本文關(guān)鍵詞： 業(yè)績評價 股權(quán)激勵 有效性　出處：《河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著公司股權(quán)的日趨分散化以及管理手段的日益復(fù)雜化,世界各地的大公司為了給所有者帶來最大利潤,實現(xiàn)資源與人力最優(yōu)組合,都在追捧所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離的模式。但由于二者的目標(biāo)不同,出現(xiàn)了管理層損害所有者權(quán)益來謀私利等不良副作用。為了有效地解決委托代理問題,合理激勵約束公司核心人員,美國在20世紀(jì)80年代開啟了股票期權(quán)等股權(quán)激勵模式,并開始廣泛流傳。在我國,隨著改革開放腳步邁進(jìn),不少公司對股權(quán)激勵躍躍欲試。從上世紀(jì)90年代萬科的期股計劃到股權(quán)激勵遍地開花,終于在2006年迎來了《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法(試行)》,標(biāo)志著我國公司治理正式拉開了股權(quán)激勵的序幕。但是,大部分公司引用國外股權(quán)激勵出現(xiàn)了“水土不服”現(xiàn)象,我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵制度的發(fā)展仍為滯后。本文主要以蘇寧云商作為研究對象,懫用案例分析的方法,對該公司多次公布的股權(quán)激勵方案進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)分析。著重研究蘇寧云商實施股權(quán)激勵計劃前后公司績效的變化,探究股權(quán)激勵與業(yè)績的關(guān)系以及增加股權(quán)激勵有效性的激勵方案設(shè)計。研究方法上,本文懫用了指標(biāo)分析法對研究對象的財務(wù)與價值進(jìn)行縱向分析,同時又懫用了功效系數(shù)法來比較蘇寧云商與參照對象的業(yè)績和整體排名。得出蘇寧云商股權(quán)激勵對公司價值的提升未起到積極作用的結(jié)論。在此基礎(chǔ)上從激勵對象、行權(quán)考核指標(biāo)與行權(quán)價格等要素角度對蘇寧云商的股權(quán)激勵方案進(jìn)行分析,并結(jié)合案例提出了相關(guān)建議。本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)是從縱向和橫向雙角度多方法來辯證蘇寧云商股權(quán)激勵對公司績效的影響,并在此基礎(chǔ)上對蘇寧云商股權(quán)激勵方案的設(shè)計要素進(jìn)行了具體分析。以此說明公司股權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計上的不足之處與注意點,找到發(fā)揮股權(quán)激勵有效性的要素設(shè)置。為其他公司的股權(quán)激勵提供借鑒和參考,使其充分發(fā)揮和利用股權(quán)激勵的正面效用。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly decentralized ownership and increasingly complex management tools, large companies around the world in order to bring maximum profits to the owners, to achieve the optimal combination of resources and human resources. But due to the different objectives of the two, there are adverse side effects, such as the damage of owners' rights and interests to seek private interests. In order to effectively solve the principal-agent problem. In 1980s, the United States opened the stock option and other equity incentive model, and began to spread widely. In China, with the pace of reform and opening up step forward. Many companies are eager for equity incentive. From Vanke's stock plan in -10s to equity incentive everywhere, it finally ushered in the "Stock incentive Management measures of listed companies (trial)" on 2006. It marks the prelude that corporate governance of our country has officially opened the stock right incentive. However, most of the companies quoted from foreign stock right incentive appear "hard to accept" phenomenon. The development of equity incentive system of listed companies in China is still lagging behind. This paper mainly takes SUNING cloud quotient as the research object and uses the method of case study. The company has carried on the detailed analysis to the stock right incentive plan published many times, emphatically studied the SUNING cloud business to carry on the stock right incentive plan before and after the company performance change. This paper explores the relationship between equity incentive and performance and the design of incentive scheme to increase the effectiveness of equity incentive. At the same time, the efficiency coefficient method is used to compare the performance and overall ranking of SUNING cloud quotient and reference object. It is concluded that SUNING cloud quotient equity incentive does not play a positive role in the promotion of company value. Elephant. This paper analyzes the equity incentive scheme of SUNING cloud merchants from the point of view of exercise index and exercise price. The main contribution of this paper is to dialectically analyze the impact of SUNING's equity incentive on corporate performance from both vertical and horizontal perspectives. On this basis, the paper analyzes the design elements of SUNING's equity incentive scheme in order to explain the deficiencies and points for attention in the design of the company's equity incentive scheme. To find out the key elements to give full play to the effectiveness of equity incentive, to provide reference and reference for other companies to make full use of the positive effect of equity incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F724.6

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