本文關鍵詞： 對賭協議 激勵機制 公司治理 期權 射幸合同 價值　出處：《上海交通大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：PE作為一種戰(zhàn)略投資者，過去的十年在中國得到快速發(fā)展。而源于對非公眾公司信息披露不完善和公司治理水平的不確定性，對賭協議這一估值調整工具也被PE行業(yè)廣泛運用，并成為項目的關鍵機制。 這一被投資方廣泛采用的機制是否真的實現了很好的價值發(fā)現功能和對融資方的激勵效應，這是本文要論述的。 對賭協議從合同屬性來看，是建構在合同自由這一民事行為原則基礎上，基于對未來不確定性收益建構的一種利益交換約定，很好的體現了市場經濟的自發(fā)調節(jié)原則，它所具備的射幸合同的等價有償的相對性，很好的解決了信息不確定性下的風險控制機制。 而從經濟學角度來看，作為對信息不對稱環(huán)境下的“逆向選擇”和“道德問題”的回應，“對賭協議”在一定條件下，對管理層來說是激勵強度最大，對投資者來說是風險控制最優(yōu)，對經濟效率來講是帕累托最優(yōu)的一種機制安排。 本文重點用量化模型的方法，，首先構建了一個方程模型，論證了對賭協議可以視為一個固定收益?zhèn)蛯嵨锲跈嘟M合模型，并體現出了對賭協議對于投資方而言是一種很好的風險轉移工具。 然后通過案例，比較了實物期權定價模型和凈現值計算結果的差異，發(fā)現了對賭協議作為一種期權性質的財務工具的價值發(fā)現功能。 最后通過對賭協議投資方和融資方收益方程的建立與比較，進一步論證了對賭協議是一種對投資方和融資方的雙向激勵機制。 作為公司治理中的激勵機制是否有效,取決于在多大程度上將激勵主體與激勵客體的目標利益函數聯系在一起,使報酬具有充分的激勵數額與合理的結構。對賭協議的恰恰很好的將投資方和融資方的目標利益函數聯系在一起，它不只是一種零和博弈的利益再分配機制和對投資方的風險保障，更是實現了對未來不確定性的戰(zhàn)略決策權的價值發(fā)現，進而創(chuàng)造性的解決了投資和融資方之間的利益一致化問題，實現一種雙向的激勵機制設計。對賭協議的設計體現了一種對當事雙方的正向激勵性。
[Abstract]:As a strategic investor, PE has developed rapidly in China in the past ten years. But because of the uncertainty about the imperfect information disclosure of non-public companies and the level of corporate governance, gambling agreement, a valuation adjustment tool, has also been widely used in the PE industry. And become the key mechanism of the project. Whether the mechanism widely used by the investors has really realized the value discovery function and the incentive effect to the financier is discussed in this paper. From the point of view of contract attribute, the gambling agreement is based on the civil behavior principle of freedom of contract and a kind of benefit exchange agreement based on the construction of uncertain income in the future, which well embodies the principle of spontaneous regulation of market economy. It has the equivalent paid relativity of the lucky contract, which solves the risk control mechanism under the information uncertainty. From the economic point of view, as a response to the "adverse selection" and "moral issues" in the asymmetric information environment, the "gambling agreement" is the strongest incentive for the management under certain conditions. Risk control is optimal for investors and Pareto optimal mechanism for economic efficiency. In this paper, the quantitative model is used to construct an equation model, which proves that the bet agreement can be regarded as a combination model of fixed income bonds and real options. It also shows that gambling agreement is a good risk transfer tool for investors. Then the difference between the real option pricing model and the net present value calculation results is compared and the value discovery function of the gambling agreement as a financial tool of option nature is found. Finally, through the establishment and comparison of the profit equation between the investor and the financier of the gambling agreement, it is further demonstrated that the gambling agreement is a two-way incentive mechanism for the investor and the financier. Whether the incentive mechanism in corporate governance is effective or not depends on the extent to which the incentive subject and the objective interest function of the incentive object are linked together. Make the reward have sufficient incentive amount and reasonable structure. The agreement on gambling is a good link between the investor and the financier's objective interest function, It is not only a zero-sum game benefit redistribution mechanism and risk protection for investors, but also the realization of the value of the strategic decision-making power of uncertainty in the future. Then it creatively solves the problem of the consistency of interests between the investors and the financiers, and realizes the design of a two-way incentive mechanism, and the design of the gambling agreement reflects a positive incentive for both parties.
【學位授予單位】：上海交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.48

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