中國—東盟經(jīng)貿(mào)格局演變與南海經(jīng)貿(mào)戰(zhàn)略選擇
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 中國—東盟 經(jīng)貿(mào)格局演變 非零和博弈 南海經(jīng)貿(mào)戰(zhàn)略 出處:《廣西大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:中國南海蘊藏著豐富的石油和天然氣資源以及豐富多樣的漁業(yè)資源,因此,經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展對資源需求日益強烈的新興東盟國家爭先開發(fā)中國南海的寶貴資源。自2009年中國南海問題爆發(fā)以來,越南和菲律賓加緊對中國南海資源的開發(fā),并持續(xù)地制造和升級領(lǐng)土沖突,同時南海區(qū)域外大國也試圖介入南海問題,嚴(yán)重影響了中國的領(lǐng)土完整和經(jīng)濟利益。 中國與東盟一方面存在領(lǐng)土沖突,另一方面也存在巨大的共同利益。中國—東盟自由貿(mào)易區(qū)的建設(shè)已經(jīng)歷十年時間,對中國和東盟國家的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展起到了積極的推動作用,在貿(mào)易與投資方面為中國和東盟國家?guī)砹司薮蟮膭?chuàng)造效應(yīng)和轉(zhuǎn)移效應(yīng),并通過貿(mào)易與投資促進雙方產(chǎn)業(yè)形成網(wǎng)絡(luò)化分工,雙方的經(jīng)貿(mào)共同利益不斷深化。 筆者認(rèn)為中國南海的領(lǐng)土沖突涉及國際經(jīng)濟、國際政治、軍事、文化等多種因素,屬于綜合性難題;而經(jīng)貿(mào)往來是雙方最主要的聯(lián)系,并推動雙方的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展,為雙方帶來巨大的共同利益。因此,雙方存在著合作的可能性,中國南海的領(lǐng)土沖突應(yīng)運用合作博弈模型進行分析,并不是“非負(fù)即正”的零和博弈。作為博弈中的一方,中國應(yīng)抓住經(jīng)濟全球化和區(qū)域經(jīng)濟一體化的機遇,積極參與國際經(jīng)濟合作和競爭,尤其是區(qū)域經(jīng)濟合作,促進經(jīng)濟發(fā)展和地區(qū)穩(wěn)定,以減弱和平衡中國南海的領(lǐng)土沖突。本文旨在通過運用托馬斯·謝林提出的非零和博弈理論對中國南海的領(lǐng)土沖突進行深入分析,探究中國如何運用經(jīng)濟手段制衡和減弱雙方領(lǐng)土爭端問題,并提出相應(yīng)的中國南海安全戰(zhàn)略,為維護中國東盟關(guān)系健康發(fā)展提供合理建議。首先,本文概括中國南海的領(lǐng)土爭端現(xiàn)狀和特點;其次,由于貿(mào)易與投資為中國與東盟的主要經(jīng)濟聯(lián)系,本文將歸納中國一東盟貿(mào)易與投資的現(xiàn)狀和特點,并推測其未來的演變趨勢;并在此基礎(chǔ)上,研究中國與菲律賓、越南間的貿(mào)易與投資特點與現(xiàn)狀,并推測未來的演變趨勢;再次,根據(jù)現(xiàn)實經(jīng)貿(mào)聯(lián)系分析和領(lǐng)土收益的分析結(jié)果,建立非零和博弈模型,進一步分析中國與菲律賓、越南在領(lǐng)土沖突博弈中的損失和收益。最后,根據(jù)博弈模型分析結(jié)果,筆者嘗試提出中國能夠平衡各方和減弱領(lǐng)土沖突的博弈戰(zhàn)略構(gòu)想。
[Abstract]:The South China Sea is rich in oil and gas resources and various fishery resources. With the rapid development of economy, the emerging ASEAN countries, which are in increasing demand for resources, are scrambling to exploit the precious resources in the South China Sea. Since the outbreak of the South China Sea problem in 2009. Vietnam and the Philippines have stepped up the exploitation of resources in the South China Sea and continuously created and escalated territorial conflicts, while the great powers outside the South China Sea have also tried to intervene in the South China Sea issue. Seriously affected China's territorial integrity and economic interests. On the one hand, there are territorial conflicts between China and ASEAN, on the other hand, there are also huge common interests. The construction of China-ASEAN Free Trade area has been going through ten years. It has played a positive role in promoting the economic development of China and ASEAN countries, and has brought great creative and transfer effects to China and ASEAN countries in terms of trade and investment. And through trade and investment to promote the two industries to form a network division of labor, mutual economic and trade interests continue to deepen. The author thinks that the territorial conflict in the South China Sea involves many factors, such as international economy, international politics, military affairs, culture and so on. Economic and trade exchanges are the most important ties between the two sides, and promote the economic development of both sides, bringing great common interests for both sides. Therefore, there is the possibility of cooperation between the two sides. The territorial conflict in the South China Sea should be analyzed by the cooperative game model, which is not a zero-sum game. As one side of the game, China should seize the opportunity of economic globalization and regional economic integration. We will actively participate in international economic cooperation and competition, especially regional economic cooperation, and promote economic development and regional stability. In order to weaken and balance the territorial conflict in the South China Sea, this paper aims to analyze the territorial conflict in the South China Sea by using the non-zero sum game theory proposed by Thomas Schelling. Explore how China uses economic means to balance and weaken the issue of territorial disputes between the two sides, and put forward the corresponding security strategy for the South China Sea, to maintain the healthy development of China-ASEAN relations to provide reasonable advice. This paper summarizes the present situation and characteristics of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Secondly, as trade and investment are the main economic relations between China and ASEAN, this paper will sum up the current situation and characteristics of China-ASEAN trade and investment, and speculate on its future evolution trend. On this basis, the characteristics and present situation of trade and investment between China and the Philippines and Vietnam are studied, and the trend of evolution in the future is speculated. Thirdly, based on the analysis of economic and trade relations and territorial income, a non-zero-sum game model is established to further analyze the losses and benefits of China, Philippines and Vietnam in the territorial conflict game. Finally. According to the result of game model analysis, the author tries to put forward a game strategy that China can balance the parties and weaken the territorial conflict.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F752.7
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