內(nèi)蒙古草原牧區(qū)可持續(xù)發(fā)展制度建設(shè)研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-05-04 08:40
本文選題:草原牧區(qū) + 可持續(xù)發(fā)展; 參考:《內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文
【摘要】:‘直以來,內(nèi)蒙古草原牧區(qū)因獨特的地貌就肩負著我國北方生態(tài)屏障的作用,近年來,隨著資源的不斷探明,區(qū)域化能源基地的角色也逐漸明朗。特別是自治區(qū)“8337”發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的提出使得內(nèi)蒙古草原牧區(qū)的多重角色定位更加明晰。在這樣的背景下,也使得牧區(qū)眾多利益主體圍繞草原礦產(chǎn)資源開發(fā)、生態(tài)建設(shè)等核心利益產(chǎn)生了諸多矛盾。因此基于利益相關(guān)者理論開展牧區(qū)可持續(xù)發(fā)展制度建設(shè)層面的研究就顯得十分必要。該研究一方面從理論上有效地補充和完善草原可持續(xù)發(fā)展領(lǐng)域的研究,另一方面也為政府在推動制度建設(shè),制定相關(guān)政策,有效改善區(qū)域利益主體關(guān)系,緩和社會矛盾,保持邊疆穩(wěn)定等方面提供了重要的現(xiàn)實意義。 本研究基于可持續(xù)發(fā)展理論,生態(tài)經(jīng)濟協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展理論以及公共物品理論和外部性理論,結(jié)合當前自治區(qū)草原牧區(qū)的實情,運用利益相關(guān)者分析法綜合概括出草原牧區(qū)三大利益主體——即政府、企業(yè)和牧民。然后運用了以完全靜態(tài)博弈為核心的博弈分析方法,以各主體利益最大為突破口構(gòu)建兩兩間的博弈模型,進而推導(dǎo)出制約各自主體行為的因素。文章結(jié)論部分從博弈分析的制約因素入手,提出政府罰款機制的控制、政府行政費用的縮減、政府補償費用合理及時給付、引導(dǎo)企業(yè)節(jié)能減排,走新型工業(yè)化道路等多方面的政策意見,從而將研究落于實處,對草原牧區(qū)可持續(xù)發(fā)展建設(shè)提供了重要的指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:Since then, the grassland pastoral area of Inner Mongolia has been shouldering the role of ecological barrier in northern China because of its unique landforms. In recent years, with the continuous exploration of resources, the role of regionalized energy base is gradually clear. In particular, the development strategy of "8337" in Inner Mongolia makes the multi-role positioning of Inner Mongolia grassland and pastoral areas more clear. Under this background, many stakeholders in pastoral areas have many contradictions around the core interests of grassland mineral resources development and ecological construction. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out the research on sustainable development system of pastoral area based on stakeholder theory. On the one hand, the research effectively complements and consummates the research in the field of sustainable development of grassland theoretically, on the other hand, it also helps the government to promote the construction of institutions, formulate relevant policies, effectively improve the relationship between regional stakeholders and ease social contradictions. Maintaining the stability of the frontier provides important practical significance. This study is based on the theory of sustainable development, the theory of coordinated development of ecological economy, the theory of public goods and the theory of externality. The three main interests of grassland and pastoral area-government, enterprise and herdsman are summarized synthetically by means of stakeholder analysis. Then the game analysis method with complete static game as the core is used to construct the game model between two and two with the maximum interest of each subject as the breakthrough point and then the factors restricting the behavior of each subject are deduced. The conclusion of the paper starts with the restrictive factors of game analysis, and puts forward the control of the government penalty mechanism, the reduction of the government administrative expenses, the reasonable and timely payment of the government compensation expenses, and the guidance of the enterprises to save energy and reduce the emission. Taking the new way of industrialization and other policy suggestions, the research will be put into practice, which will provide important guidance significance for the sustainable development of grassland and pastoral areas.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:X322;F127.8
【參考文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條
1 王利清;馬建榮;;礦產(chǎn)資源開發(fā)中政府、企業(yè)與牧民的利益博弈——以錫林郭勒盟礦產(chǎn)資源開發(fā)為例[J];前沿;2010年05期
2 胡文國;劉凌云;;我國煤礦生產(chǎn)安全監(jiān)管中的博弈分析[J];數(shù)量經(jīng)濟技術(shù)經(jīng)濟研究;2008年08期
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