獨(dú)立董事、審計(jì)委員會(huì)和股東制衡的有效性——基于會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表披露的視角
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2019-03-30 07:44
【摘要】:利用滬深兩市A股上市公司2001~2007年的資料,研究了獨(dú)立董事、審計(jì)委員會(huì)和股東制衡在年度財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表披露過(guò)程中的有效性。實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明,三者在報(bào)表披露過(guò)程中是有效的,獨(dú)立董事規(guī)模和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的設(shè)立有助于降低財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告被出示"非標(biāo)"意見(jiàn)的可能性,并能促使報(bào)表更及時(shí)地披露,而股東制衡作用越大,財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告被出示"非標(biāo)"意見(jiàn)的可能性就越大,報(bào)表披露的及時(shí)性也越差。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2001 to 2007, this paper studies the effectiveness of independent directors, audit committees and shareholders' checks and balances in the disclosure of annual financial and accounting statements. The results of empirical research show that the three are effective in the reporting disclosure process, that the size of independent directors and the establishment of the Audit Committee help to reduce the possibility of financial and accounting reports being presented with "non-standard" opinions and to promote more timely disclosure of statements, And the greater the shareholder checks and balances, the greater the possibility that the financial and accounting reports will be presented "non-standard" opinions, and the worse the timeliness of reporting disclosure.
【作者單位】: 廈門(mén)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】:F239.4
[Abstract]:Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2001 to 2007, this paper studies the effectiveness of independent directors, audit committees and shareholders' checks and balances in the disclosure of annual financial and accounting statements. The results of empirical research show that the three are effective in the reporting disclosure process, that the size of independent directors and the establishment of the Audit Committee help to reduce the possibility of financial and accounting reports being presented with "non-standard" opinions and to promote more timely disclosure of statements, And the greater the shareholder checks and balances, the greater the possibility that the financial and accounting reports will be presented "non-standard" opinions, and the worse the timeliness of reporting disclosure.
【作者單位】: 廈門(mén)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】:F239.4
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