本文選題：制度雙元性 + 海外投資企業(yè)��； 參考：《南京信息工程大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化加速發(fā)展的背景下,企業(yè)為了在更大的市場范圍內(nèi)獲取持續(xù)的競爭力,越來越多的發(fā)展中國家企業(yè)選擇進(jìn)行海外投資。引人矚目的是,新興經(jīng)濟(jì)國家企業(yè)對外投資發(fā)展速度正趕超發(fā)達(dá)國家,尤其是中國企業(yè)海外投資正進(jìn)入加速階段,中國已成為全球跨國企業(yè)投資的焦點。企業(yè)高管作為海外投資企業(yè)的投資戰(zhàn)略決策的發(fā)行者與主要執(zhí)行者,其理念和行為對企業(yè)生存與創(chuàng)新發(fā)展具有關(guān)鍵作用,他們是企業(yè)最為重要的資源,其人口統(tǒng)計學(xué)特征尤其是公司治理中的權(quán)力激勵特征會對企業(yè)創(chuàng)新和外部風(fēng)險認(rèn)知偏好產(chǎn)生重要影響,進(jìn)而影響其行為與企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效。鑒于當(dāng)前中國企業(yè)海外投資所面臨的機遇與挑戰(zhàn),即既有迫切的海外創(chuàng)新動力又面臨跨國環(huán)境中的高度創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險,因此,在國內(nèi)制造企業(yè)走出去轉(zhuǎn)型升級的新時期,探討中國企業(yè)高管權(quán)力特征與企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效的關(guān)系具有重要的實踐意義與學(xué)術(shù)價值�；谏鲜隼碚撍悸�,本文以滬深A(yù)股市場中我國2001—2013年制造業(yè)海外投資企業(yè)為樣本,借鑒組織控制理論的相關(guān)原理,將企業(yè)創(chuàng)新決策中的母國政治關(guān)聯(lián)作為高管的重要創(chuàng)新動力、東道國制度環(huán)境作為高管的關(guān)鍵風(fēng)險意識,對兩者在高管權(quán)力配置與企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效之間的交互影響進(jìn)行實證檢驗,并重點揭示了國有企業(yè)與民營企業(yè)在上述問題中的顯著差異�；诜诸愔卫肀尘�,對制度雙元性下的高管權(quán)力與企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效之間關(guān)系進(jìn)行了研究。主要的研究發(fā)現(xiàn):第一,無論是國有還是民營企業(yè),董事會監(jiān)控、高管任期總體上與企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效顯著負(fù)相關(guān);相對于國有企業(yè),高管兩職兼任對民營企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效有著更為顯著的負(fù)面影響,而高管年薪的人力資本定價功能和股權(quán)比例的管理防御效應(yīng)對民營企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效分別起著更為顯著的積極與消極影響。第二,相對于國有企業(yè),民營企業(yè)中的母國政治關(guān)聯(lián)在兩職兼任、董事會監(jiān)管和海外創(chuàng)新績效關(guān)系方面都發(fā)揮更顯著的調(diào)節(jié)作用。其中,董事會監(jiān)控力度會因母國政治關(guān)聯(lián)中高管權(quán)力強化效應(yīng)而得到增加,不利于企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效;兩職兼任引發(fā)的管理防御效應(yīng)對企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效的不利影響受到母國政治關(guān)聯(lián)反向積極的調(diào)節(jié)作用;相對于民營企業(yè),國有企業(yè)高管連任所產(chǎn)生的對企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效更為不利的特色影響受到了母國政治關(guān)聯(lián)更為顯著的反向調(diào)節(jié)作用。第三,無論是國有企業(yè)還是民營企業(yè),東道國制度完善性在董事會監(jiān)管、海外創(chuàng)新績效和年薪報酬方面都有著顯著的調(diào)節(jié)作用。其中,董事會監(jiān)控的權(quán)力約束效應(yīng)對企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效的不利影響因東道國制度完善而得到強化;高管年薪的人力資本定價功能對企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效的有利影響,受到東道國制度完善性的正向強化的積極作用。相對于民營企業(yè),國有企業(yè)中高管連任所產(chǎn)生的對企業(yè)海外創(chuàng)新績效更為不利的特色影響,被東道國制度環(huán)境完善性的創(chuàng)新支持作用反向調(diào)節(jié)后更為顯著。
[Abstract]:In the context of accelerated economic globalization, more and more enterprises in developing countries choose to invest abroad in order to gain sustainable competitiveness in a larger market. The focus is that the development of foreign investment in emerging economic countries is catching up with the country, especially in China. China has become the focus of global investment in transnational enterprises. As the issuer and chief executive of investment strategic decision of overseas investment enterprises, the concept and behavior of enterprise executives play a key role in the survival and innovation of enterprises. They are the most important resources of the enterprise, and their demographic characteristics, especially corporate governance, are the most important. In view of the opportunities and challenges facing the overseas investment of Chinese enterprises, that is, both the urgent overseas innovation power and the high innovation risk in the transnational environment are faced with the opportunities and challenges facing the overseas investment of Chinese enterprises, therefore, it is made in China. It is of great practical significance and academic value to discuss the relationship between the characteristics of Chinese enterprises' executive power and the innovation performance of enterprises overseas. Based on the above theory, this paper takes the sample of the overseas investment enterprises in China's manufacturing industry from 2001 to 2013 in the A stock market in Shanghai and Shenzhen as a sample, drawing on the correlation of the theory of organizational control. The principle is that the political association of the parent country in the enterprise innovation decision is the important innovation motive of the executive, and the host country system environment is the key risk consciousness of the executive, and the interaction between the executive power allocation and the enterprise's overseas innovation performance is tested empirically, and the key points are revealed that the state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises are in the above problems. On the basis of Classified Governance background, the relationship between executive power and overseas innovation performance under institutional dual nature is studied. The main research results are as follows: first, the supervisory control of the state-owned or private enterprises and the board of directors is negatively related to the enterprise's overseas innovation performance; relative to the state-owned enterprises. The two position of senior executives has a more significant negative impact on the overseas innovation performance of private enterprises, while the human capital pricing function of the executive salary and the management defense effect of the share proportion have more significant positive and negative effects on the overseas innovation performance of private enterprises respectively. Second, relative to the state-owned enterprises, the home country of the private enterprises. Political relevance plays a more significant role in regulating the relationship between the two posts, the board supervision and the overseas innovation performance. Among them, the monitoring of the board of directors will be increased by the strengthening effect of the executive power in the country's political connection, which is not conducive to the enterprise's overseas innovation performance; the management defense effect caused by the two job is the innovation of the enterprise overseas. The negative impact of the performance is positively adjusted by the political relevance of the mother country; the more negative influence on the enterprise's overseas innovation performance relative to the continuous appointment of the state-owned enterprises relative to the private enterprises. Third, the state-owned enterprise or the private enterprise, the host country, and the host country. The perfection of the state system has a significant adjustment effect on the board of directors, the innovation performance overseas and the annual salary. Among them, the effect of the power constraint effect on the overseas innovation performance of the enterprise is strengthened by the improvement of the host country system; the human capital pricing function of the senior executive's annual salary has the innovation performance of the enterprise overseas. The favorable influence of the host country system is positively strengthened by the improvement of the host country system. Relative to the private enterprises, the senior executives in the state-owned enterprises have a more unfavorable influence on the enterprise's overseas innovation performance, and the innovation support role of the host country's institutional environment is more significant after the reverse regulation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京信息工程大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F273.1;F125;F279.2

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