本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國中小板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀及其效應(yīng)研究　出處：《西北大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離導(dǎo)致委托代理問題的出現(xiàn),激化了股東和經(jīng)營者之間的利益矛盾,股權(quán)激勵(lì)通過給予經(jīng)營者部分公司股權(quán),將二者的目標(biāo)利益統(tǒng)-起來。西方國家的實(shí)踐證明股權(quán)激勵(lì)在降低公司代理成本、完善治理結(jié)構(gòu)、健全激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制、促進(jìn)企業(yè)長期價(jià)值創(chuàng)造、吸引和留住人才方面具有重要作用,并被視為有效解決委托代理問題的重要途徑和激勵(lì)管理人員的“金手銬”。隨著我國對股權(quán)激勵(lì)的不斷探索和中小企業(yè)的迅速崛起,大批中小企業(yè)紛紛加入股權(quán)激勵(lì)的大軍,由此引來理論界和實(shí)業(yè)界的廣泛關(guān)注和熱議。 那么,股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國中小企業(yè)的實(shí)施狀況究竟如何?在我國特殊的體制背景下能否促進(jìn)公司業(yè)績的提升和價(jià)值的創(chuàng)造?激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度與公司業(yè)績水平之間具有怎樣的效應(yīng)規(guī)律?本文在已有研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,針對上述問題提出三個(gè)假設(shè),選取2009-2011年披露并實(shí)施了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的中小上市公司作為研究樣本,分別進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。在對股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施狀況的研究中主要運(yùn)用經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析的方法得出定性結(jié)論；在對實(shí)施效果的研究中采用獨(dú)立樣本T檢驗(yàn)和配對樣本T檢驗(yàn)的方法,并運(yùn)用獨(dú)立樣本的非參數(shù)檢驗(yàn)考察了不同股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式的效應(yīng)差異；在對激勵(lì)水平與公司業(yè)績之間的效應(yīng)規(guī)律研究中通過構(gòu)建模型采用多元線性回歸分析的方法來揭示二者之間的相關(guān)性。 本文的研究結(jié)果表明：盡管中小公司對實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的熱衷度較高,但實(shí)施進(jìn)程卻不佳,因各種原因終止或撤銷的較多,在激勵(lì)方案的設(shè)計(jì)中普遍存在計(jì)劃有效期較短、激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度和水平不高、激勵(lì)條件的業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)過于單一等問題；股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施對于公司業(yè)績的提升具有一定的積極效應(yīng),激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度與公司業(yè)績之間存在較為顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系；股票期權(quán)與限制性股票兩種激勵(lì)模式對公司業(yè)績的影響差異不大。最后,根據(jù)本文的研究結(jié)論提出相關(guān)建議及展望。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management right of modern enterprise system leads to the emergence of principal-agent problem, which intensifies the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. The practice of western countries proves that equity incentive can reduce the agency cost, perfect the governance structure, perfect the incentive and restraint mechanism, and promote the long-term value creation of the enterprise. Attracting and retaining talent has an important role to play. It is regarded as an important way to solve the principal-agent problem effectively and "golden handcuffs" to motivate managers. With the continuous exploration of equity incentive and the rapid rise of small and medium-sized enterprises in China. A large number of small and medium-sized enterprises have joined the ranks of equity incentives, which has attracted wide attention and heated discussion in theoretical and business circles. So, what is the status of equity incentive in the implementation of small and medium-sized enterprises in China? Can we promote the promotion of corporate performance and the creation of value under the special institutional background of our country? What is the effect law between the incentive intensity and the performance level of the company? Based on the existing research results, this paper puts forward three hypotheses to solve the above problems, and selects the small and medium-sized listed companies which disclosed and implemented the equity incentive plan in 2009-2011 as the research sample. In the study of the implementation of equity incentive, we mainly use the method of empirical analysis to get the qualitative conclusion. The independent sample T test and matched sample T test are adopted in the study of the implementation effect, and the non-parametric test of independent sample is used to investigate the effects of different equity incentive modes. In the study of the effect law between incentive level and corporate performance, the correlation between incentive level and corporate performance is revealed by using the method of multiple linear regression analysis. The results of this paper show that: although small and medium-sized companies have a high enthusiasm for the implementation of equity incentives, but the implementation process is not good, because of a variety of reasons to terminate or withdraw more. In the design of incentive scheme, there are many problems, such as short period of validity, low intensity and level of incentive, too single performance evaluation index of incentive condition, etc. The implementation of equity incentive has a certain positive effect on the improvement of corporate performance, and there is a significant positive correlation between incentive intensity and corporate performance. There is little difference between the two incentive modes of stock option and restrictive stock. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, some suggestions and prospects are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.3;F272.92

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