中央和地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批動力機制及其差異
發(fā)布時間:2018-08-11 16:16
【摘要】:農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批是中國土地用途管制的重要制度安排,對控制農(nóng)地非農(nóng)化具有重要作用。通過構建中央和地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批動力機制的理論框架,并運用2000-2012年省級層面數(shù)據(jù)進行實證分析,揭示中央和地方農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批動力機制差異。結(jié)果表明,雖然中央和地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批均受到經(jīng)濟和財政等因素的共同驅(qū)動作用,但中央和地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批的資源管控機制和目標導向機制差異明顯?傮w上,中央政府傾向于嚴格遵守國家農(nóng)地管控規(guī)則進行審批,地方政府卻具有應對管制規(guī)則擴大審批規(guī)模的傾向。較之中央政府,地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批更容易受到區(qū)域耕地資源稟賦、土地利用比較效益和財政支出、收入等因素的影響。此外,中央和地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批動力還表現(xiàn)出東中西部之間的差異性。東部地區(qū)中央和地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批動力因素差異最明顯,西部地區(qū)次之,中部地區(qū)最不明顯。今后,應加強中央和地方政府在農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批上的分工合作,優(yōu)化中央與地方政府農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批權限,因地制宜地實施農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用審批管理措施,促進農(nóng)地轉(zhuǎn)用制度發(fā)揮作用。
[Abstract]:The examination and approval of farmland conversion is an important institutional arrangement of land use control in China, which plays an important role in controlling farmland conversion. By constructing the theoretical framework of the dynamic mechanism of the central and local governments' farmland conversion and approval, and using the provincial level data from 2000 to 2012 to carry out an empirical analysis, the paper reveals the difference between the central and local governments' dynamic mechanism of agricultural land conversion and approval. The results show that, although the central and local governments are driven by economic and financial factors, there are significant differences in the resource control mechanism and the goal-oriented mechanism between the central and local governments. On the whole, the central government tends to strictly abide by the national farmland control rules for examination and approval, but local governments have the tendency to respond to the regulatory rules to expand the scale of approval. Compared with the central government, the examination and approval of farmland conversion by the local government is more easily affected by the regional cultivated land resource endowment, the comparative benefit of land use, the financial expenditure, the income and so on. In addition, the power of central and local governments to approve the conversion of agricultural land also shows the differences between the east, the west and the west. The difference of the power factors of the central and local governments in the eastern region is the most obvious, followed by the western region, and the central region is the least obvious. In the future, it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation between the central and local governments in the examination and approval of farmland conversion, optimize the authority of the central and local governments to approve and approve the conversion of agricultural land, implement the management measures of farmland conversion examination and approval according to local conditions, and promote the farmland conversion system to play its role.
【作者單位】: 南京農(nóng)業(yè)大學公共管理學院;
【基金】:教育部哲學社會科學研究重大課題攻關項目(13JZD014) 2016年度江蘇高!扒嗨{工程”優(yōu)秀青年骨干教師培養(yǎng)計劃項目
【分類號】:F321.1
[Abstract]:The examination and approval of farmland conversion is an important institutional arrangement of land use control in China, which plays an important role in controlling farmland conversion. By constructing the theoretical framework of the dynamic mechanism of the central and local governments' farmland conversion and approval, and using the provincial level data from 2000 to 2012 to carry out an empirical analysis, the paper reveals the difference between the central and local governments' dynamic mechanism of agricultural land conversion and approval. The results show that, although the central and local governments are driven by economic and financial factors, there are significant differences in the resource control mechanism and the goal-oriented mechanism between the central and local governments. On the whole, the central government tends to strictly abide by the national farmland control rules for examination and approval, but local governments have the tendency to respond to the regulatory rules to expand the scale of approval. Compared with the central government, the examination and approval of farmland conversion by the local government is more easily affected by the regional cultivated land resource endowment, the comparative benefit of land use, the financial expenditure, the income and so on. In addition, the power of central and local governments to approve the conversion of agricultural land also shows the differences between the east, the west and the west. The difference of the power factors of the central and local governments in the eastern region is the most obvious, followed by the western region, and the central region is the least obvious. In the future, it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation between the central and local governments in the examination and approval of farmland conversion, optimize the authority of the central and local governments to approve and approve the conversion of agricultural land, implement the management measures of farmland conversion examination and approval according to local conditions, and promote the farmland conversion system to play its role.
【作者單位】: 南京農(nóng)業(yè)大學公共管理學院;
【基金】:教育部哲學社會科學研究重大課題攻關項目(13JZD014) 2016年度江蘇高!扒嗨{工程”優(yōu)秀青年骨干教師培養(yǎng)計劃項目
【分類號】:F321.1
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