本文選題：管理者薪酬　切入點(diǎn)：最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文考慮管理者薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)如何影響公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)問(wèn)題,論證了在我國(guó)實(shí)行一個(gè)成熟的、富有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的中小企業(yè)管理者的薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的必要性和可行性。本文在定性分析管理者薪酬激勵(lì)運(yùn)行機(jī)理基礎(chǔ)之上,通過(guò)構(gòu)建風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性定價(jià)模型,得到中小企業(yè)最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)數(shù)值解,定量討論了市場(chǎng)摩擦和公司收益波動(dòng)率對(duì)公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)和債券溢價(jià)的影響、管理者的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)和外部收入對(duì)公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)的影響、部分股權(quán)和機(jī)會(huì)收益對(duì)管理者與股東之間利益沖突的影響、擔(dān)保契約設(shè)計(jì)參數(shù)與管理者薪酬及融資規(guī)模的關(guān)系等問(wèn)題。數(shù)值計(jì)算結(jié)果表明:在企業(yè)債券融資規(guī)模不變的情況下,管理者若是選擇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大的項(xiàng)目,會(huì)得到更多的薪酬價(jià)值,同時(shí)企業(yè)股權(quán)價(jià)值也增加,而企業(yè)的債券價(jià)值減少,即管理者有較強(qiáng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移動(dòng)機(jī);隨著券息的增加,公司價(jià)值先增加后遞減;企業(yè)杠桿增加,債券的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)也增加。在無(wú)杠桿下,管理者放棄時(shí)機(jī)與券息無(wú)關(guān)。隨著固定薪水的增加,管理者的薪酬價(jià)值、債券價(jià)值和公司價(jià)值增加;公司財(cái)務(wù)杠桿減少;債券信用溢價(jià)減少。隨著管理者獲得的股權(quán)份額增加,管理者薪酬價(jià)值、公司股權(quán)價(jià)值隨之增加;債券價(jià)值與公司價(jià)值減少;公司財(cái)務(wù)杠桿和債券信用溢價(jià)隨之減少;管理者放棄水平和期權(quán)水平增加,而最優(yōu)的券息減少。假設(shè)企業(yè)資本由股權(quán)和基于擔(dān)保換股權(quán)協(xié)議獲得的永久性債權(quán)資本組成,管理者薪酬包括部分股權(quán)和固定工資,擔(dān)保公司擔(dān)保部分債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。分析表明:管理者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移動(dòng)機(jī)隨著管理者獲得股權(quán)份額、固定工資、機(jī)會(huì)收益增加而增強(qiáng),隨著擔(dān)保公司獲得的擔(dān)保比例增加而減少。
[Abstract]:This paper considers how the salary structure of managers affects the capital structure of a company, and demonstrates the necessity and feasibility of implementing a mature and competitive salary incentive mechanism for managers of small and medium-sized enterprises in China.Based on the qualitative analysis of the mechanism of managers' compensation incentive, this paper constructs a risk-neutral pricing model and obtains the numerical solution of the optimal capital structure of SMEs.The effects of market friction and volatility of corporate income on corporate capital structure and bond premium, and the effects of managers' salary structure and external income on capital structure and risk premium are discussed quantitatively.The influence of partial equity and opportunity income on the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, the relationship between the design parameters of guarantee contract and the salary and financing scale of managers, etc.The numerical results show that under the condition of constant corporate bond financing scale, managers will get more compensation value if they choose high-risk projects, at the same time, the corporate equity value will also increase, while the corporate bond value will decrease.That is, managers have strong motivation for risk transfer; with the increase of bond interest, the value of the company increases first and then decreases; the corporate leverage increases, and the risk premium of bonds also increases.In the absence of leverage, managers give up the timing is not related to coupon interest.With the increase of fixed salary, managers' compensation value, bond value and company value increase; corporate financial leverage decreases; and bond credit premium decreases.With the increase of the share share of the manager, the compensation value of the manager, the equity value of the company increases, the value of the bond and the value of the company decrease, the financial leverage and the credit premium of the bond decrease.The manager gives up the level and the option level increases, while the optimal coupon rate decreases.Assuming that the corporate capital consists of equity and permanent debt capital based on the guarantee for equity agreement, the manager's compensation includes a portion of the equity and fixed salary, and the guarantee company guarantees part of the debt risk.The analysis shows that the risk transfer motivation of managers increases with the increase of equity share, fixed salary and opportunity income, and decreases with the increase of guarantee ratio.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F275

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

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本文編號(hào)：1723306