本文選題：審計(jì) + 審計(jì)合謀��； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)鑒證功能,是現(xiàn)代資本市場(chǎng)正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的重要基石之一,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師獨(dú)立性的保持更是其發(fā)揮鑒證功能的基本前提。但是近年來(lái)發(fā)生的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊案件,很多都牽涉到注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)合謀問(wèn)題。審計(jì)合謀是一種不正常的經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)象,它的存在對(duì)我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展造成很嚴(yán)重的危害,同時(shí)也嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了我國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所形象。筆者希望通過(guò)對(duì)我國(guó)審計(jì)合謀現(xiàn)象的研究,能夠提供一點(diǎn)對(duì)審計(jì)合謀防范和治理有價(jià)值的建議。 本文試圖結(jié)合我國(guó)的制度、環(huán)境等非經(jīng)濟(jì)因素,從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度,運(yùn)用博弈分析的方法,考察審計(jì)市場(chǎng)中合謀雙方的預(yù)期合謀利益、合謀成本,分析雙方趨利避害的行為選擇,揭示審計(jì)合謀的形成機(jī)制,進(jìn)而提出通過(guò)整治外部社會(huì)法律環(huán)境、完善創(chuàng)新現(xiàn)有制度等途徑來(lái)改變審計(jì)合謀雙方的預(yù)期和行為選擇,從而達(dá)到防范、治理審計(jì)合謀行為的目的。 文章首先介紹了文章的研究背景以及選題的意義,對(duì)中外學(xué)者以往的研究情況進(jìn)行了回顧,通過(guò)學(xué)習(xí)、借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外專家、學(xué)者以往的研究成果,闡述了審計(jì)合謀的內(nèi)涵和審計(jì)合謀行為形成的理論機(jī)理,并結(jié)合中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的當(dāng)前現(xiàn)狀,歸納了審計(jì)合謀的特性。 通過(guò)收集、整理、比較近幾年審計(jì)署、證監(jiān)會(huì)等監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)公布的處罰公告,簡(jiǎn)要介紹了審計(jì)合謀行為在我國(guó)的現(xiàn)狀,揭示了我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)中目前存在的問(wèn)題。通過(guò)對(duì)一個(gè)典型審計(jì)合謀案例的說(shuō)明與分析,指出了審計(jì)合謀行為產(chǎn)生的原因是多方面的,既有外部制度環(huán)境等因素的影響,也有內(nèi)部利益驅(qū)動(dòng)原因。由此區(qū)分制度環(huán)境以及利益驅(qū)動(dòng)等不同方面深入考察了審計(jì)合謀行為的形成機(jī)制。在分析利益驅(qū)動(dòng)原因部分,為了能夠深入分析利益的取舍以及審計(jì)市場(chǎng)雙方趨利避害的行為選擇,采取了處理此類問(wèn)題比較通用的作法,即運(yùn)用博弈分析的方法,通過(guò)建立符合中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)特點(diǎn)的博弈矩陣并對(duì)其進(jìn)行分析,考察雙方的預(yù)期合謀利益、合謀成本,希望在此基礎(chǔ)上找到治理審計(jì)合謀的有效措施。 通過(guò)對(duì)審計(jì)合謀行為產(chǎn)生機(jī)制的分析,有針對(duì)性的提出了對(duì)審計(jì)合謀行為的治理意見(jiàn),其中既包括為鼓勵(lì)和保證良好審計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)質(zhì)量而應(yīng)當(dāng)采取的積極對(duì)策與措施,也包括為抑制審計(jì)合謀行為發(fā)生所應(yīng)當(dāng)采取的懲治對(duì)策與措施。
[Abstract]:The audit verification function of CPA is one of the important cornerstones of the normal operation of the modern capital market, and the maintenance of the independence of CPA is the basic premise of its function of authentication. However, in recent years, many of the financial reporting fraud cases involve the audit collusion of CPA. Audit collusion is a kind of abnormal economic phenomenon, its existence causes very serious harm to the development of market economy of our country, at the same time, it also seriously damages the image of the accounting firm of our country. The author hopes to provide some valuable suggestions for the prevention and management of audit collusion by studying the phenomenon of audit collusion in China. This paper attempts to combine the system, environment and other non-economic factors of our country, from the angle of economics, using the method of game analysis, to investigate the expected collusion benefit and collusion cost of both sides in the audit market, and to analyze the behavior choice of both sides to seek profit and avoid harm. This paper reveals the forming mechanism of audit collusion, and then puts forward to change the expectation and behavior choice of both sides of audit collusion by renovating the external social legal environment and perfecting and innovating the existing system, so as to achieve the purpose of preventing and managing audit collusion. The article first introduces the research background and the significance of the topic, reviews the past research situation of Chinese and foreign scholars, and draws lessons from the previous research results of domestic and foreign experts and scholars. This paper expounds the connotation of audit collusion and the theoretical mechanism of the formation of audit collusion, and sums up the characteristics of audit collusion combined with the current situation of audit market in China. By collecting, sorting out and comparing the punishment announcements issued by the Audit Office and the Securities Regulatory Commission in recent years, this paper briefly introduces the present situation of audit collusion in China, and reveals the problems existing in the audit market in our country. Through the explanation and analysis of a typical audit collusion case, it is pointed out that the causes of audit collusion are various, both the influence of external institutional environment and the internal interest driven reason. The formation mechanism of audit collusion is investigated from different aspects, such as institutional environment and interest drive. In the part of analyzing the reasons of interest driving, in order to analyze the choice of interests and the behavior choice of both sides of audit market, we adopt the general method to deal with this kind of problem, that is, using the method of game analysis. By establishing and analyzing the game matrix in accordance with the characteristics of China's audit market, the paper investigates the expected collusion interests and collusion costs of both sides, and hopes to find effective measures to govern audit collusion on this basis. Based on the analysis of the mechanism of audit collusion, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the governance of audit collusion, including the positive countermeasures and measures to encourage and guarantee the good audit quality. It also includes the countermeasures and measures that should be taken to curb the occurrence of audit collusion.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 龔嘉音;;審計(jì)合謀的成因與治理對(duì)策探析[J];商;2012年03期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 薛美君;上市公司審計(jì)合謀及其治理研究[D];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年

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本文編號(hào)：2058003