引入權(quán)威第三方的產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移博弈演化路徑分析
發(fā)布時間:2018-10-19 14:02
【摘要】:文章運用演化博弈理論,在引入權(quán)威第三方政府之基礎(chǔ)上,建構(gòu)了產(chǎn)業(yè)跨界轉(zhuǎn)移演化博弈模型及其雅克比矩陣均衡解。研究表明,通過轉(zhuǎn)出地和承接地的自身演化無法實現(xiàn)產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移的最優(yōu)策略均衡,引入一個以政府為代表的權(quán)威第三方以實施財政補償與政策引導(dǎo)乃不二之選。為此,要加快建立和完善產(chǎn)業(yè)跨界轉(zhuǎn)移的三邊補償機制;把握區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展趨勢,以繁榮城市群集群經(jīng)濟為主導(dǎo),以發(fā)展同城化集群經(jīng)濟為趨向,努力構(gòu)筑區(qū)域經(jīng)濟"高精尖"的產(chǎn)業(yè)體系;促進產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移與技術(shù)升級雙重戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的實現(xiàn),實現(xiàn)產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)出地與產(chǎn)業(yè)承接地經(jīng)濟發(fā)展與社會進步的雙向共贏。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of evolutionary game and the introduction of authoritative third party government, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of industrial cross-border transfer and its Jacobian matrix equilibrium solution. The research shows that the optimal strategic equilibrium of industrial transfer can not be realized through the evolution of the transfer and the undertaking land, and it is necessary to introduce an authoritative third party represented by the government to carry out financial compensation and policy guidance. Therefore, it is necessary to speed up the establishment and improvement of the trilateral compensation mechanism for industrial cross-border transfer, grasp the trend of regional economic development, and take the prosperity of the urban cluster economy as the dominant trend, and the development of the urban cluster economy as the trend. We should try hard to build a "sophisticated" industrial system of regional economy, promote the realization of the dual strategic goal of industrial transfer and technological upgrading, and realize the two-way win-win situation between the economic development and social progress of industrial transfer and industrial undertaking.
【作者單位】: 陜西理工學(xué)院經(jīng)濟與法學(xué)學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家社會科學(xué)基金資助項目(13BJY034) 陜西省社會科學(xué)基金資助項目(2014G12)
【分類號】:F127
本文編號:2281352
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of evolutionary game and the introduction of authoritative third party government, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of industrial cross-border transfer and its Jacobian matrix equilibrium solution. The research shows that the optimal strategic equilibrium of industrial transfer can not be realized through the evolution of the transfer and the undertaking land, and it is necessary to introduce an authoritative third party represented by the government to carry out financial compensation and policy guidance. Therefore, it is necessary to speed up the establishment and improvement of the trilateral compensation mechanism for industrial cross-border transfer, grasp the trend of regional economic development, and take the prosperity of the urban cluster economy as the dominant trend, and the development of the urban cluster economy as the trend. We should try hard to build a "sophisticated" industrial system of regional economy, promote the realization of the dual strategic goal of industrial transfer and technological upgrading, and realize the two-way win-win situation between the economic development and social progress of industrial transfer and industrial undertaking.
【作者單位】: 陜西理工學(xué)院經(jīng)濟與法學(xué)學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家社會科學(xué)基金資助項目(13BJY034) 陜西省社會科學(xué)基金資助項目(2014G12)
【分類號】:F127
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1 鄭群;基于并聯(lián)機構(gòu)的平面3自由度微動工作臺的研究[D];合肥工業(yè)大學(xué);2007年
,本文編號:2281352
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