發(fā)布時間：2018-01-07 04:41

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效關(guān)系實證研究　出處：《西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司 高管薪酬 企業(yè)績效 相關(guān)性研究

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)最顯著的特征之一就是“兩權(quán)(即所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán))分離”,所有權(quán)和剩余索取權(quán)歸所有者,而企業(yè)的經(jīng)營控制權(quán)歸管理者。這種情況一方面可以提高企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益,但是所帶來的副產(chǎn)物——“委托——代理”問題也隨之產(chǎn)生。我國是一個農(nóng)業(yè)大國,農(nóng)業(yè)的發(fā)展關(guān)系著國家的長治久安和廣大百姓的幸福生活。從生態(tài)和可持續(xù)發(fā)展的角度來看,現(xiàn)代農(nóng)業(yè)的發(fā)展是必然的結(jié)果,而農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司作為現(xiàn)代農(nóng)業(yè)的先進(jìn)代表,是帶動現(xiàn)代農(nóng)業(yè)推廣,帶動農(nóng)業(yè)增產(chǎn)增收的重要組織形式。但是目前我國農(nóng)業(yè)類上市公司數(shù)量仍然數(shù)量較少,而且在上市公司中競爭力較弱,研究農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效之間的關(guān)系,一方面可以規(guī)范高管薪酬的激勵機(jī)制,另一方面也可以提高企業(yè)績效,為農(nóng)業(yè)現(xiàn)代化的發(fā)展做出更大貢獻(xiàn)。本文以委托代理理論、激勵理論、人力資本理論、公司治理理論為指導(dǎo)理論,以我國農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬和企業(yè)績效為研究對象,通過對前人的研究成果進(jìn)行整理總結(jié),對二者之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行理論推演并提出研究假設(shè),研究方法采用規(guī)范研究法和實證分析法相結(jié)合。使用農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬前三名總額均值的對數(shù)作為高管薪酬的衡量指標(biāo),使用熵值法對每股收益、凈資產(chǎn)收益率、總資產(chǎn)收益率建立企業(yè)績效綜合指標(biāo),同時引入公司規(guī)模、高管持股比例、董事長和總經(jīng)理兼任情況、高管學(xué)歷背景、高管任職時長、監(jiān)事會規(guī)模作為回歸模型的控制變量,建立面板數(shù)據(jù)的回歸模型。通過實證研究,本文得出以下幾點結(jié)論:(1)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)綜合績效存在顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系;(2)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)規(guī)模、高管持股比例、高管學(xué)歷背景之間存在顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系;(3)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與董事長總經(jīng)理兼任情況之間存在顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系;(4)農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與其任職時長之間無顯著性關(guān)系。因此本文分別從委托人和代理人兩方面提出幾點管理意見:(1)對于委托人來說,需要采取多種正向激勵手段來激發(fā)代理人的積極性,為農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的長期發(fā)展付出更大的努力;(2)代理人需要從自身素質(zhì)抓起,提升自身知識、經(jīng)驗水平,在提升企業(yè)績效的同時能夠獲取更高的薪酬。
[Abstract]:One of the most prominent features of modern enterprises is the separation of two rights (that is, ownership and management), and the ownership and residual claim belong to the owner. On the one hand, this situation can improve the economic benefits of enterprises, but the by-product-"principal-agent" problem also arises. China is a large agricultural country. The development of agriculture is related to the long-term stability of the country and the happy life of the people. From the perspective of ecological and sustainable development, the development of modern agriculture is an inevitable result. As an advanced representative of modern agriculture, agricultural listed companies are an important organizational form to promote modern agricultural extension and increase agricultural production and income. But at present, the number of agricultural listed companies in China is still relatively small. And the competitiveness of listed companies is weak, the study of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of agricultural listed companies, on the one hand, can regulate the incentive mechanism of executive compensation, on the other hand, it can also improve corporate performance. This paper is guided by principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital theory and corporate governance theory. Taking the executive compensation and enterprise performance of agricultural listed companies in China as the research object, this paper summarizes the previous research results, deduces the relationship between them theoretically and puts forward the research hypothesis. Using the logarithm of the top three average of executive compensation of agricultural listed companies as the measure index of executive compensation, entropy method is used to measure earnings per share. Net asset return, total return on assets to establish a comprehensive index of corporate performance, at the same time introducing the company size, executive shareholding ratio, chairman and general manager of the situation, executive education background, executive tenure. As the control variable of the regression model, the scale of the board of supervisors is used to establish the regression model of panel data. This paper draws the following conclusions: 1) there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance in agricultural listed companies; (2) there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and enterprise size, the proportion of executive stock ownership, and the educational background of senior executives in agricultural listed companies; 3) there is a significant negative correlation between the executive compensation of agricultural listed companies and the concurrent appointment of the chairman of the board of directors; 4) there is no significant relationship between the executive compensation and the length of service of agricultural listed companies. Therefore, this paper puts forward several management opinions from the two aspects of principal and agent respectively. A variety of positive incentives should be adopted to stimulate the enthusiasm of agents and make greater efforts for the long-term development of agricultural listed companies. 2) agents need to improve their knowledge and experience level from their own quality, so that they can get higher salary while improving enterprise performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F324;F272.92;F272.5

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