本文選題：去產(chǎn)能 + 產(chǎn)業(yè)政策　； 參考：《上海金融》2017年08期

【摘要】："去產(chǎn)能"作為供給側(cè)結(jié)構(gòu)性改革五大任務(wù)之首,是我國經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型升級的關(guān)鍵所在。雖已經(jīng)過近二十年的治理,綜合運用了行政、財稅、金融、法律等各方面措施,但產(chǎn)能過剩問題不僅未得到明顯改善反而顯得愈發(fā)嚴(yán)重,使得我們不得不反思相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的有效性。從現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)來看,大多是從"市場失靈"、"體制扭曲"等方面討論產(chǎn)能過剩的形成原因,但對去產(chǎn)能政策在實施過程中的影響因素及其執(zhí)行效果缺乏系統(tǒng)性分析。中央政府和地方政府作為產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的制定主體和執(zhí)行主體,二者的博弈直接影響產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的實施效果。本文建立了中央政府和地方政府的演化博弈模型,用以研究分析影響地方政府執(zhí)行去產(chǎn)能政策效果的相關(guān)因素,并對提高去產(chǎn)能政策的執(zhí)行效果提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:As the top five Ren Wuzhi of supply-side structural reform, "deproductivity" is the key to China's economic transformation and upgrading.Although administrative, fiscal, financial, legal and other measures have been comprehensively applied in the past 20 years, the problem of overcapacity has not been significantly improved, but has become increasingly serious.So that we have to reflect on the effectiveness of relevant industrial policies.According to the existing literature, the causes of overcapacity are mostly discussed from the aspects of "market failure" and "system distortion", but there is a lack of systematic analysis of the influencing factors and the effect of the implementation of the policy of deproductivity in the process of implementation.The game between central government and local government, as the main body of industrial policy formulation and execution, directly affects the effect of industrial policy implementation.In this paper, the evolutionary game model of central government and local government is established to study and analyze the relevant factors that affect the effect of local government to implement the policy of deproductivity, and to put forward some policy suggestions to improve the effect of implementing the policy of deproductivity.
【作者單位】： 中國人民銀行石家莊中心支行;
【分類號】：F124
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本文編號：1742934