further enhance the governance function of debt, so this paper studies the governance of management's in-service consumption from the perspective of bank debt financing combined with financial environment. In this paper, the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2011 are selected as the research samples. The results show that the scale of bank debt plays a significant governance effect on the in-service consumption behavior of managers in general. Long-term borrowing is more effective than short-term borrowing because short-term borrowing is shorter, less risky, and banks have less incentive to regulate, whereas long-term borrowing is relatively long. The banks are faced with more uncertain factors, thus the risks are higher, and the supervision motivation of the banks on the loan enterprises is also larger. Considering the nature of property rights, bank debts play a more important role in the governance of non-state-owned enterprises than the state-owned enterprises. This is caused by the widespread problem of soft budgetary constraints. From the point of view of the current macroeconomic environment in China, China is in a period of economic transition, and the merits and demerits of the financial environment will inevitably have a corresponding impact on the behavior of micro-enterprises. So this paper takes the financial environment as the macro background to analyze the governance effect of bank borrowing on the in-service consumption behavior. The influence of financial environment improvement on bank debt governance is studied from the perspective of financial development. The study shows that the higher the level of financial development, the stronger the governance effect of bank borrowing on senior executives' in-service consumption. And this role is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises. The contribution of this paper lies in: providing a new perspective for the governance of in-service consumption, promoting the perfect development of the first kind of agency cost theory in the corporate governance theory, enriching and perfecting the corporate financing theory and corporate governance theory, In addition, the influence of macro-financial environment is considered to enrich and develop the research between macro-economic policy and micro-enterprise behavior.
【學位授予單位】：石河子大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 陳耿,周軍;企業(yè)債務融資結(jié)構(gòu)研究——一個基于代理成本的理論分析[J];財經(jīng)研究;2004年02期

2 唐松;楊勇;孫錚;;金融發(fā)展、債務治理與公司價值——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];財經(jīng)研究;2009年06期

3 趙玉珍;張心靈;郭巧莉;;政治關聯(lián)、金融發(fā)展與債務治理——以我國國有控股上市公司為例[J];財經(jīng)理論與實踐;2012年01期

4 馬君潞;周軍;李澤廣;;雙重代理成本與債務治理機制的有效性——來自我國上市公司的證據(jù)(1998-2006)[J];當代經(jīng)濟科學;2008年03期

5 于東智;資本結(jié)構(gòu)、債權(quán)治理與公司績效:一項經(jīng)驗分析[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2003年01期

6 田利輝;;國有產(chǎn)權(quán)、預算軟約束和中國上市公司杠桿治理[J];管理世界;2005年07期

7 黎凱;葉建芳;;財政分權(quán)下政府干預對債務融資的影響——基于轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟制度背景的實證分析[J];管理世界;2007年08期

8 李增泉;辛顯剛;于旭輝;;金融發(fā)展、債務融資約束與金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)——來自民營企業(yè)集團的證據(jù)[J];管理世界;2008年01期

9 羅宏;黃文華;;國企分紅、在職消費與公司業(yè)績[J];管理世界;2008年09期

10 范從來,葉宗偉;上市公司債務融資、公司治理與公司績效[J];經(jīng)濟理論與經(jīng)濟管理;2004年10期

本文編號：1502105